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Introduction
The crucial role of money and the financial system in our economy and daily 
lives was never more visible than in the global financial crisis of 2007-09. It
was a financial shock that started within the financial market in one country on 
one continent but rapidly spread to other industries, other countries and other 
continents; impacting not only global financial markets but also the real 
economy and the common man. 
In the aftermath, it became evident that the crisis was not the outcome of a 
singular activity or event but was the consequence of numerous weaknesses 
within the global financial architecture. The web of financial linkages 
connecting financial markets and institutions locally as well as globally 
combined to result in a global and systemic financial shock. While weak 
corporate governance structures and the presence of government guarantees
contributed to the chaos, financial innovation and its use in financial markets 
also played a significant role in the crisis.
A key financial innovation was securitized banking – the use of securitized 
instruments as collateral in repo transactions, which allowed financial 
institutions to borrow money from each other for very short periods of time, 
usually overnight or a few days.1 Securitized instruments (called asset-backed 
securities) are the outcome of the process of securitisation, which packages 
numerous bank assets, mostly loans, to create privately issued securities with 
varying levels of credit quality. Besides the risk management and diversification 
benefits of securitisation, it catered to the rising demand from investors and 
financial markets for privately issued safe collateral.2 Securitized instruments 
with high credit ratings represented high credit quality and hence, these
securities were perceived to be safe by all market participants.3 Consequently, 
                                                          
1 See chapter 1, section 1.1.1 for an explanation of a repo transaction.
2 Scholars acknowledging the rising demand for privately issued collateral include Gary Gorton 
and Andrew Metrick, ‘Regulating the Shadow Banking System’ (2010) 2010 Brookings Papers 
on Economic Activity 261; Nicola Gennaioli, Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny, ‘Neglected 
Risks, Financial Innovation, and Financial Fragility’ (2012) 104 Journal of Financial Economics 
452; Andrei Shleifer and Robert W Vishny, ‘Unstable Banking’ (2010) 97 Journal of Financial 
Economics 306; Viral V. Acharya and Matthew Richardson, ‘Causes of the Financial Crisis’ 
(2009) 21 Critical Review: Journal of Politics and Society 195; Gary Gorton and Andrew 
Metrick, ‘Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo’ (2012) 104 Journal of Financial 
Economics 425.
3 Gennaioli, Shleifer and Vishny, ‘Neglected Risks, Financial Innovation, and Financial 
Fragility’.
  
2
these high-grade securitized instruments were considered as good substitutes 
for traditional securities (i.e. treasury and government securities), encouraging 
their use as collateral in financial transactions. 
Although commercial banks have traditionally been involved in repo markets 
as lenders, in the years preceding the crisis, they have expanded their role as 
borrowers and are known to be increasingly involved in securitized banking for 
short-term funding.4 Since repo borrowing is extremely short-term and between 
financial institutions, it provides commercial banks with a cheaper source of 
short-term funding than interest-bearing retail deposits. Using privately issued 
securitized instruments created from banks’ assets as collateral in repo markets, 
banks were able to develop a new source of borrowing where the creditors were 
financial institutions and not traditional depositors. Thus, securitized banking 
became analogous to a money machine for banks, providing them with an 
additional source of short-term funding (besides deposits) using privately issued 
securities which created a private liquidity cycle for banks and therefore, 
increased liquidity in financial markets.5
Motivation and Contribution
Post-crisis, bank involvement in securitized banking has gained considerable 
attention and is claimed to be one of the main sources of the crisis.6 While 
greater capital and liquidity of financial intermediaries can be beneficial for 
financial market stability, private liquidity creation can create instability and 
expose the financial system to risks from excessive leverage and liquidity.7 This 
was evident in the recent crisis, which illustrated the financial fragility and 
                                                          
4 Shleifer and Vishny, ‘Unstable Banking’; Jeremy C Stein, ‘Monetary Policy as Financial 
Stability Regulation’ (2012) 127 The Quarterly Journal of Economics 57; Gorton and Metrick, 
‘Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo’; VV Acharya and others, ‘Manufacturing Tail Risk: 
A Perspective on the Financial Crisis of 2007–2009’ (2010) 4 Foundations and Trends® in 
Finance 247; Financial Stability Board, ‘Securities Lending and Reposௗ: Market Overview and 
Financial Stability Issues’ (2012); Arvind Krishnamurthy, Stefan Nagel and Dmitry Orlov, 
‘Sizing Up Repo’ (2014) 69 The Journal of Finance 2381.    
5 M Odenbach, ‘Mortgage Securitization: What Are the Drivers and Constraints from an 
Originator’s Perspective (Basel I/Basel II)?’ (2002) 17 Housing Finance International 52; Gary 
Gorton and Andrew Metrick, ‘Securitization’ [2012] NBER Working Paper No. 18611; Gorton 
and Metrick, ‘Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo’.
6 Gorton and Metrick, ‘Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo’; Peter Hördahl and Michael 
R King, ‘Developments in Repo Markets during the Financial Turmoil’ [2008] BIS Quarterly; 
Gary Gorton and Andrew Metrick, ‘Who Ran on Repo?’ [2012] NBER working paper no.
18455.      
7 See chapter 2, section 2.2.
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negative externalities from private liquidity creation through securitized 
banking. Current literature recognizes the harmful social welfare effects from 
such private liquidity creation and questions whether all creation of private 
money by the banking system is desirable.8 Although securitized banking might 
be a recent development, the underlying vulnerabilities are similar to other 
forms of short-term debt, akin to traditional banking.
Bank regulation aims to internalize the social costs of potential bank failures, 
which can exert sizeable negative externalities on the financial system when 
individual bank failure spreads to other financial institutions, financial markets 
and eventually, the entire economy. The Basel Accords are globally accepted 
standards for bank regulation, which essentially provide guidelines and 
recommendations of best practice for national authorities to implement in their 
legislation. These standards predominantly impose capital requirements on
banks, which aims to restrict the build-up of leverage and constrain bank
balance sheets by requiring a minimum level of equity.
The crisis highlighted the shortcomings of the global financial regulatory 
framework and the failure of banks and regulators to incorporate the possible 
risks from securitized banking in capital regulation. Regulation that aimed to 
internalize the social costs of potential bank failures was now considered to be 
inadequate in fully incorporating the true risk of banks’ activities and 
overlooked regulatory capital arbitrage.9 The criticism has been primarily 
focused on the presence of regulatory arbitrage to reduce capital requirements 
through asset securitisation. However, the role of the Basel Accords in 
encouraging bank involvement in securitized banking, which utilizes the 
securitisation output, has been overlooked. 
The dissertation firstly contributes to the current literature by identifying the 
presence of regulatory arbitrage for securitized banking in the Basel Accords. 
In this regard, it analyses the incentives for securitized banking in the preceding 
                                                          
8 Gennaioli, Shleifer and Vishny, ‘Neglected Risks, Financial Innovation, and Financial 
Fragility’; Shleifer and Vishny, ‘Unstable Banking’; Stein (2012).
9 F Vallascas and J Hagendorff, ‘The Risk Sensitivity of Capital Requirements: Evidence from 
an International Sample of Large Banks’ (2013) 17 Review of Finance 1947; Gerard Caprio, 
Asli Demirgü-Kunt and Edward J Kane, ‘The 2007 Meltdown in Structured Securitization: 
Searching for Lessons, Not Scapegoats’ (2010) 25 The World Bank Research Observer 125; 
Anat R Admati; and others, ‘Fallacies, Irrelevant Facts, and Myths in the Discussion of Capital 
Regulation: Why Bank Equity Is Not Socially Expensive’ [2013] Max Planck Institute for 
Research on Collective Goods 2013/23; Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford 
University Working Paper No. 161; Stanford University Graduate School of Business Research 
Paper No. 13-7; Acharya and Richardson (2009).
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Basel Accords and assesses the effectiveness of the current regulatory regime, 
Basel III, in regulating securitized banking. Additionally, majority of the current 
literature is restricted to arbitrage opportunities provided by the internal model 
approach for capital calculations, which allowed banks to use their in-house risk 
models to determine capital requirements. Most prominently, Hellwig identifies 
banks’ use of their internal models, permitted since the Market Risk 
Amendment of the Basel regime, as the main source of regulatory arbitrage.10
A further contribution of this dissertation is to extend the investigation from the 
internal model approach and shed light on the fact that even the simpler 
standardised methodology for capital calculations, designed to be more 
stringent, had inherent significant adverse incentives for banks to engage in 
securitized banking.
Secondly, the dissertation contributes by focusing on Emerging Economies
(EMEs). The Basel Accords are soft law and thus, not legally binding unless 
implemented by national authorities in their legislation. These Accords are 
formulated by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), which 
was set up to promote convergence of international banking standards by 
proposing guidelines and recommendations of best practice for national 
authorities. While the Basel Accords were solely formulated and intended for 
BCBS member states, these standards became the benchmark for financial 
regulation worldwide and were transposed into national laws of member and 
non-member states, hence applied to banks worldwide. The global 
implementation of the Basel Accords implies that the regulatory arbitrage 
opportunities and incentives inherent in these Accords would be present in all 
financial markets. After the crisis, majority of the research regarding securitized 
banking focuses on advanced economies as they are key participants in global 
financial markets and thus, research involving EMEs is still in its infancy.
This contributes to the scant research that exists on the international dimension 
of securitized banking, specifically in EMEs, to evaluate the similarities and 
assess the differences in national implementation of the Basel Accords. The 
objective will be to identify the arbitrage opportunities which might be 
transposed with Basel implementation and encourage the development of 
securitized banking similar to that preceding the crisis. The aim is to highlight 
that countries implementing the Basel Accords also transpose the adverse 
incentives inherent in these Accords, encouraging similar bank behaviour and 
                                                          
10 Martin F Hellwig, ‘Systemic Risk in the Financial Sector: An Analysis of the Subprime-
Mortgage Financial Crisis’ (2009) 157 De Economist 129 p. 44.
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hence, both Basel Committee member and non-member states are similarly 
affected by Basel implementation. 
While majority of the dissertation centres on the previous Basel Accords, the 
last part will provide a policy-level contribution by focusing on the current
regulatory regime – Basel III. This will be the third contribution of the 
dissertation, which will assess the incentives for securitized banking in the Basel 
III Accord and provide policy implications to address whether the existing 
regulatory framework should be reformed. This will contribute to the current 
policy setting and be informative for policy-level decision makers in all 
countries, as it will allow them to weigh the benefits and drawbacks of Basel III 
implementation for securitized banking and its impact on their banking sectors. 
Problem Statement and Research Questions
The inability of regulators to incorporate the possible risks from securitized 
banking in regulation imposed significant negative externalities on other 
financial institutions, and on society. The risks from bank reliance on short-term 
funding through securitized banking should have been accounted for in capital 
regulation, for banks to have sufficient equity cushion to absorb losses in case 
of a financial shock.
Post-crisis, the global regulatory framework has also been criticized for 
overlooking regulatory capital arbitrage, which refers to strategies by which 
regulated financial institutions evade capital requirements. The presence of 
regulatory capital arbitrage has been identified as a contributory factor towards 
the build-up of systemic risk in the recent crisis, emanating from highly 
leveraged financial institutions backed by insufficient equity.11
The dissertation assesses the role of international capital regulation – the Basel 
Accords, in encouraging bank involvement in securitized banking. It focuses on 
the presence of any regulatory capital arbitrage that would incentivise banks to 
engage in securitized banking. The dissertation aims to answer the overarching 
question: “What is the role of the Basel Accords in encouraging bank 
involvement in securitized banking?” 
                                                          
11 VV Acharya and others, ‘Market Failures and Regulatory Failures: Lessons from Past and 
Present Financial Crises’ [2011] ADBI Working Paper Series no. 264 41; Acharya and 
Richardson (2009); A Admati and M Hellwig, The Bankers’ New Clothes: What’s Wrong with 
Banking and What to Do about It (Princeton University Press 2014).
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In this regard, the dissertation firstly aims to assess the incentives inherent in 
the Basel Accords to identify the presence (or absence) of regulatory arbitrage 
for securitized banking. This relates to the first contribution i.e. assessing the 
role of the Basel Accords in encouraging bank involvement in securitized 
banking. The assessment of the Basel Accords starts with Chapters 3 and 4, 
focusing on the pre-crisis and post-crisis Basel Accords respectively, to 
examine the incentives for securitized banking. These chapters answer the 
following sub-research questions:  
Chapter 3: “Did the pre-crisis Basel Accords incentivise banks to engage in 
securitized banking?” 
Chapter 4: “Did the post-crisis regulatory response strengthen the capital 
requirements for securitized banking?”
To assess the impact of global Basel implementation and investigate the 
international dimension of securitized banking, Chapter 5 answers the sub-
research question: 
“Were the incentives inherent in the Basel Accords for securitized banking 
transposed in all countries that implemented them, specifically Emerging 
Economies?”
Lastly, Chapter 6 examines the current regulatory framework – Basel III, to 
answer the sub-research question:
“Has the current regulation resolved the deficiencies inherent in the preceding 
Basel Accords for securitized banking and does it continue to provide incentives 
for banks to engage in securitized banking?”
Methodology
The dissertation belongs to the area of financial regulation and follows a law 
and economics approach, specifically focusing on the economics of regulation 
to evaluate the incentives inherent in banking regulation. In this regard, chapter 
2 provides an overview of the relevant theoretical economic framework. The 
dissertation does not exclusively focus on a specific research methodology but 
uses several methodologies to effectively answer the research questions. First,
to examine the incentives inherent in bank regulation, chapters 3, 4 and 5 
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conduct a legal analysis of the Basel Accords to assess the specific standards 
applicable to banks and evaluate how they impact bank behaviour. Secondly, to 
evaluate the international dimension of bank regulation and bank behaviour, 
chapter 5 also conducts a comparative legal analysis of the implementation of 
regulation within two EMEs. Thirdly, these chapters also employ an empirical 
approach, where descriptive empirics are used to provide data trends to support 
the theoretical findings of the legal analysis. 
Structure of Dissertation 
The remainder of the dissertation is structured as follows. 
The first two chapters provide a theoretical overview of securitized banking and 
summarize the current literature in this regard. Chapter 1 focuses on the 
functioning and motivation behind bank involvement in securitized banking. It 
provides an overview of the repo transaction, the process of securitisation and 
how these combined to develop a new kind of money-like instrument through 
securitized banking. Chapter 2 highlights the key literature relevant for this 
dissertation and thus, focuses exclusively on securitized banking and its role in 
the crisis. The chapter centres on the negative externalities from private liquidity 
creation through securitized banking, which provides grounds for legal 
intervention through bank regulation to internalize the social costs of potential 
bank failures. In this regard, this chapter further elaborates on the shortcomings 
of the financial regulatory framework visible in the aftermath of the crisis. 
These chapters are followed by an analysis of the preceding Basel Accords to 
evaluate the role of regulation in incentivising bank involvement in securitized 
banking. Chapter 3 is an analysis of the pre-crisis Basel Accords (Basel I and 
the Market Risk Amendment) to identify the presence of regulatory arbitrage 
and adverse incentives for bank involvement in securitized banking. Chapter 4
focuses on the post-crisis Basel Accords (Basel II and Basel 2.5) to assess the 
effectiveness of the immediate post-crisis regulatory response in eliminating the 
arbitrage opportunities inherent in the pre-crisis Basel Accords. The objective 
of both chapters is to compare the capital requirements for securitized banking
under the two balance sheet dimensions (the banking book and the trading book)
to identify the presence (or absence) of any regulatory capital arbitrage.
Following these analytical chapters, Chapter 5 focuses on the implementation 
of the Basel Accords in EMEs to evaluate the similarities and differences in 
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Basel implementation within these countries. The aim is to determine whether 
national implementation and trends in bank behaviour in EMEs conforms to the 
theoretical conclusions of the preceding chapters. Chapter 6 sheds light on the 
current Basel regime (Basel III) to evaluate its effectiveness in eliminating the 
previous adverse incentives for bank involvement in securitized banking. 
Additionally, the chapter assesses whether the current Basel regime continues 
to incentivise banks to engage in securitized banking and provides policy 
implications to address whether current regulatory framework should be 
redesigned or reformed more effectively. 
The dissertation concludes with a summary of the research findings and 
provides recommendations for future research. 
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Chapter 1
 
Repo Markets, Securitisation and Securitized 
Banking
The global financial crisis brought to attention the hidden evolution of banking, 
which had transformed in several ways.        
Deregulation and liberalization removed barriers between banks’ lending and 
investment activities, allowing them to undertake an array of financial activities, 
both for the customer and themselves; a model that is called universal banking.12
This was a crucial development, which not only blurred the line between 
banking and its activities but also supported high global interconnectedness due 
to growing cross-border financial activities and financial innovation. These 
global linkages made integrated financial markets highly susceptible to a 
contagion in case of a crisis. There has also been a considerable change in the 
financial landscape, where borrowers and lenders have shifted towards market-
based financing, in which financial markets play a more significant role than 
banks for financial intermediation. Financial innovation has been the main 
factor in driving this move away from traditional bank-based markets, providing 
cheaper alternatives for borrowers and higher investment returns for lenders. 
‘…a financial innovation represents something new that reduces costs, reduces 
risks, or provides an improved product/service/instrument that better satisfies 
participants' demands.’13
In the years before the crisis, financial innovation supported the development of
numerous financial instruments such as credit-default swaps, asset-backed
securities and asset-backed commercial paper, derivatives, options and 
collateralized debt obligations. These instruments not only fulfilled market 
demand but also became valuable risk sharing instruments for market 
participants. One such innovation was securitized banking, a new kind of 
                                                          
12 For a detailed overview of universal banking and its contribution to the crisis, see AE 
Wilmarth, ‘The Dark Side of Universal Banking: Financial Conglomerates and the Origins of 
the Subprime Financial Crisis’ (2009) 41 Connecticut Law Review.
13 :6FRWW)UDPHDQG/DZUHQFH-:KLWHµ(PSLULFDO6WXGLHVRI)LQDQFLDO,QQRYDWLRQௗ/RWVRI
7DON/LWWOH$FWLRQௗ"¶-RXUQDORI(FRQRPLF/LWHUDWXUH p. 118.
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money-like instrument which was a form of debt, short-term and was backed by 
banks’ assets.14 This became the new medium of exchange and an additional 
source of banks’ short-term debt, but the creditors were financial institutions 
and not traditional depositors. Nonetheless, this innovation had its drawbacks 
as it obscured the lines of banking for regulators, who were not aware which 
firms were banks and what debt was money, as securitized banking had become 
an important form of money.15
Banks are known to have been increasingly involved in securitized banking 
prior to the crisis, using securitized instruments (i.e. asset-backed securities) as 
collateral in repo markets.16 It was a fundamental change in banks’ traditional 
maturity transformation, allowing them to utilise previously illiquid loans into 
a new source of funding. Consequently, securitized banking became an 
additional source of short-term funding (besides deposits) for banks created 
from privately issued securities, providing a new avenue for banks’ private 
liquidity creation. Post-crisis, this bank involvement in securitized banking has 
gained considerable attention as one of the main sources of the recent crisis.17
This chapter provides an overview of the repo transaction and how it developed 
into a new kind of money-like instrument through securitized banking. The 
chapter begins with the repo transaction as an important instrument for short-
term financing, followed by an outline of the process of securitisation that was 
the critical step for the innovation of securitized banking. The last section 
focuses on securitized banking and how it developed as an additional source of 
banks’ short-term funding. 
                                                          
14 Gorton and Metrick, ‘Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo’.
15 Gary B Gorton, Misunderstanding Financial Crises: Why We Don’t See Them Coming
(Oxford University Press 2012); Gorton and Metrick, ‘Securitized Banking and the Run on
Repo’.
16 Shleifer and Vishny, ‘Unstable Banking’; Stein (2012); Gorton and Metrick, ‘Securitized 
Banking and the Run on Repo’ (2014); Acharya and others, ‘Manufacturing Tail Risk: A 
Perspective on the Financial Crisis of 2007–2009’; Financial Stability Board, ‘Securities 
/HQGLQJDQG5HSRVௗ0DUNHWOverview and Financial Stability Issues’; Krishnamurthy, Nagel 
and Orlov (2014).
17 Gorton and Metrick, ‘Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo’; Hördahl and King (2008); 
Gorton and Metrick, ‘Who Ran on Repo?’
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1.1. Repo Markets
Repo is a multi-trillion dollar market and has been described as the core of the 
financial system, providing a vital source of liquidity and short-term 
financing.18 Since 2002, repo markets have doubled in size, with outstanding 
gross amounts at year-end 2007 of approximately $10 trillion in both US and 
EU repo markets, with an additional $11 trillion in UK markets.19 Moreover, 
repo markets are known to have grown globally at an average annual rate of 25 
percent between 2001 and 2007.20
The repo market is an important part of the larger money market, a source of 
short-term liquidity for borrowers, with financial transaction maturity less than 
one year and assets that can be readily converted to cash. Repo operates as a 
deposit market, where market participants deposit large sums of money for very 
short-term periods, usually overnight or a few days. Market participants include 
financial institutions and non-financial firms, with commercial and investment 
banks being the largest participants.21 Central banks are also key participants in 
repo markets, using it to implement monetary policy by intervening in money 
markets to impact money supply. During normal market conditions, the scale of 
central bank repos as compared to repos between other market participants is 
relatively small.22
Repos have been used by financial institutions since the 1980s in the United 
States, primarily driven by the needs of securities firms (broker-dealers and 
investment banks) to fund long positions in securities acquired for trading 
purposes.23 As these institutions lacked access to retail or interbank deposits, 
their primary source of funding was restricted to unsecured markets including 
                                                          
18 Gorton, Misunderstanding Financial Crises: Why We Don’t See Them Coming; Gorton and 
Metrick, ‘Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo’.
19 Hördahl and King (2008), p. 37.
20 Gorton and Metrick, ‘Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo’; Hördahl and King (2008);
Gary Gorton and Andrew Metrick, ‘Who Ran on Repo?’ citing International Capital Market 
Association (ICMA) repo survey. 
21 Gorton, Misunderstanding Financial Crises: Why We Don’t See Them Coming; Gorton and 
Metrick, ‘Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo’.
22 Euroclear and Richard Comotto, Understanding Repos and the Repo Markets (2009).
23 Gorton and Metrick, ‘Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo’; Hördahl and King (2008);
Gorton and Metrick, ‘Who Ran on Repo?’ See also, European Repo Council, ‘A White Paper 
on the Operation of the European Repo Market, the Role of Short-Selling, the Problem of 
Settlement Failures and the Need for Reform of the Market Infrastructure’ (2010); KTW Ong 
and EYC Yeung, ‘Repos & Securities Lending: The Accounting Arbitrage and Their Role in 
the Global Financial Crisis’ (2011) 6 Capital Markets Law Journal 92.
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loans and issuing commercial paper.24 The main financiers in these markets 
were commercial banks, providing funds at high costs due to the highly 
leveraged and risky nature of securities firms. Repo offered a form of secured 
financing, as the presence of collateral mitigates lender’s risk and also 
eliminates the need for commercial banks as intermediaries by providing 
borrowers with direct access to lenders.25 This lowered the cost of borrowing 
for securities firms, allowing them to access a cheaper source of funding and 
increase their level of leverage.  
Consequently, repo became the primary source of funding for securities firms 
and other highly leveraged institutions, including hedge funds. Although 
commercial banks have traditionally been involved in repo transactions as 
lenders, over the last few decades, they have expanded their role as borrowers. 
This bank borrowing through repo has also provided commercial banks with a 
cheaper source of short-term funding than interest-bearing retail deposits.
1.1.1. The Repurchase Agreement – Repo
The repo transaction is a repurchase agreement, where one party sells securities 
for cash with a simultaneous agreement to repurchase these securities at a 
specific price at an agreed date in the future. The seller of securities borrows 
cash and holds a repo or a sale and repurchase agreement and is called the repo 
seller. The buyer of securities lends cash and holds a reverse repo or a purchase 
and resale agreement and is called the repo buyer. The remainder of this 
dissertation will use repo seller/borrower and repo buyer/lender 
interchangeably, unless stated otherwise.26
A repo transaction essentially consists of two transactions, the sale of securities 
and the repurchase of the same. In the first, the borrower sells securities to the 
lender and agrees to buy it back at an agreed date and price, classifying it as a 
‘repo’. The lender agrees to resell the same or equivalent securities at the agreed 
upon price and date, classifying it as a ‘reverse repo’. The second transaction is 
the repurchase of securities, where the borrower purchases the securities with 
                                                          
24 Euroclear and Comotto (2009).
25 ibid.
26 This focus on the lending and borrowing of cash is taken in accordance with the motivation 
of this dissertation, which focuses on the use of repo transactions as a source of short-term 
funding, rather than to fulfil short positions in securities.
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cash to repay the debt. The agreed upon repurchase price is higher than the 
purchase price (i.e. the amount of cash received by the borrower) to reflect the 
interest rate on the transaction. This predetermined interest rate represents the 
cost of borrowing and is called the repo rate.
A typical repo transaction between two parties is illustrated in the figure below: 
Figure 1: Repo Transaction 
(a) Sale – Initiation
(b) Repurchase – Maturity (2 days later)
The hypothetical scenario represents the repo seller (borrower) selling securities 
with a market price of 100 euros for 95 euros and agrees to repurchase them for 
95.01 in 2 days. The agreed repurchase price implies a repo rate of 2% (quoted 
on an annualized basis), representing the interest rate for this transaction.27 The 
securities sold represent the underlying collateral, which usually has a haircut 
(or initial margin) that indicates the lender’s perceived risk of the collateral.
These haircuts vary for different asset classes and credit ratings, with low 
haircuts for highly rated and less risky collateral.28 In the scenario above, the 
haircut is 5%, which limits the repo seller to borrow less than the market value 
of the underlying collateral. This overcollateralization reduces credit risk for the 
                  
27 Repurchase price = Purchase price (1 + repo rate) = 95 {1+ 2% (2/365)} = 95.01 euros.
28 Bank for International Settlements, ‘Implications of Repo Markets for Central Banks’ (1999); 
European Repo Council (2010).
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repo buyer, as he will have to sell collateral on the market if the repo seller fails 
to repay the borrowed funds i.e. buyback the securities. 
In essence, this repo transaction is a collateralised loan to borrow 95 euros for 
2 days at an interest rate of 2%. However, the collateral is not pledged but sold 
and repurchased at maturity. The sale of collateral represents a transfer of 
ownership as the legal title to the collateral passes to the lender, increasing his 
control and thus, reducing credit risk. On the other hand, based on economic 
substance, the seller retains the risk and return of the collateral.29 This makes 
repo an ideal financing tool for the borrower, allowing him to take long
positions in assets and simultaneously finance the purchase by using them as 
collateral in repo, while continuing to receive asset return.  
An important feature of repo transactions is that they can be renewed without 
any additional contractual obligations. As repo transactions are short-term, not 
lasting for longer than two weeks, the lender can withdraw money simply by 
failing to renew or roll over the transaction at maturity.30 Additionally, repo is 
analogous to a deposit system since the lending party can withdraw some funds 
by renewing the transaction at a higher haircut (Figure 2).31
Figure 2: Repo – rolled over but with a higher haircut
(a) Post additional collateral
                  
29 Euroclear and Comotto (2009).
30 ibid.
31 ibid. See also Bank for International Settlements (1999); European Repo Council (2010).
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(b) Reduce borrowing
Although the repo transaction is rolled over (renewed), the lender has now 
increased the haircut from 5% to 20%, perhaps due to a change in the market 
value or an increase in the lender’s perceived riskiness of collateral. The 
borrower can respond firstly, by posting more collateral to preserve the same 
level of funding. As shown in Figure 2(a), the borrower will have to post 
additional collateral worth 18.75 euros, the lender now in possession of 
collateral with a market value of 118.75 euros. Another alternative to fulfil the 
increased haircut requirement would be for the borrower to reduce the amount 
of funding. Figure 2(b) illustrates this scenario, where the borrower can now 
raise less funds than before with the same underlying collateral, since the 
increased haircut reduces the amount of funding by 15 euros. The borrower can 
repay 15 euros to the lender and reduce its total borrowing to 80 euros to 
maintain the higher haircut of 20%. 
Therefore, in case of an increase in haircut, the lender has the right to claim 
additional funds or collateral from the borrower and withdraw funding. This is 
analogous to withdrawing from a bank deposit, except that this is not between 
a depositor and a bank but between financial institutions.32
1.1.2. The importance of collateral and counterparty 
1.1.2.1. Collateral as a risk mitigant
Collateral is the main element that hedges the lenders’ credit risk in a repo 
transaction, providing protection against both, counterparty and collateral issuer 
default.33 This makes repo attractive for lenders, since the underlying collateral 
                  
32 Euroclear and Comotto (2009).
33 ibid.
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acts as an insurance for the lender in case of default i.e. if the repo seller 
(borrower) is unable to buy back the securities. In this instance, the transfer of 
collateral ownership plays an important role, as it gives the lender the right to 
liquidate collateral in the market to recover funds. Therefore, accurate collateral 
valuation is crucial for the repo buyer as insufficient collateral increases the 
transaction’s credit risk. In the same manner, collateral valuation is also vital 
for the borrower since excessive collateralization limits the borrower’s ability 
to access greater funding. Thus, accurate collateral valuation at initiation and 
duration of the repo contract is essential for both parties.34
Liquidity of the underlying collateral i.e. the ability and price at which the lender 
can sell collateral in the market, is critical for valuation. Collateral value varies 
with the degree of liquidity and is dependent on characteristics of the underlying 
security.35 For example, traditional collateral such as government securities 
issued by sovereigns of high credit standing are considered to be default free 
and very liquid. These characteristics support an active market for these 
securities, allowing market participants to appropriately value them and 
determine their market price. Consequently, majority of collateral used in repo 
markets is government bonds since their characteristics can be easily 
incorporated in market prices and can be seen as a benchmark for valuation.36
Non-government securities or alternative forms of collateral with complex 
characteristics and low liquidity can limit valuation accuracy and the ability of 
these securities to be used as collateral. 
The subject of collateral liquidity and valuation should also incorporate the 
negative impact from adverse market conditions, which can render even high 
quality collateral illiquid when distorted market prices make market participants 
unwilling to trade. This undermines the role of collateral as a risk mitigant for 
the lender, as adverse market conditions can limit the ability to liquidate 
collateral and recover funds. The repo instrument safeguards the lender against 
these issues by requiring an initial margin (or haircut) and regular margin 
maintenance (margin call).37 As the lender is giving the more liquid asset (i.e. 
cash), the initial margin protects him from changes in price due to inaccurate 
collateral valuation or market movements. Additionally, margin maintenance 
ensures consistent presence of sufficient collateral to minimise lender’s credit 
                                                          
34 ibid.
35 ibid. See also GB Gorton and A Metrick, ‘Haircuts’ [2009] NBER Working Paper No. 15273.
36 Euroclear and Comotto (2009).
37 TV Dang, Gary Gorton and Bengt Holmström, ‘Haircuts and Repo Chains’ [2013] Columbia 
University; Gorton and Metrick, ‘Haircuts’.
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risk. In the instance that market prices fall below the initial margin or the issuer 
of collateral defaults, the lender has the right to make a margin call, requiring 
the borrower to place additional collateral or reduce credit exposure. 
The initial margin (haircut) is the difference between the market value of the 
collateral and its purchase price in the repo market. The haircut serves as a 
buffer for the lender against a fall in collateral value if the lender has to liquidate 
the collateral in case of borrower default.38 In the simple repo transaction in 
Figure 1(a), the securities worth 100 euros in the market are being sold for 95 
euros in the repo market, representing a haircut of 5%. In case of default, the 
haircut protects the lender from liquidating the securities at a market price 
between 95 and 100 euros i.e. even if the price of the collateral falls by 5%, the 
lender can still recover the loaned funds.  
The level of haircut is dependent on (i) characteristics of the collateral 
(illiquidity, complexity, demand and price volatility), (ii) credit worthiness of 
the counterparty (default risk) and (iii) the term (maturity) of the transaction.39
Repo with an underlying collateral that is illiquid and not widely used or those 
with complex characteristics will attract a higher haircut, as the lender requires 
greater protection from the collateral’s idiosyncratic risk. Risky counterparties 
(borrowers) with low credit standing or inherently risky business are subject to 
higher haircuts, since they increase the likelihood of counterparty failure and 
increased lender’s credit risk. Moreover, the term (maturity) of repo also 
influences the haircut, with long term repo (more than a few days) attracting 
higher haircuts due to the increased probability of counterparty default or 
adverse market conditions. For example, the haircut for an overnight repo with 
a high credit standing counterparty and a government bond as collateral would 
be lower than that for the same term and counterparty but with a non-
government security.   
Another important feature of repo transactions, beneficial to the lender, is the 
re-hypothecation of collateral. The lender is allowed to use collateral given in a 
repo deposit in a new repo transaction with other market participants. This 
assures unconstrained liquidity for the lender since the collateral received can 
be used to access additional funds, if required. The re-hypothecation of 
collateral also has a positive impact on market liquidity and creates effects 
                                                          
38 )LQDQFLDO6WDELOLW\%RDUGµ6HFXULWLHV/HQGLQJDQG5HSRVௗ0DUNHW2YHUYLHZDQG)LQDQFLDO
Stability Issues’.
39 Dang, Gorton and Holmström (2013); Gorton and Metrick, ‘Haircuts’. Also Marcia Stigum, 
Stigum’s Money Market (McGraw-Hill Education 2007).
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analogous to the ‘money multiplier’40, resulting in “high levels of ‘velocity’ in 
repo markets”.41 Therefore, on any given day, the same repo collateral can be 
used for multiple financial transactions, increasing the velocity in repo markets 
and resulting in an increased quantity of money.42
1.1.2.2. The importance of counterparty
In essence, repo offers a ‘double indemnity’ to the lender, as he can rely on both 
the counterparty and the collateral to reduce credit risk.43 In case of borrower 
default, the lender can liquidate collateral in the market to recover funds. 
However, if the issuer of the collateral defaults, the lender can make a margin 
call and obtain additional collateral from the borrower. While both scenarios are 
a possibility, the lender will be able to significantly diversify credit risk when 
the borrower and the issuer of collateral are independent entities, with credit 
risks that are sufficiently uncorrelated.44
Although the presence of collateral significantly reduces the credit risk of repo, 
its effectiveness in case of default might be constrained by adverse market 
conditions. In such circumstances, the collateral value might be negatively 
impacted or market participants might be unwilling to trade, restricting the 
lender’s ability to recover funds. Thus, collateral should be treated like 
insurance and the primary risk should be related on the counterparty, implying 
that the contributions of collateral and counterparty to the diversification of 
credit risk are not symmetrical.45 This asymmetry is due to the relative 
convenience for the lender in case of issuer default versus counterparty 
(borrower) default. In the former, a margin call would require the borrower to 
either provide new collateral or reduce credit exposure. However, with 
counterparty default, the lender can recover funds only by liquidating collateral 
                                                          
40 The money multiplier can be explained simply as the possibility of money held in bank 
deposits to be used for multiple transactions. So for a given deposit, the money can be used to 
extend a loan and an investment, creating more money from the fixed deposit. 
41 Euroclear and Comotto (2009). See also Financial Stability Board, ‘Securities Lending and 
5HSRVௗ0DUNHW2YHUYLHZDQG)LQDQFLDO6WDELOLW\,VVXHV¶
42 Manmohan Singh, ‘Velocity of Pledged Collateral: Analysis and Implications’ [2011] IMF 
Working Papers 11/256.
43 Euroclear and Comotto (2009).
44 ibid.
45 LELG )LQDQFLDO 6WDELOLW\ %RDUG µ6HFXULWLHV /HQGLQJ DQG 5HSRVௗ 0DUNHW Overview and 
Financial Stability Issues’; Gorton and Metrick, ‘Haircuts’.
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in the market, which can be constrained in adverse market conditions that both 
parties cannot foresee or control. 
Therefore, the risk from accepting poor quality collateral from a credit worthy 
borrower is lower when compared to receiving good quality collateral from a 
risky counterparty. Thus, lenders should not be indifferent between the two 
scenarios and the creditworthiness of the borrower must be the primary factor 
influencing their lending decision, not the underlying collateral. 
1.1.3. Accounting treatment and Balance sheet impact 
While harmonization of global accounting standards is currently underway, 
prior to the crisis, International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and US 
Financial Accounting Standards Board’s Statement of Financial Accounting 
Standards (SFAS) were the two main accounting regimes.46 Differences in these 
accounting standards for recognition of an off-balance sheet transaction 
encouraged accounting arbitrage, allowing financial institutions to undertake 
repo as off-balance sheet financing and window-dress their financial 
statements.47 These differences were present in the criteria to determine whether 
repo was a sale transaction (off-balance sheet) or a secured loan (on-balance 
sheet). 
An off-balance sheet repo transaction would have no impact on the borrower’s 
balance sheet as the repo seller does not record a liability to disclose its 
obligation to repay the borrowed funds. The repo seller reports the transfer of 
securities for cash by removing these securities from the balance sheet and 
recording a corresponding increase in cash. Therefore, the borrower is able to 
increase its borrowing without disclosure and hence, can achieve an artificially 
lower leverage ratio.48 On the other hand, an on-balance sheet repo transaction 
would require the transferred securities to remain on the repo seller’s balance 
                                                          
46 Companies located in places such as the UK, European Union and Hong Kong, are required 
to adopt the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), whereas for listed companies 
in the USA, adoption of the US Financial Accounting Standards Board’s Statement of Financial 
Accounting Standards (SFAS) is mandatory. Currently, 91 jurisdictions require the adoption 
IFRS as accounting standard for its listed companies, See http://www.iasplus.com. The 
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) in the USA has been the designated organization 
in the private sector for establishing standards of financial accounting.
47 Ong and Yeung (2010).
48 Leverage is the relationship between a company’s total debt obligations to shareholders’ 
equity or total assets.
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sheet and a corresponding repayment obligation is recorded by an increase in
liabilities, expanding the borrower’s balance sheet to indicate increased 
leverage. 
However, capital regulation for banks is based on economic substance and 
hence, repo is treated as a secured loan, where the risk and reward remains with 
the repo seller. Capital regulation under the Basel Accords equalized capital 
requirements for both, on-balance sheet and off-balance sheet repo. This was 
achieved by assigning a credit conversion factor (CCF) to convert the off-
balance sheet transaction into an equivalent on-balance sheet exposure, which 
was then used to calculate the capital requirements for repo. 
The balance sheet impact of repo for both, the borrower and lender, can be seen 
in the following example, which illustrates an on-balance sheet or an equivalent 
off-balance sheet repo transaction. For the purpose of this illustration, repo 
seller refers to the borrower of cash (seller of collateral) and repo buyer refers 
to lender of cash (buyer of collateral). Figure 3 starts by showing the balance 
sheet of both parties prior to the repo transaction. 
Figure 3: Pre-repo balance sheets
Source: Euroclear and Richard Comotto, ‘Understanding Repos and the Repo Markets’ (2009) p. 45
Consider a repo transaction involving the sale of securities with a market value 
of 10 million and no haircut.49 Assuming a repurchase price of 10.1 million, the 
implied repo rate is 1% i.e. the repo seller (borrower) pays an interest of 0.1 
million.
Repo Initiation 
At initiation, the repo seller reports an increase in the assets and liabilities of 10 
million as (i) securities sold are transferred from investments to collateral 
                  
49 This zero haircut requirement is not unusual as it is usually when the underlying collateral is 
high quality government securities and the market participant is a core market participant i.e. 
financial institution with a good credit standing. 
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(remains on the balance sheet) and (ii) the proceeds from the sale of securities 
(i.e. the borrowed funds) increase cash and liabilities (collateralised borrowing) 
by 10 million. For the repo buyer, there is no change in the overall assets or 
liabilities as the cash lent is transferred from cash account and reported as a 
claim on the repo seller under other current assets. 
Figure 4: Balance sheets at repo initiation
Source: Euroclear and Richard Comotto, ‘Understanding Repos and the Repo Markets’ (2009) p. 45
The repo seller’s balance sheet expands due to the increase in liabilities from 
reporting the repurchase obligation on repo, indicating an increase in borrowing. 
The repo buyer’s balance sheet remains unchanged as there was only a 
redistribution on the asset side to show a claim on the repo seller and record a 
reverse repo.  
Repo Maturity
At maturity, the repo seller repurchases the securities at the predetermined 
repurchase price of 10.1 million. The repo seller now reports a decrease in assets 
and liabilities as (i) the collateral item is reduced (extinguished in this case) and 
investments increase as the securities are returned, (ii) cash is reduced by the 
repurchase price of 10.1 million and (iii) liability of repo under collateralised 
borrowing is reduced by 10 million (extinguished entirely in this case) and 
retained earnings reduced by 0.1 million to account for the repo rate.
The repo buyer records the return of securities to the repo seller with an increase 
in cash of 10.1 million and a simultaneous reduction in current assets of 10 
million, indicating the settled claim on the repo seller. The receipt of 0.1 million 
on the transaction is reported as an increase in retained earnings to represent the 
return earned on reverse repo.   
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Figure 5: Balance sheets at repo maturity
Source: Euroclear and Richard Comotto, ‘Understanding Repos and the Repo Markets’ (2009) p. 45
At maturity, the repo seller’s balance sheet shrinks while the repo buyer’s 
balance sheet expands, representing the return paid by the borrower for using 
the lender’s cash. 
The inflow and outflow of cash is also reported in the cashflow statement of 
both parties. For the repo seller, the obligation to repurchase the securities sold 
is reported as a financing activity, where the recorded liability expands the 
balance sheet. Thus, repo transactions are used as a source of funding to finance
the purchase (long position) through cash proceeds from repo. For the repo 
buyer, who holds a reverse repo, the commitment to resell and the claim it holds 
on the counterparty is reflected as a collateralized loan (an asset) on the balance 
sheet and is reported as an investing activity. Therefore, a reverse repo can be 
used either to cover short positions (receive specific collateral) or as a form of 
investment with excess cash proceeds (earn higher interest than other cash 
investments).
1.1.4. Why use repo?
In essence, repo is economically similar to a secured loan, with the seller of 
securities (or borrower of cash) using it as a source of short-term funding and 
the buyer of securities (or lender of cash) using it as a short-term investment. 
From the repo seller’s perspective, repo is a cheaper source of financing than 
unsecured borrowing as the presence of collateral reduces the lender’s credit 
risk. Thus, lenders are subject to lower regulatory capital requirements and 
hence, are willing to lend more cash and at lower rates than in unsecured 
markets (such as deposits or commercial paper).50 Repo sellers primarily use 
                  
50 ibid.
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repo to fund the purchase (long positions) of securities that they hold as 
investments by using them as collateral in repo. Although the legal title is 
transferred to the lender, the repurchase commitment ascribes the risk and 
rewards of the underlying collateral with the borrower.51 For example, repo with 
a coupon paying bond or dividend paying share would transfer the ownership 
title to the repo buyer but the coupons and dividends would still be received by 
the repo seller. Similarly, any fall in price of the underlying securities during 
the term of the repo is borne by the seller i.e. if the price of the bond or share 
falls below the repurchase price, the repo seller incurs the loss.52 Therefore, the 
repo seller continues to maintain exposure to the underlying collateral and also 
increase leverage.
From the repo buyer’s perspective, reverse repo is a short-term investment, 
providing reasonable returns with lower credit risk than unsecured lending, 
which reduces lender’s regulatory requirements and improves their returns on 
cash. Additionally, reverse repo can be used to cover short positions in 
securities, as part of the repo buyer’s trading activity, where required securities 
can be acquired to settle delivery obligations.53 Moreover, the possibility of re-
hypothecation of collateral provides lenders with the opportunity to restore their 
cash balances by using the same collateral in repo with a third party. Therefore, 
unlike lending in unsecured markets or using non-transferable instruments like 
deposits, reverse repo does not deplete lenders’ liquidity. 
1.2. Securitisation
Securitisation has existed since the 1970s, with the issuance of mortgage-
backed securities in the United States.54 Although several financial crises have 
occurred since then, the role of securitisation has gained prominence after the 
recent crisis. It became the most popular innovation for financial institutions, 
making it easier to value and trade banks’ loans as securitized instruments in 
                                                          
51 ibid.
52 This risk pertaining to the underlying collateral is transferred to the repo buyer in case of 
counterparty default i.e. if the repo seller is unable to buy back the securities. This transfer of 
risk is explained in section 1.1.2.1.
53 LELG )LQDQFLDO 6WDELOLW\ %RDUG µ6HFXULWLHV /HQGLQJ DQG 5HSRVௗ 0DUNHW 2YHUYLHZ DQG
Financial Stability Issues’; Euroclear and Comotto (2009).
54 Allen Franklin and Douglas Gale, Financial Innovation and Risk Sharing (The MIT Press 
1994).
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secondary markets.55 In aggregate, securitisation worldwide grew from $767 
billion at year-end 2001 to a peak of $2.7 trillion at year-end 2006.56
Securitisation is the process of packaging a number of assets, mostly loans (such 
as credit cards, mortgages, auto loans and corporate debt), to create various 
forms of securitized instruments called asset-backed securities (ABS).57 The 
value of these securities is derived from the quality and expected future income 
of the underlying assets. For instance, a mortgage-backed security is a 
securitized instrument with mortgages as the underlying asset, where the value 
of these securities is determined by the credit quality and expected mortgage 
repayments by mortgage holders.
The process of securitisation is presented in Figure 6. The main element for 
securitisation is the Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV), a bank-sponsored entity 
treated as legally separate from the sponsoring institution, usually in the form 
of a trust or subsidiary (e.g. investment banking subsidiary of a universal bank).
Assets are transferred to the SPV, which performs the packaging on behalf of 
banks and issues ABS that are then sold to investors.58 This was reported as an 
off-balance sheet transaction, which fulfilled the required criteria under both 
accounting regimes (IFRS and US GAAP). The sale of securitized instruments 
to final investors allows the SPV to fund the purchase of bank loans i.e. the bank 
sells loans to the SPV, which pays for these loans from the sale of ABS to 
investors. Besides being sold to investors, issuing banks can also retain 
securitisation tranches and in recent decades, these could be used as collateral 
in money markets.
                                                          
55 Gorton and Metrick, ‘Securitization’; Joshua Coval, Jakub Jurek and Erik Stafford, ‘The 
Economics of Structured Finance’ (2009) 23 Journal of Economic Perspectives 3; Shleifer and 
Vishny, ‘Unstable Banking’.
56 Acharya and Richardson (2009), p. 200.
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58 GB Gorton and NS Souleles, ‘Special Purpose Vehicles and Securitization’, The Risks of 
Financial Institutions (University of Chicago Press 2007); Gorton and Metrick, ‘Securitization’; 
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Figure 6: Securitisation and Asset-backed Securities
The ABS are classified into different tranches according to their level of 
seniority and assigned specific credit ratings by authorized credit rating 
agencies. The credit ratings range from AAA (lowest risk) to D (highest risk) 
and are grouped as investment grade (AAA to BBB-) and non-investment/junk 
grade (below BBB-).59 The highest grade tranche (AAA) is the least risky, 
structured to suffer losses only after all other tranches are negatively affected, 
thus carrying the highest level of certainty for investors. Therefore, high-grade
securitized instruments provide lower returns as compared to the more risky 
BBB- tranche, as investors are compensated for accepting higher risk of the 
latter. 
In the last decades, there has been enormous growth in the rate of securitisation 
in global financial markets. It was developed as an innovative tool for economic 
risk transfer to minimize the credit risk of banks’ assets.60 Securitisation allows 
effective risk management and diversification by moving large concentrated 
asset positions off banks’ balance sheets and transferring small portions of the 
risk to a large number of investors.61 Moreover, since the proceeds from 
                  
59 These ratings are based on Standard & Poor and Fitch long term ratings ranging from AAA 
to D. Short-term ratings range from A-1 to C by Standard & Poor and P-1 to P-3 by Moody’s.
60 Stuart I Greenbaum and Anjan V. Thakor, ‘Bank Funding Modes: Securitization versus 
Deposits’ (1987) 11 Journal of Banking and Finance 379; Franklin and Gale (1994).
61 Gorton and Metrick, ‘Securitization’; Coval, Jurek and Stafford (2009); Odenbach (2002).
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securitisation are accounted as a sale, the cash inflow can improve solvency and 
capital ratios.62
Aside from these benefits, two key elements have been singled out as major 
contributors for the growth in securitisation. Firstly, it is proclaimed that 
securitisation grew to evade capital requirements.63 The transfer of assets to a 
SPV fulfilled the accounting criteria for a true sale and hence, was classified as 
an off-balance sheet transaction. Therefore, there is no net effect as the assets 
sold are removed from the balance sheet and a corresponding increase in cash 
(proceeds from the sale of ABS by the SPV) is recorded. Consequently, this 
reduction in reported assets lowers banks’ capital requirements, which are 
calculated as a proportion of total risk-weighted assets.64
Secondly, securitisation grew to meet the rising demand from investors and 
financial markets for privately issued safe collateral.65 Financial institutions 
engineered securities from large asset positions with varying levels of risk, the 
highest grade (AAA rated) tranches of these securitized instruments attracted 
both individual and institutional investors such as pension funds, hedge funds, 
mutual funds and insurance companies. Due to the high credit rating, these 
securities were perceived to be safe by all market participants, signalling to 
investors that these tranches of ABS were as safe as high-grade corporate 
bonds.66 Consequently, these high-grade securitized instruments were 
considered as good substitutes for traditional securities (e.g. treasury and 
government guaranteed securities), encouraging their use as collateral in 
financial transactions.
                                                          
62 Odenbach (2002).
63 Gorton, Misunderstanding Financial Crises: Why We Don’t See Them Coming; Gorton and 
Souleles (2007).
64 Gorton and Metrick, ‘Regulating the Shadow Banking System’; Admati and Hellwig (2014); 
Gorton and Metrick, ‘Securitization’.
65 Several scholars have maintained this view of rising demand for privately issued collateral, 
such as Gorton and Metrick, ‘Regulating the Shadow Banking System’; Gennaioli, Shleifer and 
Vishny, ‘Neglected Risks, Financial Innovation, and Financial Fragility’; Shleifer and Vishny, 
‘Unstable Banking’; Acharya and Richardson (2009); Admati and Hellwig (2014); Gorton and 
Metrick, ‘Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo’; Financial Stability Board, ‘Securities 
/HQGLQJDQG5HSRVௗ0DUNHW2YHUYLHZDQG)LQDQFLDO6WDELOLW\,VVXHV¶
66 Gennaioli, Shleifer and Vishny, ‘Neglected Risks, Financial Innovation, and Financial 
Fragility’. For the role of credit rating agencies and the potential conflicts of interest in the 
recent financial crisis, see Lawrence J White, ‘The Credit-Rating Agencies and the Subprime 
Debacle’ (2009) 21 Critical Review: A Journal of Politics and Society 389.
  
27
1.3. Securitized Banking 
Prior to the crisis, repo markets in non-traditional ‘alternative’ collateral were
growing, which included innovative instruments such as covered bonds and 
ABS, as these were considered good collateral by market participants.67
Although the relative size of alternative collateral repo market is smaller when 
compared to repo with traditional securities, it represents a significant portion 
of private liquidity creation by market participants.68 Securitized banking was 
one such form of alternative collateral repo transaction where ABS were used 
as collateral in repo. 
Banking is all about debt. Minsky saw bankers as entrepreneurs engaged in an 
innovative and profit driven business, describing them as “merchants of debt 
who strive to innovate in the assets they acquire and the liabilities they 
market”.69 Banks act as financial intermediaries between depositors and 
borrowers, the former providing funds to make loans and banks providing 
expertise in assessing borrower credit risk. Banks earn through maturity 
transformation i.e. the process of using short-term debt to fund long-term 
investments. This is core to banks’ earnings as they borrow short-term (usually 
in the form of deposits) and use these funds to offer long-term loans. Deposits 
are a form of debt since depositors have the right to withdraw their funds at any 
time. Hence, they are short-term, backed by the banks’ assets and are classified 
as banks’ short-term debt.  
In the traditional banking model, deposits are the main source of short-term 
funds and banks earn from the interest rate spread between the rate offered to 
attract deposits and the higher rate paid by borrowers when these deposits are 
loaned out. Figure 7 illustrates traditional maturity transformation, where a bank 
offering a deposit rate of 2 percent and a loan with an interest rate of 5% earns 
the interest rate differential of 3%. This interest rate differential is called the 
“spread” and is an essential component of banks’ earnings. The higher the short-
term debt and thus leverage, the greater the banks’ earnings from credit 
intermediation.
                                                          
67 Euroclear and Comotto (2009).
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69 Hyman P Minsky, ‘The Financial Instability Hypothesis’ [1999] The Jerome Levy Economics 
Institute Working Paper No. 74, p. 6.
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Figure 7: Traditional banking – Maturity transformation
Securitized banking is the combination of securitized instruments and repo, 
where short-term funds from the repo market are used to make long-term 
investments. Therefore, securitized banking is also maturity transformation but 
with repo as the main source of short-term funds and financial institutions as 
borrowers and lenders. Figure 8 shows maturity transformation under 
securitized banking, where repo is used to fund a long position in an ABS.
Figure 8: Securitized banking – Maturity transformation
As the risk and return of the transferred security remains with the repo seller, 
the borrower receives the 5% return on the security. With a cost of borrowed 
funds of 1% (repo rate), the repo seller earns a spread of 4%. 
Therefore, “Traditional banking is the business of making and holding loans, 
with insured demand deposits as the main source of funds. Securitized banking 
is the business of packaging and reselling loans, with repo agreements as the 
main source of funds.”70
Some key aspects are visible when comparing traditional banking and 
securitized banking. Firstly, the impact on the balance sheet assets differs 
between the two, with loans kept on the balance sheet in the former and loans 
securitized in the latter. Secondly, traditional banking uses interest rates to 
attract deposits whereas securitized banking uses repo rates to attract 
                  
70 Gorton and Metrick, “Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo”, p. 1.
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counterparties when funds are low.71 Thirdly, deposits are guaranteed by the 
governments under deposit insurance whereas the funds lent in securitized 
banking are guaranteed by the underlying collateral, suggesting that deposit 
insurance is analogous to the collateral used in securitized banking. Collateral 
can be cash, treasury securities or securitized instruments, the reliability of these
is essential to prevent a ‘run’ by market participants and thus, crucial for the 
functioning of securitized banking.72
Moreover, securitized banking played a key role in moving banks away from 
traditional collateral, which includes instruments such as treasury securities, 
agency securities (issued by government sponsored entities), bank certificates 
of deposit and bankers’ acceptances.73 These traditional securities were 
considered safe, riskless and highly liquid as they could be easily converted into 
money. Securitized banking used innovative collateral i.e. high-grade
securitized instruments, which were perceived to carry the lowest risk and were 
considered as good substitutes for traditional collateral. This perception of 
safety increased demand for privately issued collateral in order for banks to 
access an additional source of funds. 
Securitized banking therefore, became an additional source of short-term 
funding (besides deposits), created from banks’ privately issued securities, 
thereby converting long-term illiquid assets into a source of liquidity. This use 
of privately issued securities to access another source of short-term funding 
created a private liquidity cycle for banks, expanding their ability to refinance 
debts. 
Banks are said to have an advantage in private liquidity creation as compared to 
non-banks, since they hold diversified loan portfolios and are thus able to create 
“…riskless, interest-bearing, transactions media”.74 In recent years, financial 
institutions pooled and tranched different kinds of loans to engineer ABS that 
were considered as safe as government securities, both by investors and the 
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intermediaries themselves.75 As market participants perceived them to be safe, 
due to the high credit ratings, they began borrowing against them as collateral, 
often with very low haircuts.76 This was a key transformation, with the chain of 
securitisation allowing regulated commercial banks to securitize long-term 
loans into high-grade securities that could be used as collateral for short-term
borrowing in repo markets, using one kind of long-term debt as collateral for 
another short-term debt.77 Thus, securitized banking became analogous to a 
money machine for banks (Figure 9), providing them with an additional source 
of short-term funding (besides deposits) created from banks’ privately issued 
securities. 
Figure 9: Securitized Banking
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Comparing the figure above with traditional banking (Figure 7), securitized 
banking was a critical change in traditional maturity transformation as banks 
were now able to utilise previously illiquid long-term loans into a new source 
of short-term funding, creating a new avenue for banks’ private liquidity 
creation and therefore, increasing liquidity in financial markets.78
1.3.1. Commercial banks, shadow banking and repo
The shadow banking system gained prominence after the crisis and is defined 
as “credit intermediation involving entities and activities (fully or partially) 
outside the regular banking system or non-bank credit intermediation in 
short.”79 This system evolved to provide bank-like deposit taking services 
without being subject to the same level of regulation as the traditional banking 
sector. The growth of shadow banking is highlighted by the fall in financial 
sector assets held by depository institutions, which dropped from 60% in 1950 
to less than 30% in 2006.80
The shadow banking sector was the result of structural and regulatory changes 
of the last few decades including private financial innovation, competition from 
the non-banking sector and its activities, de-regulation and liberalization of 
local and global financial markets.81 These changes led to the decline of the 
traditional banking model and gradually, traditional banks withdrew from the 
regulated banking sector and became heavily involved in the unregulated 
shadow banking sector.82 A primary reason for this withdrawal was binding 
capital requirements that made equity capital more expensive for banks, 
especially when increased competition from non-banks had adverse effects on 
traditional banks’ profits.83 Banks were able to shift their activities to 
unregulated sectors through non-bank subsidiaries providing bank-like services 
and off-balance sheet securitisation that had little or no requirements for 
regulatory capital.
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The main element that differentiates shadow banks from traditional banks is the 
exclusion of the former from central banks’ discount window and deposit 
insurance.84 These regulatory instruments are crucial in preventing bank runs in 
the traditional banking sector by insuring bank deposits and providing 
traditional banks with emergency liquidity in times of a crisis. Shadow banks 
include financial institutions such as investment banks, Money Market Mutual 
Funds (MMFs), hedge funds and mortgage brokers. These entities perform 
financial intermediation similar to banks i.e. maturity transformation using 
short-term funding, but their main funding source is the money market and not 
depositors. Therefore, shadow banks do not benefit from the regulatory support 
provided by deposit insurance or central banks’ discount window. 
Consequently, the shadow banking sector remained largely unregulated and the 
entities operating within were highly vulnerable to runs.   
The growth of the shadow banking sector is a combination of demand and 
supply forces. On the supply side, competition and de-regulation eroded the 
competitive advantage of banks as the ultimate financial intermediaries.85 A
stronger force came from the demand side, where both market participants and 
financial institutions demanded high quality collateral for financial transactions, 
driving the growth of securitisation and its subsequent use in repo transactions 
as a money-like instrument.86
While money market instruments like repo were the main source of short-term 
funding for shadow banks, in the last decades, traditional banks also became 
involved in repo markets through securitized banking. This created linkages 
between the traditional and shadow banks as they both became heavily involved 
in raising short-term funds via repo markets. Figure 10 shows two channels of 
traditional bank involvement in the shadow banking sector. 
                                                          
84 Gorton and Metrick, ‘Regulating the Shadow Banking System’. See also Z Pozsar and others, 
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Figure 10: Shadow Banking and Repo Markets
First, traditional banks took on the role of borrowers, using securitized banking 
to raise short-term funds and increase leverage. Second, they participated as 
lenders in the shadow banking sector, providing shadow banks with short-term 
funds and keeping the securities as part of their trading portfolios. More 
importantly, a critical linkage was created through securitisation, where 
traditional banks used bank-sponsored SPVs to package loans into securitized 
instruments to be sold to investors in money markets. Thus, banks were now 
also acting as intermediaries between investors and borrowers. Moreover, 
shadow banks include bank-sponsored entities e.g. an investment subsidiary of 
a large universal bank. This traditional bank involvement in both repo markets 
and the shadow banking sector was a crucial development as it created complex 
linkages between financial institutions in different financial markets. 
To conclude, securitisation grew to meet the rising demand for privately issued 
safe collateral in the form of high-grade securitized instruments. These were 
considered as good substitutes for traditional securities by all market 
participants, hence encouraging their use as collateral in financial transactions. 
The use of these securitized instruments in repo transactions developed into a 
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new kind of money-like instrument through securitized banking. Banks were 
now able to utilise previously illiquid assets into a new source of funding, which 
created a new avenue for banks’ private liquidity creation. Post-crisis, this bank 
involvement in securitized banking has gained considerable attention as one of 
the main sources of the recent crisis. The next chapter explores the role of 
securitized banking in the crisis, emphasizing on the negative externalities from 
private liquidity creation in financial markets. 
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Chapter 2
Securitized Banking, Financial Fragility and 
Market Failure
This chapter starts with an overview of the market failures underlying the recent 
financial crisis. However, the scope of this review is limited to key literature 
relevant for this dissertation, which does not aim to provide an all-inclusive 
account of the recent financial crisis but focuses exclusively on securitized 
banking and its role in the crisis. The core emphasis is on the negative 
externalities from private liquidity creation through securitized banking. In this 
instance, the second section focuses on the financial fragility from bank 
involvement in securitized banking and the vulnerabilities of such short-term 
debt. The last section deals with the role of regulation, which aims to internalize 
the social costs of potential bank failures but was considered to be inadequate 
in fully incorporating the true risk of banks’ activities and overlooked regulatory 
capital arbitrage.
2.1. Global Financial Crisis and Market Failures  
“A financial crisis leads to an economic crisis.”87
The global financial crisis of 2007-09 was a systemic crisis with widespread 
failures of financial institutions and freezing up of capital markets, with 
negative impacts on the real economy. The crisis can be seen as the result of 
several key market failures: mispriced government guarantees that induced risk-
taking, information asymmetry creating conflicts of interest and externalities 
from the failure of individual financial institutions.
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2.1.1. Moral Hazard and Too-Big-To-Fail 
Moral hazard is “the greater tendency of people who are protected from the 
consequences of risky behavior to engage in such behavior.”88 With regards to 
financial institutions, it refers to banks engaging in risky activities for personal 
gain to an extent that they would have otherwise not pursued. In the aftermath 
of the crisis, the significant moral hazard prevalent in implicit and explicit 
government guarantees through deposit insurance and Too-Big-To-Fail (TBTF) 
provided banks with substantial risk-taking incentives.89
The moral hazard underlying deposit insurance was not novel, as it was well 
understood that it would incentivize banks to undertake greater risk than they 
would without the insurance. Counteracting barriers were implemented such as 
mandatory payments for access to the deposit insurance system, fencing risky 
activities by separating commercial and investment banking and minimum 
capital requirements that served as a buffer against the risk-taking incentives 
arising from deposit insurance.90 However, the recent financial crisis revealed 
that the counteracting barriers were ineffective and moral hazard prevailed. 
Introduction of the universal banking model eroded the previous separation of 
activities between commercial and investment banking.91 Mandatory payments 
for access to the deposit insurance system were inadequate, specifically with 
regards to the US where majority of banks paid little or no insurance premiums 
and consequently, the US financial system was running with insufficient 
protection.92 Thus, capital requirements remained the only barrier against moral 
hazard but these too were deemed inadequate against the backdrop of risky 
activities undertaken by financial institutions.93
Implicit government bailouts also supported moral hazard and encouraged 
banks to allocate huge sums of insured deposits to generate profits from risky 
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activities, allowing them to grow in size and become highly leveraged.94 Post-
crisis, financial institutions that have grown exponentially are referred to as 
TBTF, as they have acquired too large and significant a position in the economy 
to have a silent assurance of government support in the event of a crisis.95 These 
TBTF banks were taking on excessive risks without being directly responsible 
for the consequences and relied on the government’s safety net in case of failure. 
The size and activities of these TBTF banks also made them systemically 
important financial institutions (SIFIs), where the failure of one can lead to 
successive failures of other interlinked institutions and could lead to the collapse 
of the whole financial system. 
Prior to the crisis, systemically important commercial banks were highly 
leveraged with an insufficient capital cushion, making them susceptible to huge 
losses and posing a systemic threat to the financial system.96 The large size and 
extensive linkages of a SIFI to other market participants increases the 
probability that its failure would lead to subsequent failures of other financial 
institutions, making it systemically important and more likely to be bailed out. 
Thus when the crisis hit, these SIFIs were bailed out with huge amounts of 
taxpayer’s wealth since their failure would have led to the collapse of an entire 
economy. 
There is concern over declaring financial institutions SIFIs publicly and treating 
them as TBTF, since it will further fuel the moral hazard prevalent in these 
institutions instead of restricting their behaviour.97 But the massive bailouts in 
the US, UK and EU during the crisis have already confirmed the status of these 
financial institutions as being too-big and too-important to fail.98 Moreover, 
empirical evidence shows that even before the crisis made the TBTF guarantee 
explicit, the TBTF policy was effectively in force and distorted market pricing 
for more than two decades before the onset of the crisis.99
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The global financial crisis also brought to forefront the moral hazard underlying 
employee compensation schemes in the financial industry. In this instance, 
moral hazard denotes an individual’s willingness to take excessive risks since 
they benefit from the upside but do not bear any negative consequences of their 
actions. In the years before the crisis, bankers were increasingly paid through 
short-term bonuses based on volume and current profits rather than on the long-
term profitability from their actions.100 Thus, employees in the finance industry 
were handsomely compensated when there was an upside but bore no 
responsibility for adverse outcomes in case of a failure. The presence of such 
an environment encouraged excessive risk-taking and actions that could have 
significant downside but at the expense of the company and more broadly, the 
society.
2.1.2. Information Asymmetry  
Information asymmetry arises from informational differences, where one party 
knows more than the other, leading to conflicting incentives which can cause 
market failure.101 In the recent crisis, information asymmetry was prevalent 
through the universal banking model, corporate governance and self-regulation 
that aimed to promote market discipline. 
As financial intermediaries, banks are relied upon by retail investors for 
appropriate investment decisions since banks possess superior skills in 
obtaining and assessing relevant financial information. However, retail 
investment can be categorized as a credence good since customers cannot judge 
ex-ante or ex-post the quality of financial product(s) or service(s).102 Thus, 
investors are completely dependent on the information provided by their 
advisors, creating information asymmetry that can lead to a principal-agent 
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problem whereby banks can exploit their informational advantage. This 
information asymmetry was particularly rife within universal banks, as 
commercial banks actively trading on their own accounts had conflicting 
incentives to take advantage of uninformed customers by ‘mis-selling’ stocks 
and other trades.103 Empirical evidence reveals the presence of these conflicting 
incentives where banks push private customers into underperforming stocks that 
the banks plan to sell from their proprietary portfolios to avoid adverse market 
impacts.104 The presence of this conflict of interest in universal banks such as 
Bank of America and Citigroup and also investment banks such as Goldman 
Sachs was well-publicised after the crisis. Significant evidence showed how 
these banks had put their own interests ahead of the customers, particularly in
marketing risky mortgage-related securities while the banks were placing bets 
against the mortgage market.105
Internal and external corporate governance also suffered from information 
asymmetry. Internal corporate governance refers to the principal-agent problem 
underlying the relationship between shareholders (the principals) and company 
management (the agents). In this liaison, the agents possess superior 
information about the company and its operations, which can incentivize 
management to pursue their own self-interests for rapid growth and profits 
through excessive risk-taking.106 Moreover, the increasing complexity and 
opaqueness of activities undertaken by large financial institutions weakened the 
external governance that operates through accurate pricing in capital markets, 
takeovers and mergers for corporate control and board management.107 Besides 
financial activities, the existence of opaque financial instruments and financial 
markets also created significant information asymmetry. The functioning of the 
complex and unregulated over-the-counter (OTC) market for derivatives 
provided no information about counterparty exposures, at both the regulatory 
and market level.108 Financial institutions participating in these markets 
amplified financial shocks when a single institution failed, as the opacity of 
institutional linkages raised concerns about the solvency of all others.109
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Financial regulation also had inherent information asymmetry, most 
prominently under the Basel II Accord, which allowed banks to rely on their 
proprietary risk models for determining capital requirements.110 It was not only 
limited to commercial and universal banks but comparable regulation governing 
investment banks also allowed the use of internal models to determine capital 
charges for market and credit risk.111 This was an attempt at self-regulation to 
bring market discipline by incentivising banks to improve their internal risk 
management practices. However, banks were able to take advantage of the 
underlying information asymmetry as these models were built on banks’ own 
information, allowing them to effectively set their own capital requirements. 
This delegation of power provided banks with significant discretion and 
incentivized them to reduce their capital charges through selective reporting and 
limited disclosure of exposures.112 In this instance, banks possessed superior 
information than regulators concerning their activities and the assumptions 
underlying their proprietary risk models, thus providing an opportunity for 
regulatory arbitrage. After the crisis, this internal model approach has been 
heavily criticized for being biased towards banks’ self-interests to benefit from 
lower capital requirements and incentivized the production of biased and 
inaccurate risk metrics.113
2.1.3. Externalities
An externality refers to the direct effect of the actions of a firm (or a person) on 
other firms (or people) in the form of additional costs or benefits. This results 
in a loss or gain in the welfare of one party from the activity of another, without 
compensation for the losing party. In the case of financial firms, significant 
negative externalities exist when banks, and other financial institutions, engage 
in activities that do not take into account the external costs to other firms and 
the society. This limits the incentives of financial firms to internalize the full 
social costs of their actions. Negative externalities from individual bank failure 
has five key sources: indirect externalities through loss of future funding and 
credit rationing and direct externalities through informational contagion, highly 
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interconnected bank activities and liquidity issues that can turn to solvency 
concerns.114
Indirect negative externalities from bank failures are those that spill over to the 
real economy. There is a loss of access to future funding for customers of the 
failed bank, as specific relationship and information links from financial 
intermediation are lost and might be difficult to re-build with another financial 
institution. A key externality arises from credit rationing, where banks or other 
financial intermediaries restrict new credit extension by increasing margins (or 
haircuts) for interbank lending or by raising interest rates for borrowers. 
Restricting credit intermediation though this channel negatively impacts the real 
economy through lower output and prices, raising the probability of default for 
all other borrowers, which leads to further credit restrictions – a self-amplifying 
spiral.115
Direct negative externalities from bank failure are those that impact other 
financial institutions and financial markets. An individual bank failure can lead 
to an informational contagion, particularly if the failing bank is (or is perceived 
as) similar to other banks, suggesting that the cause of failure will have a similar 
impact on other banks. Another externality arises from the highly 
interconnected network of interactions between financial institutions, through 
financial markets such as the interbank market, money markets and increasingly 
in the derivative markets. The failure of one bank within this network creates 
uncertainty about the health and risks of its creditors, which are other financial 
institutions, further supporting the externality from informational contagion. 
Lastly, negative externalities can arise from liquidity problems at one bank, 
which might be triggered by a fall in asset values and a run on the bank116,
causing it to sell assets (fire sales) which drives down market prices of similar 
assets held by other banks (when valued on a mark-to-market basis). In the case 
of a widespread liquidity problem, fire sales will lead to further declines in asset 
values, creating solvency concerns, even though they did not exist before.  
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“In short, there is an internal amplifying process (liquidity spirals) whereby a 
falling asset market leads banks, investment houses, etc., to make more sales 
(deleveraging), which further drives down asset prices and financial 
intermediaries’ assessed profit and loss and balance sheet net worth.” 117
Scholars believe that this self-amplifying dynamic was at the core of the recent 
financial crisis, predominantly caused by market dynamics and not by external 
shocks, although these shocks may have been the trigger.118 The global financial 
crisis was not a traditional bank run but a quiet run in the shadow banking sector, 
where repo and commercial paper balances were withdrawn; hence, it was not
people but firms that ran on other firms.119 While the fall in value of securitized 
instruments was the trigger, the self-amplifying spiral from negative 
externalities from bank failures spread to other financial institutions and 
financial markets, resulting in a full-blown crisis. 
This section reviewed key market failures underlying the recent financial crisis. 
Moral hazard encouraged excessive risk-taking and was prevalent in the explicit
government guarantee provided by deposit insurance, the implicit guarantee of 
government bailouts for TBTF financial institutions and employee 
compensation schemes based on short-term profitability. Information
asymmetry present in retail investment and proprietary activities of universal 
banks and between shareholders and company management created conflicts of 
interest while external corporate governance also suffered due to opaque 
activities and markets. Also, introduction of the internal model approach for 
capital calculations provided banks with information advantages as it allowed 
them to use their proprietary risk models to determine capital requirements. 
Lastly, significant negative externalities existed from the failure of individual 
banks that spread to other financial institutions and financial markets. These 
externalities are the focus of the next section, which outlines the negative 
externalities from private liquidity creation through securitized banking.
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2.2. Securitized Banking and Financial Fragility
Several academics have noted the importance of greater capital and liquidity of 
financial intermediaries for financial market stability and the benefits of 
privately issued securities to meet investor demand.120 However, there is also 
agreement on the instability caused by private security issuance which increases 
private liquidity but exposes the financial system to the risks of financial 
meltdown due to socially excessive leverage and liquidity.121
Literature recognizes the harmful social welfare effects from private liquidity 
creation through securitized banking and questions whether all creation of 
private money by the banking system is desirable. In some instances, private 
securities which owe their existence to neglected risks have proved to be false 
substitutes for traditional securities and have harmful social welfare effects, 
even without excessive leverage.122 Moreover, excessive leverage can lead to 
fire sales by financial intermediaries during adverse market conditions, resulting 
in depressed security prices that can lead to credit rationing and spill over to the 
real economy.123
2.2.1. Neglected Risks and Financial Fragility 
“It is not only that banks may engage in new activities which are risky, they may 
also engage in old activities which are riskier than previously…”124
The financial innovation of securitisation grew to meet the strong demand from 
market participants for securities with a safe pattern of cash flows.125 Financial 
intermediaries catered to these demands by creating securities from existing 
assets, which were perceived to be safe but were more risky than anticipated.  
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Traditionally, securitisation was primarily undertaken for prime mortgages, 
whereby large concentrated positions in these assets were converted to high-
grade mortgage-backed securities. However, prior to the crisis, banks extended 
the prime-mortgage securitisation model to riskier asset classes, including sub-
prime mortgage loans.126 These sub-prime mortgage-backed securities were 
structured investments which separated the asset position into different 
tranches. The tranches were structured according to their ability for loss 
absorption, with riskier tranches subject to losses before less risky tranches, 
hence investors holding riskier tranches received higher returns.127 The least
risky tranche (AAA rating) received lower return but would only suffer losses 
after all the other tranches were wiped out from non-performance i.e. through 
widespread delinquency or default.128
Although the high-grade (AAA) tranche was a signal of safety for investors, the 
underlying assets were not necessarily prime loans but the tranche represented 
the least risky arrangement of numerous subprime loans.129 The high-grade
tranches were structured to only incur losses in the rare event that a large 
number of subprime mortgages defaulted at once, adversely impacting the least 
risky tranche. This was an extremely low probability event that could only arise 
in case of a systemic shock that would impact all markets and is claimed to have 
been overlooked by all market participants.130
Scholars have proclaimed this disregard for a systemic market shock as 
intentional by banks, proposing the view that, “The banks were betting that this 
would not happen—or perhaps the bank decision makers’ time horizons were 
too short for them to care if it did happen.”131 Therefore, financial 
intermediaries who engineered these new structured subprime securities 
deliberately overlooked the risk of systemic failures in markets, undermining 
the perception of safety of these privately issued securities. Additionally, the 
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credit ratings assigned to high-grade subprime securities did not sufficiently 
incorporate the risks from systemic shocks in financial markets.132
An opposing view centres on neglected risks, both by investors and financial 
intermediaries that created these securities, which surprised all market 
participants at the onset of the crisis.133 These risks refer to the neglect of low 
probability risks (rare events) and certain states of the world in models, which 
were based on expectations that historical patterns of low mortgage default rates 
and growing housing prices will continue to persist.134 Based on these prospects 
and using diversification, tranching and insurance, these new securities were 
perceived to be safe by all market participants and considered to be good 
substitutes for traditional securities, consequently issued and bought in great 
volumes.135
“…when investors neglect certain risks, financial innovation creates a false 
substitutability between new and traditional [instruments]. This false 
substitutability explains both the excessive volume of innovation ex ante and the 
ex post flight to quality occurring as investors come to realize that the new 
[instrument] exposes them to previously unattended risks.”136
Whether these vital risks were intentionally overlooked or unintentionally 
neglected, underestimation of the true risks inherent in privately issued 
securities created a false perception of safety, resulting in excessive security 
issuance.137 Consequently, these privately issued securities were accepted by 
market participants as good collateral and fuelled banks’ private liquidity cycle 
through securitized banking, creating excessive liquidity in financial markets.138
The unexpected and overlooked shock to the housing market revealed the true 
risks pertaining to these privately issued securities, placing the reliability and 
safety of even the high-grade securitized instruments in doubt. Markets became 
fragile from two sources. First, due to the sharp decline in security prices as 
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investors seek to sell these false substitutes and move back to traditionally safe 
securities.139 Second, fragility arises from the subsequent losses suffered by 
financial institutions left holding an excess supply of these undesirable 
securities, which is further exacerbated if these institutions are highly leveraged 
and resort to fire sales, distressing security prices further.140 Thus, ex-ante over 
issuance of securities is at the core of financial fragility as financial
intermediaries are unable to fulfil the excessive claims ex-post, particularly if 
they are highly leveraged and funding liquidity dries up in the short-term debt 
market. 
In the recent financial crisis, short-term claims on banks were excessive 
precisely because there was excessive reliance on innovation and borrowing up 
to a point where there existed significant negative externalities in case of a 
shock.141 As financial institutions had relied heavily on short-term repo funding 
from each other using similar collateral, a shock in collateral value affected all 
market participants alike, transmitting weakness in one bank to other financial 
institutions. Not only did the health of financial institutions that issued these 
securities came to question but highly interconnected financial markets also 
created doubts about other financial institutions. This lead to a ‘run’, where not 
only investors ran on banks but financial institutions ran on each other.
2.2.2. Vulnerabilities of Short-Term Debt 
The crisis was a quiet run in short-term debt markets, centred on entities that 
were heavily dependent on short-term debt and held portfolios of securitized 
instruments, such as asset-backed commercial paper conduits and structured 
investment vehicles that purchased securitized instruments and financed them 
with short-term debt.142 Securitized banking has grabbed considerable attention 
for its role in the crisis, as financial institutions ran on each other by increasing 
haircuts and withdrawing from repos, termed as a ‘run on repo’.143 The 
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importance of collateral in securitized banking is akin to deposit insurance, the 
reliability of which is essential to prevent a ‘run’ by market participants.144
A repo transaction (Figure 1) is economically equivalent to a collateralised loan, 
where the collateral aims to protect the lender from counterparty default i.e. if 
the borrower fails on the promise to buy back the securities (repaying the 
borrowed funds). In case of default, the lender has the right to sell the collateral 
in the market. While repo transactions can be rolled over or renewed without 
any additional contractual obligations, the lender has discretion to withdraw 
completely by failing to roll over the transaction when it expires. Additionally, 
the lender can withdraw funds by increasing the haircut, owing to an increase 
in the perceived risk of the collateral or claim repayment due to a fall in 
collateral market value. This is analogous to withdrawing from a bank deposit, 
except that this is between financial institutions and not between a depositor and 
a bank.145
Short-term debt markets, including repo, are highly vulnerable to runs since a 
change in the perceived risk of the underlying collateral or its market value can 
lead to withdrawal by lenders. Although the lender can liquidate collateral in 
case of counterparty default, market conditions may adversely impact collateral 
liquidity, especially during a crisis, which might have been the initial reason for 
default. Given that the value of collateral remains unchanged, the repo can be 
automatically rolled over. However, risk arises when the value or riskiness of 
the underlying collateral changes. The lender can increase the haircut or claim 
repayment to reduce the level of funding. Consequently, the borrower has to 
deleverage and fulfil the lender’s claim by raising liquid funds either by 
refinancing or in worst case, by resorting to asset sales. Scholars have 
maintained that this rollover risk inherent in short-term debt i.e. the inability of 
investors to refinance, was overlooked both by the banks and regulators.146
Another important feature of repo transactions is the re-hypothecation of 
collateral i.e. the ability of lenders to use the collateral in another repo 
transaction, with other market participants. This creates effects similar to the 
money multiplier and results in high levels of velocity in repo markets. 
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Therefore, on any given day, the same repo collateral can be used for multiple 
financial transactions, increasing the velocity and liquidity in repo markets. 
However, “… [w]hen haircuts rise, the money multiplier works in reverse, 
causing a massive deleveraging process.”147 This was visible during the crisis, 
when sharply rising haircuts required repo borrowers to significantly deleverage 
their positions. Unable to raise additional funding or roll over debts, borrowers 
had to resort to fire sales, pushing asset prices down, which spread to other bank 
assets.148 Since financial institutions relied heavily on short-term repo funding 
from each other using similar collateral, changes in the perception of collateral 
quality and value affected all market participants alike, triggering a ‘run on 
repo’.
In the build-up to the recent crisis, mortgage-backed securities were the 
securitized instruments used as collateral to raise funding in short-term debt 
markets. As news surfaced of the underlying risks of these securities, financial 
institutions and investors holding them suffered losses. The shock in collateral 
value led lenders to sharply increase haircuts, triggering a bank run but not by 
traditional depositors. Short-term money markets froze due to the sharp increase 
in haircuts and financial institutions were unable to rollover their debts, 
resorting to fire sales of assets and spreading the shock to other asset classes as 
well, pushing asset prices lower.149 This shock in asset prices spread to the 
balance sheet of other banks, increasing their losses to an extent where the 
whole financial system was on the brink of insolvency. Therefore, excessive 
leverage resulting from private liquidity creation can exacerbate the impact of 
unwinding security holdings in distress.150
Although securitized banking might be a recent development, the underlying 
vulnerabilities are similar to other forms of short-term debt, akin to traditional 
banking. The failure of banks and regulators to incorporate the possible risk 
arising from a ‘run on repo’ underestimated the expected losses and hence, 
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imposed negative externalities on other financial institutions, and on society. 
These risks should have been accounted for in capital regulation, for banks to 
have sufficient equity cushion to absorb losses when funding liquidity dried up 
in short-term debt markets. 
2.3. The Importance of Capital Regulation and 
Regulatory Capital Arbitrage 
Traditional economic theory suggests that the primary reason for financial 
regulation is due to the sizeable externalities from the financial system. The 
Coase theorem states that in the presence of externalities and under certain 
market conditions i.e. free markets and an absence of transaction costs, resource 
allocation will be efficient through negotiations between parties.151 However, in 
the case of financial markets, transaction costs are high since negative 
externalities from individual bank activities affect not only other institutions but 
also the entire economy. Thus, wealth-maximizing economic agents do not 
undertake bargaining as the cost of carrying out the transactions is higher than 
the expected benefit and hence, externalities persist and negatively affect 
resource allocation.152
In the presence of negative externalities and high transaction costs, regulation 
plays an important role to indirectly control an externality and make firms (or 
people) internalize the harmful social effects from their activities.153 Since the 
failure of banks involve systemic externalities, which can spread to other 
financial institutions and subsequently to the wider economy, bank-like 
financial institutions are subject to more stringent regulation than non-financial 
institutions. Bank regulation aims to internalize the social costs of potential 
bank failures through restrictions such as reserve requirements, capital 
requirements, limitations and prohibition of certain activities whereas subsidies 
include deposit insurance, restrictive entry into banking and access to the 
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discount window.154 Restrictions for banks are akin to taxes, specifically when 
entry into banking is not restricted, so binding capital and reserve requirements 
become costly as banks face increased competition. However, these restrictions 
serve the social function of aligning banks’ incentives with that of the society 
and discourages risk taking.155
“Regulation that ignores externalities encourages financial institutions to pass 
their risks in an unfettered manner throughout the system and on to unregulated 
entities.” 156
The financial crisis highlighted the fact that financial regulation has been more 
micro-prudential and has insufficiently incorporated macro-prudential 
concerns, which stem from the systemic risk of a sufficiently large bank failing 
and leading to the failures of others and/or freezing of capital markets.157 While 
individual bank behaviour might not be potentially destructive, collective bank 
behaviour can have significant adverse impacts, especially when all banks face 
similar incentives and engage in similar behaviour. 
In banking, equity is referred to as bank capital and is considered to be an all 
shock absorbing cushion due to its ability to withstand all kinds of losses. 
However, equity capital can be expensive and maintaining prescribed capital 
requirements are usually seen by financial institutions as a form of tax.158
Besides the fact that these capital buffers cannot be lent out at interest, capital 
regulation usually prescribes only equity and retained earnings as appropriate 
capital. Boosting capital through new equity issuance dilutes the value of 
existing shares and is a signal for investors that retained earnings will be 
insufficient to meet capital requirements.159
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Capital regulation aims to restrict the build-up of leverage and constrain banks’ 
balance sheet by requiring a minimum level of equity. The Basel Accords are 
globally accepted standards that impose minimum capital requirements 
calibrated to banks’ total risk-weighted assets. Risk weights indicate how much 
capital the bank needs to carry certain assets (loans and securities) on its balance 
sheet and are dependent on the assets’ perceived level of riskiness. Higher risk-
weighted assets indicate higher levels of risk and require banks to hold greater 
amounts of equity capital for that particular asset exposure. Therefore, equity 
capital not only provides a buffer against losses but also aims to discourage risk 
taking behaviour by aligning banks’ incentives with that of the society.160
In the aftermath of the crisis, shortcomings of the financial regulatory 
framework became visible. Firstly, financial regulation was unable to keep pace 
with evolving financial markets and gaps in the regulatory framework left some 
financial institutions and markets unregulated, now known as the shadow 
banking sector. It consists of financial institutions outside the traditional 
banking system that provide similar services but are not subject to similar 
regulations as they do not have access to deposit insurance.161 However, these 
shadow banks relied heavily on short-term funds through money markets and 
remained vulnerable to bank-like runs. The unregulated shadow banking sector 
thrived but its recourse to the financial sector left systemically important 
pockets in the financial system with little or no regulatory oversight.162
Secondly, the regulatory failure underlying the Basel Accords left financial 
institutions weakly regulated. These capital requirements have been considered 
inadequate in fully incorporating the true risk of banks’ activities and have been 
criticised for overlooking regulatory capital arbitrage.163 Regulatory capital 
arbitrage refers to strategies by which regulated financial institutions evade 
capital requirements. The use of risk weights for calculation of capital 
requirements allowed banks to circumvent regulation, primarily by employing 
strategies to reduce total risk-weighted assets, either by holding less assets on 
the balance sheet or by holding assets with lower risk weights.
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The presence of regulatory arbitrage to evade capital requirements has been 
identified as a contributory factor towards the build-up of systemic risk in the 
recent crisis, emanating from highly leveraged financial institutions backed by 
insufficient equity.164 The main source of inadequacy was the perception of 
safety of privately issued securities. When rated high enough, these were 
considered as safe as traditional government securities, not only by the issuers 
and investors, but also by regulators.165 Because a large part of securitisation 
output received high credit ratings, the corresponding lower capital 
requirements applicable to these securities allowed banks to reduce their equity 
capital. Post-crisis, securitisation was recognized as a key instrument for 
regulatory capital arbitrage, allowing banks to reduce total risk-weighted assets, 
and hence capital requirements.166
The strategy for regulatory capital arbitrage was firstly, to reduce the total 
amount of assets held through off-balance sheet securitisation and secondly, 
reduce total risk-weighted assets by holding high-grade asset-backed securities
(ABS) that received low risk weights as they were perceived to be safe by both, 
market participants and regulators. For instance, capital arbitrage through 
mortgage securitisation is evident under the Basel I and II Accord, both assign 
higher risk weights for mortgages (50% and 35% in Basel I and II, respectively) 
than for high-grade mortgage-backed securities (20% under both Basel I and 
II).167 Thus, banks were able to reduce total risk-weighted assets, and capital 
requirements, through mortgage securitisation by reducing their asset base with 
off-balance sheet securitisation and by replacing the high risk-weighted asset 
with a low risk weight security. 
In conclusion, securitisation and ABS became a tool for banks to avoid holding 
costly capital by reducing the total amount of assets held on their balance sheet 
and lowering the corresponding amount of additional capital required for these 
exposures. In the aftermath of the crisis, most of the criticism of the Basel 
Accord has been primarily focused on the presence of regulatory arbitrage to 
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Fragility’; Coval, Jurek and Stafford (2009); Acharya and Richardson (2009).
166 Acharya and Richardson (2009).
167 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), ‘International Convergence of 
Capital Measurement and Capital Standards (Basel I)’ (1998) annex 2 and The Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision (BCBS), ‘International Convergence of Capital Measurement and 
Capital Standards (Basel II)’ (2006) pt 2, II.A.8.72 and pt 2, sec IV.D.3.(ii).567.
  
53
reduce capital requirements through asset securitisation. However, the role of 
these Accords in encouraging bank involvement in securitized banking, which 
utilizes the securitisation output, has been overlooked. The use of high-grade
(low risk weight) ABS as collateral in securitized banking allowed banks to 
further increase leverage. Thus, banks were able to maintain significantly low 
levels of equity, high levels of leverage and borrowing while undertaking 
activities with substantial risks.168 This is the primary contribution of the 
dissertation, which analyses the Basel Accords to identify the presence of 
regulatory arbitrage that incentivized banks to utilise the securitisation output 
to increase their borrowing through securitized banking. The next chapter aims 
to identify the presence of regulatory arbitrage for securitized banking in the 
pre-crisis Basel Accords while chapter 4 assesses the effectiveness of the post-
crisis regulatory response in eliminating any arbitrage opportunities.
                                                          
168 See Dewatripont, Rochet and Tirole (2010); Admati and Hellwig (2014); Acharya and 
Richardson (2009).
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Chapter 3
Pre-crisis – Basel Accords, Incentives and 
Securitized Banking
The Basel Accords are standards of best practice, aimed at promoting stability 
of international financial institutions and have become the benchmark for 
banking regulation worldwide. These standards prescribe minimum capital 
requirements which are calculated on the basis of risk-weighted assets. After 
the crisis, the standards have been considered inadequate in fully incorporating 
the risks of banks’ activities. Criticism has been primarily focused on the 
presence of regulatory arbitrage to reduce capital requirements through asset 
securitisation, which allows banks to hold less assets on the balance sheet, 
lowering total risk-weighted assets and hence, reducing capital requirements. 
However, the role of these Accords in encouraging bank involvement in 
securitized banking, which utilizes the securitisation output, has been 
overlooked. Additionally, majority of the current literature is restricted to 
arbitrage opportunities provided by banks’ internal models for capital 
requirement calculations. Most prominently, Hellwig identifies banks’ use of 
their internal models, permitted since the Market Risk Amendment of the Basel
Accord, as the main source of regulatory arbitrage.169
This chapter, along with the forthcoming Chapter 4, contributes to the existing 
literature by identifying the presence of regulatory arbitrage for securitized 
banking in the Basel Accords. A further contribution is to extend the 
investigation from the internal model approach and shed light on the fact that 
even the simpler standardised methodology, designed to be more stringent, had 
inherent significant adverse incentives for banks to engage in securitized 
banking.
This chapter aims to assess the incentives inherent for securitized banking in the 
pre-crisis Basel Accords to answer the first sub-research question: Did the pre-
crisis Basel Accords incentivise banks to engage in securitized banking?
                                                          
169 Hellwig (2009), p. 44.
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One of the main sources for regulatory arbitrage was identified to be the 
separation of banks’ balance sheets into the banking book and trading book, 
whereby banks could hold assets in the latter solely by declaring a trading intent. 
The trading book includes financial instruments in bank’s proprietary trading 
portfolios held for short-term trading strategies. This highly subjective ‘intent-
based’ asset allocation was determined by banks’ internal risk management 
procedures, overlooking the liquidity of the asset itself. Therefore, banks were 
given significant discretion for asset allocation between the two dimensions of 
the balance sheet, providing an opportunity for regulatory arbitrage. 
This is the core of the analysis in this chapter (and the next), where the objective 
will be to compare the capital requirements for securitized banking in both the 
banking book and the trading book. The assessment methodology centres on 
banks’ rationale for minimising their capital requirements for a given 
transaction by minimising the risk-weighted assets. The focus will be to assess 
the risk weights applicable firstly, to an incremental position in a securitized 
instrument and secondly, for securitized banking (long securities positions 
funded using repo). The analysis aims to assess differences between the capital 
charges for securitized banking through the two balance sheet dimensions to 
identify the presence (or absence) of any capital relief. 
The chapter begins with an overview of the Basel Committee of Banking 
Supervision, its objectives and members, along with a brief introduction to the 
Basel Accords and what they represent. The second section provides a detailed 
overview of the pre-crisis Basel Accords, not in their entirety but limited to the 
key standards applicable to securitized banking. The third section provides a 
detailed analysis of relevant capital requirements for securitized banking to 
illustrate the presence of any regulatory arbitrage. The last section provides 
descriptive data trends that support the outcomes of the analysis in this chapter. 
3.1. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and 
The Basel Accords 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) was established in 1974 
by the central bank governors of G-10 countries and consists of central bank
representatives and banking supervisors. Founding members of the Basel 
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Committee included Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the US.
The Committee meets and is funded by the Bank for International Settlements 
(BIS) in Basel, Switzerland where its permanent Secretariat is located.
The BCBS was set up to promote convergence of international banking 
standards by proposing guidelines and recommendations of best practice for 
national authorities. The goal was to combine domestic and regional expertise 
to develop a common supervisory approach applicable to large cross-border 
banks. The objectives of the Basel committee were twofold. Firstly, to 
strengthen the stability of the international banking system and secondly, it 
aimed at consistent application to eliminate competitive inequality among banks 
in different countries.170
The proposed guidelines are essentially consensus-based documents, founded 
on the collective opinion of BCBS members regarding best practices for 
banking regulation and supervision.171 The most significant and influential of 
these documents is the Basel Accord, which not only represents the shared 
opinion but also an agreement by the BCBS members to incorporate the Basel 
guidelines in their national legislation. As a consensus-based document, the 
Basel Accord has a large impact on the national regulation of BCBS member 
states, particularly on issues where agreement was achieved. 
Therefore, the guidelines provided in the Basel Accord are soft law and not 
legally binding, even on BCBS member states, unless implemented by national 
authorities in their legislation. The formulation and implementation of the Basel 
Accord in the European Union (EU) can be presented as an example. The 
process for formulation of the first Basel Accord (Basel I) was underway since 
1987, approved and agreed upon by the BCBS member countries and released 
to banks in July 1988. These standards were required to be implemented by 
banks in G10 countries by the end of 1992. Subsequently, Basel I was 
implemented in EU legislation in 1993 with the Capital Adequacy Directive 
(CAD) 1993/6/EEC. The Basel Committee published the Basel II Accord in 
June 2006, after almost six years of preparation and consultation, with a planned 
implementation by end 2007. However, all BCBS member countries agreed to 
adopt the Basel II standards with varying timelines. In the EU, implementation 
                                                          
170 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), ‘International Convergence of 
Capital Measurement and Capital Standards (Basel I)’ p. 1.
171 Roel Theissen, EU Banking Supervision (Eleven International Publishing 2013).
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of the Basel II Accord was already underway in 2006 through the Capital 
Requirements Directive I (CRD I) 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC. 
While the Basel Accords were formulated by and intended for its member 
countries (G-10), supervisory authorities worldwide were encouraged to adopt 
these standards for banks with significant international activities. Gradually, 
these standards of best practice became the benchmark for financial regulation, 
signalling regulatory strength and financial stability. Soon enough, the Basel 
Accords were transposed into national laws of BCBS member and non-member 
states, hence applicable to banks worldwide. 
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, the BCBS expanded its membership to 
include G20 countries to complement the evolution and importance of global 
financial markets. The BCBS now consists of central banks and supervisory 
authorities from 28 countries. The Committee expanded its membership in 
March 2009 with Australia, Brazil, China, India, Korea, Mexico and Russia.172
In June 2009, it extended its membership to the remaining G20 members 
including Argentina, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and Turkey along 
with Hong Kong SAR and Singapore.173
The Basel Accord focuses on the capital adequacy of banks and provides 
standards for capital requirements, supervisory review and disclosures. The core 
component of the Basel Accord is the calculation and maintenance of capital 
requirements which incorporates the credit risk, market risk and operational risk 
from banks’ activities. These capital requirements serve as a minimum, where 
national authorities have discretion to adapt higher capital levels but little 
discretion on the methodology of capital calculations. 
Since the first version of the Basel Accord (Basel I), several revisions and 
amendments have been made to keep pace with evolving financial markets. In 
essence, the Basel Accord is one comprehensive document consisting of the 
original text (Basel I) along with a series of revisions and major amendments, 
which have been implemented up to the current revisions (Basel III).174 As the 
global financial crisis of 2007-2008 is the core of this dissertation, the remainder 
of it is organized into three distinct phases of the Basel regime. The pre-crisis 
phase focuses on the Basel standards before 2007 while the post-crisis phase 
                                                          
172 Press Release dated 13 March 2009, available at www.bis.org/press/p090313.htm.
173 Press Release dated 10 June 2009, available at www.bis.org/press/p090610.htm.
174 ibid.
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(2007-2011) centres on the immediate regulatory response following the crisis. 
Lastly, the current regime (2013 to date) refers to the existing Basel III 
standards. A timeline of these three phases, with the Basel Accords and their 
corresponding implementation dates is presented in Appendix 1. 
The forthcoming sections in this chapter focus on the pre-crisis Basel Accords 
– Basel I and the Market Risk Amendment – which were the standards in force 
before 2007. The aim is to describe and then analyse these pre-crisis Basel 
Accords, not in their entirety, but primarily focusing on key components 
relevant for securitized banking. 
3.2. Pre-crisis Basel Accords
3.2.1. Basel I
The first set of Basel standards, Basel I, was released in July 1988 with a target 
implementation in member countries by year end 1992. Thereafter, several 
improvements were made to the Accord and Basel I was finalized in April 1998. 
These Basel standards focused primarily on capital adequacy requirements 
which were based solely on credit risk i.e. the risk of counterparty failure or 
default from borrower’s failure to repay a loan or fulfil contractual obligations. 
Accountability for other risks, such as interest rate or market risk were left at 
the discretion of national authorities.175
Basel I set minimum capital requirements at 8% of total risk-weighted assets
(RWA).176 Risk weights indicate the amount of capital a bank needs to carry 
assets (e.g. loans and securities) on its balance sheet. The risk weights in Basel 
I were divided into five fixed categories: 0, 10, 20, 50 and 100%. These weights 
were dependent on the assets’ perceived level of riskiness. High risk weights 
indicated higher levels of risk and therefore, required banks to hold greater level 
of equity capital for that particular asset exposure. 
                                                          
175 Interest rate and market risk refers to adverse impacts on investment values due to changes 
in interest rates or market disruptions. 
176 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), ‘International Convergence of 
Capital Measurement and Capital Standards (Basel I)’ sec III, para 44.
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Besides credit risk, the risk weights also incorporated country transfer risk i.e. 
the risks of investments and assets in foreign countries. The differential risk 
weights for assets with country transfer risk was determined by whether 
countries were part of the OECD or not.177 For example, claims on OECD 
central governments and central banks, including those collateralised by OECD 
government securities, were considered riskless and assigned a risk weight of 
0%. Whereas, the applicable risk weights for short-term and long-term claims 
on banks incorporated outside the OECD were 20% and 100%, respectively.  
Additionally, the risk weights incorporated both on and off-balance sheet 
activities. The latter was required to be converted into credit-equivalents using 
a credit conversion factor (CCF). 
The Basel I capital requirements can be summarised as: 
ܱ݊ െ ܾ݈ܽܽ݊ܿ݁ ݏ݄݁݁ݐ ܴܹܣ =  ܧݔ݌݋ݏݑݎ݁ ܸ݈ܽݑ݁ כ ܴ (ܹ௖௢௨௡௧௘௥௣௔௥௧௬)
ܱ݂݂ െ ܾ݈ܽܽ݊ܿ݁ ݏ݄݁݁ݐ ܴܹܣ = (ܧݔ݌݋ݏݑݎ݁ ܸ݈ܽݑ݁ כ ܥܥܨ) כ ܴ (ܹ௖௢௨௡௧௘௥௣௔௥௧௬)
Where, RWA = risk-weighted assets, RW = risk weight and CCF = credit conversion factor. 
These abbreviations will be used henceforth.
Repo transactions were treated as on-balance sheet transactions, regardless of 
the accounting treatment. Moreover, similar capital requirements were imposed 
on both sides of the transaction – repo and reverse repo. If a repo transaction 
fulfilled the required accounting criteria to be classified as an off-balance sheet 
transaction, Basel I standards required the exposure to be converted to an 
equivalent on-balance sheet transaction by using a 100% credit conversion 
factor. This converted exposure was then multiplied by the risk weight of the 
counterparty to determine the total RWA for that repo transaction. 
The Basel I standards duly acknowledged the importance of collateral in 
mitigating credit risk for collateralised transactions, as collateral can be used for 
recourse in case of counterparty default. Risk mitigation refers to the reduction 
in capital charge for credit risk, reducing total RWA and therefore, lowering 
overall capital requirements. The standards used a substitution approach, which 
replaced the risk weight of the counterparty with that of the issuer of collateral, 
altering the RWA as below: 
                                                          
177 Basel I defined OECD countries as those which were full members of the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) or had concluded special lending 
arrangements with the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
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 ܱ݊ െ ܾ݈ܽܽ݊ܿ݁ ݏ݄݁݁ݐ ܴܹܣ =  ܧݔ݌݋ݏݑݎ݁ ܸ݈ܽݑ݁ כ ܴ (ܹ௜௦௦௨௘௥ ௢௙ ௖௢௟௟௔௧௘௥௔௟)178
The collateral issuer was deemed to represent the collateral quality, where high 
quality issuers such as OECD central governments and central banks were 
assigned a zero risk weight.  Therefore, the applicable risk weight for 
collateralized transactions (such as repo) was determined by the quality of 
underlying collateral rather than the counterparty. For instance, repo transaction 
with a risky counterparty (non-OECD incorporated bank – 20% risk weight) but 
with high quality collateral (OECD government security – zero risk weight) 
received a zero risk weight, representing the lower risk and higher quality of 
collateral. Consequently, the presence of collateral reduced the RWA, lowering 
credit risk and thus, decreasing capital requirements.
However, the Basel I standards provided limited collateral recognition for credit 
risk mitigation. Collateral was primarily restricted to traditional assets such as 
loans against cash (e.g. lien on deposits), securities issued by OECD 
governments, public sector entities or multilateral development banks.179 These 
assets were considered safe and assigned a zero risk weight as they were readily 
convertible to cash and carried little or no default risk.  
The prescribed minimum capital requirements was based on the Basel ratio of 
8%, which was applied to total RWA, as below: 
ܥܽ݌݅ݐ݈ܽ ܴ݁ݍݑ݅ݎ݁݉݁݊ݐ௠௜௡௜௠௨௠ =  8% כ ܴܹܣ(௢௡ା௢௙௙ ௕௔௟௔௡௖௘ ௦௛௘௘௧)
3.2.2. The Market Risk Amendment 
The fixed risk weight buckets of Basel I faced criticism for being highly risk-
insensitive, as they did not differentiate between credit quality and overlooked 
the risk diversification of banks’ portfolios.180 For example, all mortgages were 
assigned a risk weight of 50%, regardless of the credit quality of individual 
                                                          
178 ibid annex 3, 4. ft 1.
179 ibid pt II, (iv).39.
180 James R Barth, Gerard Caprio and Ross Levine, Rethinking Bank Regulation: Till Angels 
Govern (Cambridge University Press 2008); Bryan J Balin, ‘Basel I , Basel II , and Emerging 
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'01DFKDQHDQGRWKHUV
‘Capital Requirements and Bank Behaviour: An Empirical Analysis of Indian Public Sector 
Banks’ (2003) 15 Journal of International Development 145; Caprio, Demirgü-Kunt and Kane 
(2010).
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loans. This also provided banks with the opportunity to reduce total RWA
through cherry-picking i.e. securitizing loans with the least risk while more 
risky loans remained on the balance sheet with the same risk weight.181
Consequently, the Basel Committee along with the International Organization 
of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) formulated the Market Risk Amendment 
in January 1996, with a target implementation by year end 1997. The main 
objective was to incorporate market risk i.e. the risk of loss arising from 
fluctuations in market prices from banks’ trading activities. The minimum 
capital requirement now incorporated both credit and market risk as below:
ܥܽ݌݅ݐ݈ܽ ܴ݁ݍݑ݅ݎ݁݉݁݊ݐ௠௜௡
= 8% כ {ܥݎ݁݀݅ݐ ܴܹܣ (݁ݔ݈ܿݑ݀݁ݏ ݐݎܽ݀݅݊݃ ܾ݋݋݇)
+ܯܽݎ݇݁ݐ ܴܹܣ}182
In order to accommodate the diverse risk profile of banks’ activities, this 
Amendment combined various risks under the umbrella of market risk. It 
incorporated risks pertaining to interest rate related debt instruments and 
equities in the trading book along with foreign exchange and commodities risk 
throughout the bank.
ܯܽݎ݇݁ݐ ܴܹܣ
= {ܶݎܽ݀݅݊݃ ܾ݋݋݇ [ܫ݊ݐ݁ݎ݁ݏݐ ݎܽݐ݁ + ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ]} + [ܨ݋ݎ݁݅݃݊ ܧݔ݄ܿܽ݊݃݁
+ ܥ݋݉݉݋݀݋ݐ݅݁ݏ]
An important modification was made to the calculation methodology for market 
risk. The Amendment introduced two approaches, a standardised method and 
an internal model approach. The main difference between the two methods was 
the level of discretion allowed to banks for their market risk calculations. The 
standardised method assigned fixed risk weights calibrated to external credit 
ratings assigned by authorized credit rating agencies. These credit ratings were 
a signal of the level of riskiness of financial instruments. On the other hand, the 
internal model approach allowed banks with advanced risk management 
processes to use their in-house proprietary risk models to assess their market 
risk capital requirements. Although this method required explicit approval by 
supervisory authorities, it was an attempt at self-regulation to bring market 
                                                          
181 Balin (2008).
182 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), ‘Amendment to the Capital Accord 
to Incorporate Market Risks’ (1996) pt I, sec (b).13.
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discipline by incentivising banks to improve their internal risk management 
practices.183
While supervisory approval for the use of internal model approach was limited 
to large banks with advanced risk management systems, the standardised 
approach was applicable to and implemented by all banks. Therefore, the 
remainder of this chapter focuses on the standardised approach and outlines key 
standards relevant for this dissertation. As the underlying instrument in 
securitized banking are traded debt securities – asset-backed securities (ABS) –
the most relevant risk factor is interest rate risk i.e. the risk of loss in investment 
value due to changes in interest rates. 
Under the standardised method, total interest rate risk was the summation of a 
capital charge for risk arising from individual security movements (specific 
risk) and a charge for broader risk arising from market interest rate movements 
(general risk).184
ܫ݊ݐ݁ݎ݁ݏݐ ܴܽݐ݁ ܴ݅ݏ݇ = ܵ݌݂݁ܿ݅݅ܿ ܴ݅ݏ݇ + ܩ݁݊݁ݎ݈ܽ ܴ݅ݏ݇ 
The specific risk charge refers to the risk of a change in price of an instrument 
due to factors related to its issuer. For debt securities, it was calculated by 
applying fixed risk weights to specific issuer categories, namely government, 
qualifying and other.185 The first category included all types of securities issued 
by governments and received the lowest risk weight of zero. The ‘Qualifying’ 
category comprised of securities rated investment grade by authorized credit 
rating agencies. The applicable risk weights were dependent on the maturity of 
individual securities, with weights ranging from 0.25%-1.60% for short-term to 
long-term securities, respectively. The ‘Other’ category included all remaining 
debt instruments (non-investment grade and unrated) and received the highest 
fixed risk weight of 8%. The specific risk charge incorporated idiosyncratic risk 
and was applicable to individual security positions. 
General risk is the risk of a price change in securities due to a change in the 
level of interest rates. For traded debt instruments, two calculation methods 
were available – the maturity method and the duration method – both dependent 
                                                          
183 For an overview of the information asymmetry inherent in this approach to self-regulation,
see chapter 2, section 2.1.2.
184 ibid pt A, sec A.1.
185 ibid sec A.1.I.6.
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on security characteristics. The maturity method assigned fixed risk weights 
based on coupon payments and residual maturity whereas the duration approach 
used a pre-specified formula to determine a precise risk weight dependent on 
various security specific characteristics. The general risk charge concerned the 
entire trading book and was applicable to all securities positions. 
3.2.2.1. Asset allocation between the banking book and trading 
book
The most significant development in the Basel standards, introduced by the 
Market Risk Amendment, was the separation of the balance sheet into the 
banking book and the trading book. The banking book consisted of exposures 
that were typically held to maturity whereas the trading book included financial 
instruments either held with a trading intent or to hedge exposures. The main 
criteria for asset allocation between these two dimensions of the balance sheet 
was the trading intent i.e. exposures held with the intent for short-term resale 
and/or benefitting from price or interest-rate differences.186 Trading book 
exposures included debt and equity instruments from banks’ proprietary trading, 
client servicing and market-making and were required to be kept on the balance 
sheet at current market prices. 
This distinction between the two balance sheet dimensions was primarily based 
on asset liquidity. Assets in the trading book were considered to be highly liquid 
as they were primarily held for short-term trading whereas those held in the 
banking book were to be kept until maturity and hence, deemed illiquid. Thus, 
the main risk for trading book exposures stems from liquidating positions at the 
prevailing market price, making these positions highly susceptible to market 
risk. Banking book exposures were predominantly long-term investments held 
until maturity and hence more at risk of counterparty default, exposing these 
assets to credit risk. These differences in asset characteristics were incorporated 
by differentiating capital requirements for exposures held in the banking and 
trading book, where assets held in the latter received lower capital charges. For 
instance, a higher credit risk charge was applicable to mortgages in the banking 
book while government securities held in the trading book for short-term resale 
were subject only to the lower market risk requirement.187
                                                          
186 ibid pt I, sec(a).2.
187 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), ‘International Convergence of 
Capital Measurement and Capital Standards (Basel I)’ annex 2 and The Basel Committee on 
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These differential capital requirements needed an explicit criteria for 
monitoring banks’ asset allocation to prevent regulatory arbitrage, whereby the 
standards stated: 
“...In particular, they will seek to ensure that no 
abusive switching designed to minimise capital 
charges occurs and will be vigilant in seeking to 
prevent "gains trading" in respect of securities which 
are not marked to market. ...In both cases, there must 
be a clear audit trail created at the time such 
transactions were entered into to enable supervisory 
authorities to monitor the bank's compliance with its 
established criteria by which items are allocated to 
the trading or banking book.”188
However, these were vague guidelines with an ex-post monitoring approach that 
was aimed at promoting self-regulation. Firstly, asset allocation was determined 
by banks’ internal risk management policies and procedures. Secondly, the 
intent-based criteria was highly subjective as banks were allowed to hold assets 
in the trading book solely by declaring a trading intent, overlooking the liquidity 
of the asset itself. The stipulation that asset allocation was based on an ‘intent 
to trade’ did not require any proof of trade since that would impose a mandatory 
requirement which could result in losses. For example, a bank may hold a 
security in the trading book with the intent to benefit from sale due to expected 
price appreciation. However, short-term market volatility might negatively 
impact security value, discouraging the bank from trading to avoid losses. 
Therefore, ‘intent to trade’ did not incorporate market conditions, which could 
adversely impact banks’ ability to trade and hence, asset liquidity. 
Consequently, absent a clear and objective criterion for asset allocation and 
consistent monitoring, the standards gave banks significant discretion for asset 
allocations between the two dimensions of the balance sheet. 
The balance sheet division between the banking and trading book had similar 
consequences for repo transactions. Banking book repo referred to repo 
                                                          
Banking Supervision (BCBS), ‘Amendment to the Capital Accord to Incorporate Market Risks’ 
sec A.1.I.6.
188 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), ‘Amendment to the Capital Accord 
to Incorporate Market Risks’ pt I, sec (a).4.
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transactions with securities held in the banking book (under the accounting item 
available for sale securities) whereas trading book repo represented repo 
transactions with securities held in the trading book (under the accounting item 
securities held for trading). However, the criteria of ‘trading intent’ was 
irrelevant for determining the balance sheet allocation of repo transactions as 
repo is a short-term transaction to fund long positions in securities, regardless 
of the underlying security characteristics. For instance, the same overnight repo 
transaction can be undertaken with a security held until maturity in the banking 
book or that held for short-term transactions in the trading book. The ‘intent-
based criteria’ primarily determined initial asset allocation but the balance sheet 
dimension for repo transactions was guided by the differential capital 
requirements for exposures in the banking and trading book.
3.3. Assessment Methodology
Post-crisis, most of the criticism regarding the Basel Accords concerned the 
internal model approach, which was claimed to be biased towards banks’ self-
interests to benefit from lower capital requirements.189 However, this chapter 
aims to assert that even the simpler standardised method for capital calculation 
provided banks with significant adverse incentives for securitized banking. 
Therefore, the proceeding analysis pertains solely to the standardised 
methodology prescribed in the Basel Accords.
The most important sub-section of the Basel Accords is the minimum capital 
requirements, which are calculated on the basis of total RWA. This emphasis 
on risk weights can be a source of regulatory arbitrage to reduce capital 
requirements, either by asset securitisation (holding less assets on the balance 
sheet) or through asset substitution (holding assets with lower risk weights). The 
analysis in the forthcoming sections focuses on the latter since the aim is to 
assess banks’ incentives for securitized banking and not asset securitisation. The 
key opportunity for asset substitution was provided by the separation of the 
balance sheet into the banking and trading book. Thus, the objective is to
compare the capital charges for securitized banking under these different 
balance sheet dimensions to identify the presence (or absence) of any capital 
relief. 
                                                          
189 See Admati and Hellwig (2014); Hellwig (2009); Dewatripont, Rochet and Tirole (2010); 
Plosser and Santos (2014); Acharya and Richardson (2009); Caprio, Demirgü-Kunt and Kane 
(2010).
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The analysis centres on banks’ rationale for minimising their capital 
requirements for a given transaction by minimising the RWA. In this regard, 
one specific scenario will be examined under the pre-crisis regulatory regime 
between the two balance sheet dimensions. The focus will be to assess the risk 
weights applicable firstly, to an incremental position in a securitized instrument 
and secondly, for securitized banking (long securities positions funded using 
repo). The analysis assumes a high-grade ABS (AAA to AA- or A-1/P-1)190
since high credit ratings receive the lowest risk weights and hence, minimum 
capital charge. An ABS will be used broadly to include all securitized 
instruments, similar to the Basel Accords, which do not differentiate between 
these instruments and treats them collectively as securitisation exposures.191
Additionally, the analysis will be restricted to the first leg of the repo transaction 
(the funding side), where the asset remains on the balance sheet as if it was still 
owned by the borrower and a corresponding liability is recorded. This approach 
is consistent with the dissertation’s emphasis on the use of repo as a funding 
source. Moreover, similar capital requirements are applicable on either side of 
a repo transaction (repo and reverse repo), so concentrating on one has no 
material impact on the outcome.   
It is important to emphasize that the capital charge in the following analysis 
refers to the risk weight applicable to an incremental position for the calculation 
of RWA. The actual capital required to be held against such exposures is much 
lower and corresponds to the Basel ratio of 8% of RWA, as below: 
ܥܽ݌݅ݐ݈ܽ ܴ݁ݍݑ݅ݎ݁݉݁݊ݐ௠௜௡௜௠௨௠ =  8% כ  ܴܹܣ {ܧݔ݌݋ݏݑݎ݁ ݒ݈ܽݑ݁ כ ܴܹ}
This emphasis on risk weight is justified as it is the only parameter that changes 
the capital requirements, while the exposure value and 8% Basel ratio remains 
constant. Therefore, the incremental effect on the total capital requirement can 
be analysed by looking at the change in the applicable risk weight. Lastly, while 
in reality the trading book refers to a bank’s securities portfolio, the analysis 
                                                          
190 The credit rating represents the highest credit quality in case of a long-term exposure (AAA 
to AA-) or a short-term exposure (A-1/P-1). These ratings are based on Standard & Poor and 
Fitch long term ratings ranging from AAA to D. Short-term ratings represent those by Standard 
& Poor and Fitch (A-1 to D) and Moody’s (P-1 to P-3).
191 Asset-backed securities can be differentiated according to the underlying assets. For 
example, a mortgage-backed security is a securitized instrument with mortgages as the 
underlying asset whereas credit card asset-backed securities are based on credit card debt. 
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will treat transactions on a stand-alone basis since determining the effect of a 
transaction on the entire portfolio is beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
3.4. Banks’ Incentives under the Pre-crisis Basel 
Accords 
The pre-crisis regulatory regime consisted of Basel I (banking book) and the 
Market Risk Amendment (trading book). Consequently, banking book repo was 
subject to Basel I standards whereas the treatment laid out in the Market Risk 
Amendment was applicable to trading book repo. 
A simple stylized balance sheet with the risk weights that would be assigned to 
an incremental securitisation exposure highlights the incentives present for asset 
allocation and securitized banking. It is pertinent to mention here that asset 
allocation refers to the initial allocation of securities and thus, repo transactions. 
Moreover, as the analysis centres on banks’ rationale for minimising RWA to 
lower capital requirements, the emphasis will be on the minimum risk weights 
that banks can achieve.
Figure 11: Pre-crisis balance sheet
3.4.1. Banking book
The applicable standards accounted for the credit risk of assets held in the 
banking book. Basel I did not incorporate external credit ratings for banking 
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book exposures. Therefore, a high-grade securitisation exposure would be 
equivalent to claims on and securities issued by OECD banks or securities firms. 
The minimum risk weight for holding a long position in a high-grade ABS in 
the banking book was 20%.192 Under Basel I standards, this investment 
represented a claim on banks and securities firms, specifically those 
incorporated in the OECD as they were considered less risky than others and 
hence, received lowest risk weights.  
For repo transactions, the standards recognised the risk mitigating effect of 
collateral and the relevant risk weight was that applicable to the issuer of the 
underlying asset (and not the counterparty). For securitized banking, the 
collateral is the underlying asset and hence, the transaction received the 
weighting of the ABS – 20%.193
3.4.2. Trading book
The trading book standards accounted for the market risk of positions held in 
the trading portfolio. 
The interest rate risk charge applicable to debt instruments combined a specific 
risk and general risk charge, both dependent on security specifics such as 
residual maturity and coupon payments. Given the numerous alternatives for 
security characteristics, a range of all possible risk weights for a security 
position is determined, since calculating a precise risk weight is beyond the 
scope of this dissertation.194
The specific risk charge applicable to an ABS was that assigned under the 
Qualifying category, which included investment grade securities (rated AAA-
BBB). The relevant risk weight was dependent upon the residual term to 
maturity of the security, ranging from 0.25% (maturity less than 6 months) to 
1.60% (maturity greater than 24 months). 
The general risk charge is calculated using the maturity method, which assigned 
fixed risk weights for securities dependent upon coupon payments and residual 
maturity bands. This is consistent with the assessment methodology which 
                                                          
192 See Appendix II, part I, (a).1
193 Appendix II, part I, (a).2.
194 For a detailed overview of the calculations, see Appendix II, part I, (b).1.
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focuses solely on risk weights. Moreover, the general risk charge was applicable 
to securities positions in the entire trading book. This strengthens the analysis 
as the actual charge applicable to an incremental position will be much lower 
than that determined in this analysis. The possible risk weights for general risk, 
dependent on residual maturity and coupon payments, ranged from 0% 
(maturity less than one month) to 12.50% (maturity over 20 years). 
Therefore, the total interest rate risk charge for holding a high-grade ABS (with 
varying security characteristics) would be a minimum risk weight of 0.25% and 
a maximum of 14.10%. 
For repo transactions, the standards required that securities sold under repo be 
treated as if they were still owned by the repo seller, since the seller continues 
to bear the risk and reward of the underlying asset.195 Therefore, repo 
transactions were treated similar to other security positions and the risk weight 
for a securitized banking transaction would be that corresponding to the 
underlying ABS – ranging from 0.25% to 14.10%.196
3.4.3. Discussion
The key consideration in determining the incentives inherent in the pre-crisis 
Basel Accords for asset allocation and securitized banking is the presence of 
any capital relief between the two dimensions of the balance sheet. This is 
represented by differing risk weights for similar exposures, specifically the asset 
allocation that results in lowest risk weights and hence, maximum capital relief. 
It should be noted that incentives for asset allocation precede those for 
securitized banking i.e. the initial allocation of ABS determine the balance sheet 
dimension for securitized banking (whether banking or trading book securities 
will be used for repo funding). The decisive factor will be the applicable risk 
weights that determine banks’ capital requirements. Therefore, asset allocation 
will favour the balance sheet dimension with lower risk weights for securitized 
instruments and hence, securitized banking will primarily occur through the 
same dimension. 
The incentive for asset allocation for securitized instruments is readily visible 
and favours the trading book. For a long position in an ABS, banks could reduce 
                                                          
195 See chapter 1, section 1.1.4 for an explanation.  
196 Appendix II, part I, (b).2.
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the applicable risk weight from 20% in the banking book to a maximum of 
14.10% in the trading book. This corresponds to a reduction in risk weight of 
5.9 percentage points (pp) and a minimum capital saving of approximately 30 
percent. On the other hand, banks could achieve even higher capital savings if 
security-specific characteristics allowed banks to reduce the risk weight to the 
minimum of 0.25% in the trading book. In this instance, the reduction in risk 
weight would be 19.75 pp with a corresponding capital saving of approx. 99%. 
Thus, incorporating the entire range of possible risk weights that influence the 
initial allocation of securitized instruments, banks could achieve a minimum
capital saving of 30% (20% to 14.10%) and a maximum capital saving of 
approximately 99% (20% to 0.25%) from allocating securitized instruments to 
the trading book. 
Similar incentives were also present for securitized banking. The standards 
equalized the risk weights for long positions and securitized banking in both the 
banking and trading book. A long position in the securitized instrument or 
funding it through repo both received the same risk weight of 20% in the 
banking book and a possible range of 0.25 – 14.10% in the trading book. 
However, the main arbitrage opportunity is whether banks undertake securitized 
banking using ABS in the banking book or the trading book. Repo using a 
securitized instrument in the banking book was subject to the risk weight of 
20% whereas the applicable risk weights for a similar transaction through the 
trading book was lower, with a range of 0.25 – 14.10%. Banks could achieve 
capital savings similar to that for long positions in the security i.e. a minimum
reduction in the risk weight of 5.9 pp with a capital relief of approx. 30 percent 
and a maximum risk weight reduction of 19.75pp with a capital relief of approx. 
99%.
The range of possible risk weights and corresponding capital savings sheds light 
on the adverse incentives inherent in the pre-crisis Basel Accords. The standards 
allowed similar assets and transactions to receive different risk weights and 
were subject to different capital requirements. Even the minimum possible 
capital relief of 30% is significant enough to encourage asset allocation and 
securitized banking towards the trading book, regardless of the underlying risks 
in the transactions. This misalignment of capital requirements for similar assets 
between the banking and trading book created significant adverse incentives for 
banks to allocate assets towards the latter. 
Therefore, both initial asset allocation and securitized banking favour the 
trading book due to the lower risk weights that allow banks to reduce total RWA
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and corresponding capital requirements. With asset allocation incentives 
favouring the trading book, majority of banks’ holdings of securitized 
instruments would be in the trading book and their subsequent use in securitized 
banking would be undertaken primarily through the same dimension. 
3.4.4. Data trends
This section uses a new approach to assess whether the hypothesis of the 
preceding analysis is correct. It looks at data trends in some of the largest 
European banks using annual financial statements to examine banks’ trading 
book exposures and repo transactions.
Trading book exposures are represented by the percentage of debt securities 
held in the trading book (excluding government securities). Total trading book 
exposures consist of debt and equity securities held for trading purposes 
(excluding derivative positions). This data is an approximation for the 
proportion of securitized instruments held in the trading book since precise data 
for ABS is not consistently disclosed by the banks under review. 
Repo transactions as a percentage of total short-term borrowings is used as an 
indicator of bank reliance on repo as an additional source of short-term funding. 
Total short-term borrowing excludes customer deposits and consists of 
interbank deposits, commercial paper, securities loaned and repo transactions. 
This demonstrates banks’ use of repo transactions in aggregate and therefore, 
also includes securitized banking.  
The trends below suggest that the hypothesis from the previous analysis may be 
correct. Similar increases can be seen in the percentage of debt securities held 
in the trading book and bank reliance on repo transactions as an additional 
source of short-term borrowing. This highlights the increased asset allocation 
towards the trading book and an increase in bank reliance on repo transactions 
in the years before the crisis.
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Figure 12: Debt securities held in the trading book
Source: Annual financial statements of respective banks. The figure shows trading book debt 
securities (excluding government securities) as a percentage of total trading book securities. 
Figure 13: Bank reliance on repo funding
Source: Annual financial statements of respective banks. The figure shows repo transactions as a 
percentage of total short-term borrowing. 
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While there might be other driving factors for these trends, it is consistent with 
the analysis in this chapter. The pre-crisis Basel accords encouraged bank 
holdings of securitized instruments and involvement in securitized banking 
primarily through the trading book. The main source of adverse incentives was 
the introduction of the Market Risk Amendment, which provided banks with 
the opportunity for regulatory arbitrage through asset allocation between the 
two dimensions of the balance sheet. The conclusions regarding capital saving 
for securitized banking is crucial, since this is what made securitized banking 
‘cheaper’ in the trading book and therefore, could be suggestive of the increased 
bank involvement in securitized banking prior to the crisis.  
Conclusion
This chapter analysed the incentives inherent in the pre-crisis Basel Accords for 
banks to engage in securitized banking. The objective was to examine 
differences between the capital charges for securitized banking through the 
banking book and trading book to identify the presence (or absence) of any 
capital relief. The analysis was centred on banks’ rationale for minimising their 
capital requirements. Thus, asset allocation of securitized instruments will 
favour the balance sheet dimension with lower capital requirements and hence, 
securitized banking will primarily occur through the same dimension.
The chapter finds that the presence of significant adverse incentives in the pre-
crisis Basel Accords encouraged banks to engage in securitized banking. 
Similar adverse incentives existed for asset allocation of securitized instruments 
and securitized banking, both favouring the trading book. The Basel Accords 
allowed similar assets and transactions to receive different risk weights, with 
those in the trading book subject to lower capital requirements. This 
misalignment of capital requirements for similar assets between the banking
book and trading book created significant adverse incentives for banks to 
allocate assets towards the latter, allowing them to reduce their total capital 
requirements. Data trends in some of the largest European banks before the 
crisis also suggest that this hypothesis may be correct. Similar increases can be 
seen in the percentage of debt securities held in the trading book and bank 
reliance on repo transactions as an additional source of short-term borrowing. 
These trends highlight the increased asset allocation towards the trading book 
and an increase in bank reliance on repo transactions in the years before the 
crisis.
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Therefore, the pre-crisis Basel accords encouraged bank holdings of securitized 
instruments and bank involvement in securitized banking primarily through the 
trading book. The main source of adverse incentives was the introduction of the 
Market Risk Amendment, which separated banks’ balance sheets into the 
banking book and trading book, providing banks with significant discretion for 
asset allocation between these two dimensions. Most importantly, the finding 
regarding capital savings for securitized banking is vital, as these lower capital 
requirements made securitized banking cheaper in the trading book and an 
inexpensive source of funding for banks.
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Chapter 4
Post-crisis – Basel Accords, Incentives and 
Securitized Banking
The previous chapter analysed the pre-crisis Basel Accords and found that 
preceding the crisis, the presence of adverse incentives for asset allocation 
between the two dimensions of the balance sheet supported securitized banking 
primarily through the trading book. The underlying principle was the lower 
capital charge applicable to trading book exposures, as these short-term 
positions were not susceptible to credit risk, such as those in the banking book. 
This differentiated treatment of similar assets between the banking and trading 
book created significant incentives for banks to allocate assets towards the 
latter. The corresponding capital savings from lower capital requirements 
reduced the costs for securitized banking through the trading book.
This chapter focuses on the post-crisis regulatory response, the Basel 2.5 
standards, to assess its effectiveness in eliminating the arbitrage opportunities 
inherent in the pre-crisis Basel Accords. Similar to the preceding chapter, this 
chapter contributes to the existing literature by identifying the presence of 
regulatory arbitrage for securitized banking in the Basel Accords. An additional 
contribution is to highlight that even the simpler standardised methodology for 
capital calculation provides banks with significant adverse incentives for 
securitized banking.
This chapter aims to assess the incentives inherent for securitized banking in the 
post-crisis Basel Accords to answer the second sub-research question: Did the 
post-crisis regulatory response strengthen the capital requirements for 
securitized banking?
This chapter follows the structure and methodology of the previous chapter 
since the purpose of the analysis remains the same i.e. to compare the capital 
requirements for securitized banking under both the banking book and the 
trading book. In this regard, differences between the capital charges for 
securitized banking through these two balance sheet dimensions will be 
assessed to identify the presence (or absence) of any capital relief.
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The chapter begins with an overview of the post-crisis Basel Accords, not in 
their entirety but limited to the key standards applicable to securitized banking. 
The second section provides a detailed analysis of relevant capital requirements 
for securitized banking to illustrate the presence of any regulatory arbitrage. The 
last section provides descriptive data trends that support the outcomes of the 
analysis of the post-crisis Basel Accords.
4.1. Post-crisis Basel Accords
4.1.1. Basel II 
The standards received another overhaul with the Basel II Accord, which was 
aimed at strengthening and aligning banks’ capital requirements in pace with 
growing financial innovation. Basel II was introduced in June 1999, revised in 
June 2004 and after several consultations, finalised in June 2006, with planned 
implementation by year end 2007. The framework now comprised of three 
pillars: 1) minimum capital requirements that followed a more risk-sensitive 
approach than the original Basel I framework, 2) supervisory review of capital 
adequacy and 3) disclosure requirements and market discipline. 
The Basel II Accord shared some similarities with the previous standards. The 
minimum capital requirements were kept the same (Basel ratio at 8%) and the 
structure of the Market Risk Amendment remained unchanged. However, the 
capital requirements now incorporated three risks: credit, market and 
operational risk (i.e. risks from banks’ failed internal processes, people and 
systems).197 The revised capital requirements were: 
ܥܽ݌݅ݐ݈ܽ ܴ݁ݍݑ݅ݎ݁݉݁݊ݐ௠௜௡
= 8% כ {ܶ݋ݐ݈ܽ ܴܹܣ
= ܴܹܣ஼௥௘ௗ௜௧ ோ௜௦௞ + ܴܹܣெ௔௥௞௘௧ ோ௜௦௞ + ܴܹܣை௣௘௥௔௧௜௢௡௔௟ ோ௜௦௞}
Where, RWA = risk-weighted assets and RW = risk weight. These abbreviations will be used 
henceforth.
Additionally, the new Accord introduced a few significant changes. Firstly, it 
extended the use of alternative methods for measurement of market risk to other 
                                                          
197 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), ‘International Convergence of 
Capital Measurement and Capital Standards (Basel II)’ pt 2, sec I.B.44. 
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risk categories. Banks were now allowed the choice between a standardised and 
an internal model approach for both credit risk and operational risk. 
Subsequently, the risk weighting mechanism was also altered for credit risk in 
the banking book, which replaced the previous Basel I fixed-bucket risk weights 
with those calibrated to external credit ratings. While the risk weights still 
ranged from 0-100%, these weights were now linked to credit ratings assigned 
by authorized rating agencies. Higher credit ratings (AAA or A-1/P-1) reflected 
lower risk and therefore, received lower risk weights.198
Secondly, Basel II introduced the securitisation framework, which recognised 
the growing securitisation activities of banks. The framework was only 
applicable to securitisation exposures in the banking book and gave banks the 
same choice between methods for capital calculations i.e. a standardised method 
(based on external credit ratings) and an internal model approach (using banks’ 
in-house risk models). Under the standardised approach, the applicable risk 
weights for securitized exposures were dependent on their credit rating, with 
investment grade securities (AAA to BBB-) subject to lower risk weights than 
those falling within the speculative/junk category (BBB- or lower). Regardless 
of banks’ choice of the calculation approach, an originating bank was allowed 
to exclude the securitized exposures from capital calculations (only under full 
credit risk transfer).199 However, retained or repurchased exposures needed to 
be accounted for in regulatory capital.200 Furthermore, banks were required to 
hold regulatory capital against all securitisation exposures, whether they 
resulted from private origination or investment in asset-backed securities
(ABS).201
The capital treatment for repo transactions was similar to that applicable to 
banking book repo under the Basel I Accord, where the applicable risk weight 
was dependant on the counterparty: 
ܱ݊ െ ܾ݈ܽܽ݊ܿ݁ ݏ݄݁݁ݐ ܴܹܣ =  ܧݔ݌݋ݏݑݎ݁ ܸ݈ܽݑ݁ כ ܴ (ܹ௖௢௨௡௧௘௥௣௔௥௧௬)
However, the most important amendment for repo transactions was the 
introduction of the credit risk mitigation framework. It incorporated the risk 
                                                          
198 These ratings are based on Standard & Poor and Fitch long term ratings ranging from AAA 
to D. Short-term ratings represent those by Standard & Poor and Fitch (A-1 to D) and Moody’s 
(P-1 to P-3).
199 ibid pt 2, sec IV.C.1-2.
200 ibid pt 2, sec IV, C.1-2 & D.1.560.
201 ibid pt 2, sec IV.D.1.560.
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mitigating effect of collateral in case of counterparty default by allowing banks 
to reduce their credit exposure to a counterparty when the transaction was 
secured by eligible collateral. This risk mitigation was reflected as a reduction 
in the capital charge for credit risk and therefore, lowered total capital 
requirements.  
The framework widened the range of eligible collateral, which was previously 
restricted to traditionally safe securities such as loans against cash and securities 
issued by OECD governments or multilateral development banks. The Basel II 
standards recognised a wide range of instruments as eligible collateral in 
financial transactions, now including privately issued debt securities (with or 
without investment grade ratings), equities and convertible bonds.202 Moreover, 
unrated debt securities were also eligible for credit risk mitigation given that 
they were issued by a bank, listed on a recognised exchange, fulfilled criteria 
regarding the credit rating of the issuer and the supervisor was confident about 
the market liquidity of the security.203
The credit risk mitigation framework was applicable to collateralised 
transactions, including repo, under both dimensions of the balance sheet i.e. 
banking book repo and trading book repo. It required banks to calculate a 
counterparty credit risk charge under either a simple or comprehensive 
approach. The simple approach mirrored the Basel I risk mitigation 
methodology, where the counterparty risk weight was replaced with that 
corresponding to the collateral issuer and was subject to a 20% floor, unless the 
collateral was cash or certain government securities.204
ܱ݊ െ ܾ݈ܽܽ݊ܿ݁ ݏ݄݁݁ݐ ܴܹܣ =  ܧݔ݌݋ݏݑݎ݁ ܸ݈ܽݑ݁ כ ܴ (ܹ௜௦௦௨௘௥ ௢௙ ௖௢௟௟௔௧௘௥௔௟)
The comprehensive approach allowed for a fuller offset against collateral, 
applicable to the exposure rather than the risk weight, as below:
ܴܹܣ௔௙௧௘௥ ௥௜௦௞ ௠௜௧௜௚௔௧௜௢௡ = ܧכ௔ௗ௝௨௦௧௘ௗ ௘௫௣௢௦௨௥௘ כ  ܴ ௖ܹ௢௨௡௧௘௥௣௔௥௧௬205
The adjusted exposure (E*) incorporated the risk mitigating effect of collateral 
by reducing the exposure with a discounted value of collateral. The quality of 
                                                          
202 ibid pt 2, sec II.D.3.(i).
203 ibid.
204 ibid pt 2, sec II.D.2.(i).121.
205 ibid pt 2, sec II, D.2.(i).130 & D.3.(ii).148.
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collateral was represented by haircuts206, which were used to reduce its market 
value to protect against price movements. The amount of haircut was linked to 
the credit rating of collateral i.e. high credit ratings represented low risk and 
hence, received lower haircuts. Banks could use standard supervisory haircuts 
provided by the Basel Committee or their internally generated estimates. 
Standard supervisory haircuts ranged from zero (cash) to 25% (non-main index 
equities) and those for debt securities were dependent on issue rating, residual 
maturity and issuer type (sovereigns, banks or corporates).207 For example, 
supervisory haircut assigned to a high-grade (AAA rated) debt security with a 
residual maturity greater than 5 years was 8%. Thus, the collateral value was 
discounted by 8% and the exposure could be offset against 92% of the collateral 
value. This reduction in original exposure reduced the corresponding risk-
weighted assets (RWA), lowered credit risk and hence, capital requirements. 
4.1.2. Basel 2.5
When the crisis surfaced in 2007, Basel II implementation was still underway 
and at the dawn of the crisis, many flaws were visible in the current state of 
financial architecture. The Basel trading book regime received special attention 
since significant losses and build-up of leverage had occurred in banks’ trading 
books.208 While the rationale for lower capital charges in the trading book might 
have been justified, the crisis showed that in times of stress, trading positions 
can be impossible to sell or hedge and illiquidity can create losses exceeding 
the prescribed capital requirements. 
As an immediate response to the crisis, the Basel Committee made adjustments 
to the trading book regime, which still followed the standards set out under the 
1996 Market Risk Amendment. The revised trading book standards, called 
Basel 2.5, were finalised in July 2009 with expected implementation by year-
end 2010, while Basel II implementation was also extended until the same time 
period. The main objective was to improve the trading book standards by 
                                                          
206 See chapter 1, section 1.1.1 for an overview of haircuts. 
207 ibid pt 2, sec II.D.3.(ii).151.
208 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), ‘Revisions to the Basel II Market 
Risk Framework’ (2009); Adair Turner, ‘The Turner Review: A Regulatory Response to the 
Global Banking Crisis’ [2009] Financial Services Authority Report.
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incorporating key risks not currently included and to strengthen capital 
requirements that better accounted for expected losses.209
Changes were primarily made to the internal model approach, which now 
required an incremental risk capital charge that incorporated risks from 
counterparty default and rating migration (changes in credit ratings) for credit-
risk related instruments held in the trading book.210 The Basel Committee also 
recognised the presence of incentives for regulatory arbitrage between the two 
dimensions of the balance sheet and therefore, required similar methodology to 
be applied for similar exposures, regardless of where they were booked. For 
securitized exposures, banking book capital charges were now applicable and 
required to be calculated under the standardised method.211
However, Basel 2.5 made an important modification to the standardised method 
for market risk by differentiating the capital charge applicable to banks’ 
securitisation portfolio from those assigned to individual positions.212 The main 
revision was made to the interest rate risk requirement, which was still the 
combination of a capital charge for specific risk (individual securities) and 
general risk (entire portfolio). Although the capital requirements for general risk 
remained unchanged, the specific risk charge was modified for securitized 
exposures and was now applicable to net positions in securitized instruments 
held in the trading book.213
The risk weights for specific risk for securitized instruments in the trading book 
were still attuned to external credit ratings, although they were now higher than 
those prescribed under the 1996 Market Risk Amendment. The specific risk 
charge for securitized exposures ranged from 1.6% (highest rating) to 28% 
(BB+ to BB-), while securities rated below BB- required a full deduction from 
capital.214 In contrast, the corresponding risk weights under the 1996 Market 
Risk Amendment ranged from 0.25% - 1.60%, with a charge of 8% for 
securities rated BBB- and below.215 Moreover, the standards also differentiated 
the treatment of re-securitisation exposures i.e. instruments such as 
                                                          
209 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), ‘Revisions to the Basel II Market 
Risk Framework’ 1-2.
210 ibid I. 8.
211 ibid 1. & I.9.
212 ibid IV.18.
213 ibid IV.18.712(iii).
214 ibid IV.18.712(iv).
215 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), ‘Amendment to the Capital Accord 
to Incorporate Market Risks’ pt A, sec A.1.I.4-6.
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collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) of ABS where the underlying assets are 
securitized exposures. These exposures received higher risk weights, double 
than those applicable to securitisation positions, reflecting the greater risk of re-
securitized exposures.216
4.1.3. Asset allocation between the banking book and 
trading book
The post-crisis Basel Accords followed the principles of the 1996 Market Risk 
Amendment and continued the separation of the balance sheet between the 
banking and trading book. This distinction was now less crucial for repo 
transactions, as they were subject to banking book capital requirements, 
regardless of where they were booked.217
Basel II and Basel 2.5 used the same definition of trading book assets and the 
‘intent-based’ criteria for trading book allocation as before.218 Additional 
specifications for assets held in the trading book required that these assets be 
free of any covenants or be hedged completely, frequently valued and actively 
managed.219 The Basel Accords also remained unchanged with regard to 
monitoring banks’ asset allocation, stating that: 
“Banks must have clearly defined policies and 
procedure, for determining which exposures to 
include in, and to exclude from, the trading book for 
purposes of calculating their regulatory capital, to 
ensure compliance with the criteria for trading book 
set forth in this Section and taking into account the 
bank’s risk management capabilities and practices. 
Compliance with these policies and procedures must 
                                                          
216 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), ‘Revisions to the Basel II Market 
Risk Framework’ IV.18.712(iv).
217 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), ‘International Convergence of 
Capital Measurement and Capital Standards (Basel II)’ pt 2, VI.A.689.(iii).
218 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), ‘Amendment to the Capital Accord 
to Incorporate Market Risks’ I.(a).2 and The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), 
‘International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards (Basel II)’ pt 2, 
VI.A.685-687.
219 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), ‘International Convergence of 
Capital Measurement and Capital Standards (Basel II)’ pt 2, VI.A.685.
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be fully documented and subject to periodic internal 
audit.”220
Therefore, the focus remained on self-surveillance, relying on banks’ internal 
policies and procedures with periodic internal audits. However, the post-crisis 
guidelines concentrated on stipulating the relevant policies and procedures that 
banks must have in place for trading book asset allocation. The standards 
provided a minimum set of issues that must be addressed in the policies for 
adequate management of the trading book, specifying that these are ‘… not 
intended to provide a series of tests that a product or group must pass to be 
eligible for inclusion in the trading book.’221 The guidelines recommended that 
the policies should outline exposures included in the trading book and the extent 
to which these exposures can be accurately valued and marked-to-market daily, 
any legal restrictions that can restrict immediate liquidation, any limitations on 
active risk management and the criteria for transferring risk or exposures 
between the banking and the trading book.222 Additionally, detailed 
requirements for trading book allocation required a clearly documented trading 
strategy for trading book instruments or portfolio, approved by senior 
management, which outlined policies for active management and monitoring of 
positions against the bank’s trading strategy.223
Although the post-crisis standards provided detailed guidelines for policies that 
should be in place for trading book allocation, the standards continued to remain 
subjective and relied entirely on banks’ internal asset allocation and monitoring 
procedures. This limitation was acknowledged in the standards itself, where the 
guidelines represented a minimum set of issues that should be addressed rather 
than an objective criterion to determine the eligibility of assets for trading book 
allocation. Therefore, the post-crisis Basel Accords continued to provide banks 
with significant discretion for asset allocation between the two dimensions of 
the balance sheet. 
                                                          
220 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), ‘Amendment to the Capital Accord 
to Incorporate Market Risks’ I.(a).4 and The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), 
‘International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards (Basel II)’ pt 2, 
VI.A.687.(i).
221 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), ‘International Convergence of 
Capital Measurement and Capital Standards (Basel II)’ pt 2, VI.A.687.(ii).
222 ibid.
223 ibid pt 2, VI.A.688.
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4.2. Banks’ Incentives and the Effectiveness of Post-
Crisis Regulatory Response
This section analyses the post-crisis Basel Accords and follows the 
methodology of the previous chapter since the purpose remains the same i.e. to 
compare differences between the capital charges for securitized banking in the 
banking and trading book to identify the presence (or absence) of any capital 
relief. The focus remains on banks’ rationale for minimizing their capital 
requirements for a given transaction by minimizing the RWA. The analysis will 
assess the risk weights applicable to an incremental securitisation position using 
the same scenario as in the previous chapter i.e. assume a high-grade ABS (AAA 
to AA- or A-1/P-1) and focus on the first leg of the repo transaction. Likewise, 
the forthcoming analysis does not cover the Basel standards in their entirety but 
examines the key components that were previously concluded to incentivize 
bank involvement in securitized banking. 
The stylized balance sheet with Basel II standards for the banking book and the 
revised trading book regime, Basel 2.5, illustrate the continuing incentives for 
asset allocation. While the new standards aimed to equalize the treatment of 
exposures between the two dimensions of the balance sheet, the adverse
incentives for asset allocation still persisted, although to a lesser extent, now 
favouring the banking book.
Figure 14: Post-crisis balance sheet
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4.2.1. Banking book
The securitisation framework dictated the credit risk requirements for holding 
an ABS in the banking book. Applicable risk weights were dependent on credit 
ratings of securitized instruments, where investment grade instruments received 
lower risk weights than non-investment grade ratings, due to the lower risk of 
the former. Thus, the corresponding risk weight for a high-grade ABS was 20%, 
whether long-term (AAA – AA-) or short-term (A-1/P-1).224
Repo transactions fell under the credit risk mitigation framework. Banks were 
required to calculate a counterparty credit risk charge that took into account the 
risk mitigating effect of eligible collateral, which now included privately issued 
debt securities. The credit risk mitigation framework provided banks with two 
approaches. The simple approach followed the Basel I strategy and substituted 
the risk weight of the counterparty with that of the underlying collateral. In this 
instance, the applicable risk weight was that of the underlying ABS – 20%.225
On the other hand, the comprehensive approach allowed a fuller offset of the 
exposure against the underlying collateral, after accounting for collateral quality 
by using haircuts.226 This approach calculated an adjusted exposure, as below:
ܧכ௔ௗ௝௨௦௧௘ௗ ௘௫௣௢௦௨௥௘ = max{0, [ܧ(1 + ܪ௘)െ ܥ൫1െܪ஼ െ ܪ௙௫൯]}       
Where, E = exposure value, He = exposure haircut, C = collateral value, Hc = collateral haircut, 
Hfx = currency mismatch haircut
In this regard, the risk weight calculation can be assessed by examining a 
hypothetical securitized banking transaction with an exposure of 9.8 million and 
collateral of 10 million, without any currency mismatch. The collateral is 
assumed to be a high-grade ABS with a residual maturity greater than 5 years.
Using standard supervisory haircuts, the applicable haircut for the exposure and 
collateral was 2% (He) and 8% (Hc), respectively. Thus, the original exposure 
was allowed to be offset against 92% of the collateral value, as below: 
ܧכ௔ௗ௝௨௦௧௘ௗ ௘௫௣௢௦௨௥௘ = {9.8(1 + 0.02)െ 10(1െ 0.08)}
However, to determine the total RWA for the securitized banking transaction, 
this adjusted exposure was required to be multiplied by the counterparty risk 
                                                          
224 See Appendix II, part II, (a).1.
225 Appendix II, part II, (a).2.2.
226 For details on the calculations that follow, see Appendix II, part II, (a).2.3-2.5.
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weight. The counterparty to an interbank repo transaction is primarily other 
banks or securities firms. Thus, the applicable counterparty risk weight was 
20%, corresponding to claims on banks and securities firms with highest credit 
rating. 
The RWA for a securitized banking transaction with and without credit risk 
mitigation are determined below: 
ܴܹܣ = ܧݔ݌݋ݏݑݎ݁ כ  ܴ ௖ܹ௢௨௡௧௘௥௣௔௥௧௬ = 9.8 ݉݊ כ  20%
=  1.96 ݈݈݉݅݅݋݊ (݉݊)
ܴܹܣ௥௜௦௞ ௠௜௧௜௚௔௧௜௢௡ = ܧכ௔ௗ௝௨௦௧௘ௗ ௘௫௣௢௦௨௥௘ כ ܴ ௖ܹ௢௨௡௧௘௥௣௔௥௧௬
= {9.8(1 + 0.02) െ 10(1െ 0.08)} כ 20% ൎ  0.16݉݊
Therefore, the total counterparty credit risk charge was approximately 1.6% 
(RWA ÷ original exposure), significantly lower than the 20% charge without 
risk mitigation. Due to the range of possible scenarios, it suffices to say that 
under the credit risk mitigation framework, the adjusted exposure would be 
lower than the original, implying that the total credit risk charge for a securitized 
banking transaction must be lower than 20%.
4.2.2. Trading book
In the trading book, capital requirements for securitized exposures were 
differentiated from those applicable to other instruments in two ways. First, 
banking book capital charges under the standardised approach were now 
applicable and hence, determined by the banking book securitisation 
framework. In this instance, the risk weight for a high-grade ABS corresponded 
to that for similar exposures held in the banking book – 20%.227 Second, the 
interest rate risk requirement for debt securities was also applicable for holding 
an ABS, which included a capital charge for specific risk and general risk. 
Although the general risk charge remained unchanged, the specific risk of 
securitized exposures was differentiated from other instruments. A specific risk 
charge was now applicable to net positions in similar securitized instruments 
i.e. the difference between all long and short positions in a given security.228
                                                          
227 Appendix II, part II, (b).1.1.
228 Appendix II, part II, (b).1.2.
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Therefore, the incremental risk weight for an ABS was the same as that in the 
banking book – 20%. With the general risk calculations unchanged, an 
individual charge of 20% and an additional specific risk charge for net position
in the security implies that the overall risk weight of holding the ABS in the
trading book was likely to be greater than 20%.229
Repo transactions in the trading book were now treated similar to those in the 
banking book and fell under the credit risk mitigation framework. However, 
only the comprehensive approach to credit risk mitigation was allowed for 
trading book exposures. Thus, the applicable risk weight for trading book repo 
was similar to that for banking book repo under the comprehensive approach –
less than 20%.230
4.2.3. Discussion
As in the previous chapter, the main factor for determining incentives for asset 
allocation and securitized banking is the presence of any capital relief between 
the two dimensions of the balance sheet. The focus remains on differing risk 
weights for similar exposures that would result in lower risk weights and 
provide capital relief. Moreover, incentives for asset allocation precede those 
for securitized banking i.e. initial asset allocation will favour the balance sheet 
dimension with lowest risk weights and hence, securitized banking will occur 
through the same dimension. 
The incentive for asset allocation for securitized instruments persisted, although 
to a lesser extent, now favouring the banking book. While similar treatment was 
now applicable to securitized exposures in the banking and trading book, the 
new trading book regime required the risk weights to incorporate both, the credit 
risk and market risk of securitized instruments. A long position in a high-grade
ABS was subject to a lower risk weight of 20% in the banking book as compared 
to a charge greater than 20% in the trading book. Given the range of possible 
risk weights in the trading book, banks could reduce the risk weight to a 
minimum of 20% and receive the maximum capital saving from allocating 
securitized instruments to the banking book. 
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With regard to the incentives for securitized banking, Basel II equalized the risk 
weights for these transactions in both the banking and trading book. The 
standards required similar treatment of repo transactions, regardless of where 
they were booked and were subject to the credit risk mitigation framework, 
which reduced the total credit exposure and hence, capital requirements. 
Although the framework provided two options in the banking book, banks 
would likely opt for the comprehensive approach under both dimensions of the 
balance sheet, as it provided a fuller offset against the collateral and did not 
require any prior supervisory approval. Therefore, securitized banking using 
ABS in the banking book or trading book received the same risk weights, which 
eliminated the previous opportunity for regulatory arbitrage and capital saving. 
However, the post-crisis standards provided banks with an arbitrage opportunity 
between holding a long position in the securitized instrument and securitized 
banking. Under both dimensions of the balance sheet, a long position received 
higher risk weights (20% in banking book and >20% in trading book) while 
funding through repo received lower risk weights (less than 20% in both
banking and trading book). Thus, banks were now more likely to rely on repo 
funding for holding long positions in securitized instruments due to lower 
applicable risk weights and hence, higher capital savings. 
The range of possible risk weights and capital savings illustrate the adverse 
incentives inherent in the post-crisis Basel Accords. The standards continued 
the differential capital treatment of similar assets and transactions between the 
two balance sheet dimensions. Although the capital requirements for securitized 
banking were equalized, the adverse incentives for asset allocation still 
prevailed, now favouring the banking book. The minimum possible risk weight 
of 20% in the banking book was sufficient to encourage asset allocation and 
securitized banking towards the same dimension. Moreover, the post-crisis 
standards created a new arbitrage opportunity for securitized banking due to the 
differential risk weights for long positions in securitized instruments or funding 
them through repo. The latter received significantly lower risk weights, creating 
adverse incentives for banks to undertake securitized banking and reduce 
overall capital requirements.  
Therefore, while the incentives for securitized banking were aligned between 
the two dimensions of the balance sheet, the adverse incentives for holding 
securitized exposures in the banking book prevailed. Banks’ decision to 
undertake securitized banking would be dominated by the capital saving 
achieved through asset allocation towards the banking book and hence, 
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securitized banking would occur through the same dimension. Additionally, 
securitized banking remained cheaper for banks, due to the lower capital 
requirements under both dimensions of the balance sheet, irrespective of the 
underlying risks in these transactions. 
It is pertinent to mention here that although the adverse incentives for asset 
allocation in this analysis might not be sizeable, their presence is also evident 
under the internal model approach. A study using hypothetical portfolios under 
the post-crisis internal model approach finds that incentives for asset allocation 
were reversed from those present before the crisis and post-crisis, the more 
lenient regime was the banking book.231
Thus, initial asset allocation and hence, securitized banking now favoured the 
banking book due to the lower risk weights that allowed banks to reduce both 
total RWA and corresponding capital requirements. With asset allocation 
incentives favouring the banking book, majority of banks’ holdings of 
securitized instruments would be in the same dimension and their subsequent 
use in securitized banking would be undertaken primarily through the banking 
book.
4.2.4. Data Trends
This section examines post-crisis data trends in the same European banks as in 
the previous chapter since the underlying objective is the same i.e. to assess 
whether the hypothesis of the preceding section is correct. Annual financial 
statements of respective banks were used to examine banks’ banking book 
exposures and repo transactions. 
Banking book exposures are represented by debt securities held in the banking 
book as a proportion of total debt securities held by the respective bank. The 
data excludes all types of government securities. This data is used as an 
approximation for the proportion of securitized instruments held in the banking
book since actual data for ABS is not consistently disclosed by the banks under 
review. 
                                                          
231 Giovanni Pepe, ‘Basel 2.5: Potential Benefits and Unintended Consequences’ [2013] Bank 
of Italy Occasional Paper No. 159.
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Bank reliance on repo transactions is represented by the same data used for pre-
crisis illustrations. Repo transactions as a percentage of total short-term 
borrowings is used as an indicator of bank reliance on repo as an additional 
source of short-term funding. Total short-term borrowing excludes customer 
deposits and consists of interbank deposits, commercial paper, securities loaned 
and repo transactions. This demonstrates banks’ use of repo transactions in 
aggregate and therefore, also includes securitized banking.
The trends below suggest that the hypothesis from the previous analysis may be 
correct. In majority of the banks, parallel increases can be seen in the proportion 
of debt securities held in the banking book and bank reliance on repo 
transactions as an additional source of short-term borrowing. This highlights the 
increased asset allocation towards the banking book and the continued increase 
in bank reliance on repo funding in the years after the crisis.
Figure 15: Debt securities held in the banking book
Source: Annual financial statements of respective banks. The figure shows banking book debt 
securities as a percentage of total debt securities (all data excludes government securities). 
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Figure 16: Bank reliance on repo funding (post-crisis)
Source: Annual financial statements of respective banks. The figure shows repo transactions as a 
percentage of total short-term borrowing.
While a parallel increase in repo transactions is not visible for all banks under 
review, what remains prominent is the fact that repo transactions still represent 
a key source of banks’ short-term funding. This supports the hypothesis that 
repo transactions and hence, securitized banking continues to remain a cheap 
source of short-term funding for banks.
The pre-crisis and post-crisis Basel Accords can be compared to determine 
whether the post-crisis regulatory response was effective in eliminating the 
adverse incentives that were present before the crisis. Although the post-crisis 
response met its objective of strengthening the trading book regime, specifically 
for securitized exposures, the revisions did not eliminate the adverse incentives
for asset allocation and bank reliance on repo funding. 
Most importantly, while the post-crisis regulatory response equalized the 
treatment of repo transactions under both dimensions of the balance sheet, it 
failed to strengthen the capital requirements for securitized banking. On the 
contrary, the acceptance of a wide range of eligible collateral for credit risk 
mitigation provided banks with an opportunity to significantly lower the capital 
charges for securitized banking. The pre-crisis banking book regime was 
stricter, applying a risk weight of 20% for securitized banking232 whereas the 
                  
232 Appendix II, part I, (a).2.
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post-crisis accords allowed banks to significantly reduce the capital charge 
below 20%233. Therefore, securitized banking remained an inexpensive source 
of short-term funding for banks. 
Conclusion
This chapter examined the incentives inherent for securitized banking in the
post-crisis Basel Accords to assess its effectiveness in eliminating the arbitrage 
opportunities inherent in the pre-crisis Basel Accords. Similar to the previous 
chapter, the objective was to assess differences between the capital charges for 
securitized banking between the two dimensions of the balance sheet to identify 
the presence (or absence) of any capital relief. The focus remained on differing 
capital requirements for similar exposures, where asset allocation would favour 
the balance sheet dimension with lowest capital requirements and hence, 
securitized banking would be undertaken through the same dimension. 
The chapter finds that the adverse incentives for asset allocation of securitized 
instruments persisted, although to a lesser extent, now favouring the banking 
book. With regards to the incentives for securitized banking, the post-crisis 
standards equalized capital requirements under both the banking book and 
trading book, eliminating the previous opportunity for regulatory arbitrage and 
capital saving. Therefore, while the incentives for securitized banking were 
aligned between the two dimensions of the balance sheet, the adverse incentives 
for holding securitized exposures in the banking book prevailed. Asset 
allocation incentives now favoured the banking book and thus, securitized 
banking would be undertaken primarily through the same dimension. Post-crisis 
data trends in the largest European banks also suggest that this hypothesis may 
be correct. In majority of the banks, similar increases can be seen in the 
proportion of debt securities held in the banking book and bank reliance on repo 
transactions as an additional source of short-term borrowing. This highlights the 
increased asset allocation towards the banking book and the continued bank 
reliance on repo funding in the years after the crisis. 
More importantly, the chapter finds that the post-crisis Basel standards have 
failed to strengthen the capital requirements for securitized banking, which 
remains an inexpensive avenue for banks to obtain short-term funding. 
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Securitized banking received significantly low risk weights, creating adverse 
incentives for banks to reduce their overall capital requirements. Therefore, 
while the post-crisis regulatory response met its objective of strengthening the 
trading book regime, specifically for securitized exposures, the revisions did not 
eliminate the adverse incentives for asset allocation and bank reliance on repo 
funding. Securitized banking remained inexpensive for banks due to the lower 
capital requirements under both dimensions of the balance sheet, irrespective of 
the underlying risks in these transactions.
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Chapter 5
Implementation of the Basel Accords in Emerging 
Economies
This chapter examines the implementation of Basel standards in Emerging 
Economies to determine whether national implementation and trends in bank 
behavior conforms to the theoretical conclusions of the preceding chapters, 
which identified the incentives inherent in the Basel Accords for bank 
involvement in securitized banking. Chapter 3 focused on pre-crisis Basel 
Accords and concluded that there were significant incentives for banks to 
engage in securitized banking primarily through the trading book. Analysis of 
the post-crisis Basel Accords in Chapter 4 illustrates the continuing incentives 
for asset allocation, which now favored the banking book. 
The purpose of this chapter is to highlight that countries implementing the Basel 
Accords also transpose the adverse incentives inherent in these Accords, 
encouraging similar bank behavior. This chapter illustrates that emerging 
economies, both Basel Committee member and non-member states, were 
similarly affected by Basel implementation. While the coordinated 
implementation of Basel Accords leads to harmonization of global financial 
standards, it also increases the likelihood of significant negative spill overs in 
case of a financial shock.
The chapter contributes to the scant research that exists on the dynamics of bank 
behavior and securitized banking in emerging economies. In the aftermath of 
the financial crisis, majority of the research is focused on advanced economies, 
since they are major participants in global financial markets and as experienced, 
key transmitters of shocks worldwide. Since the Basel Accords were 
implemented in almost all countries of the world, the incentives inherent in these 
Accords were present in all financial markets. The findings of this chapter adds 
to current literature by investigating the international dimension of securitized 
banking.
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This chapter aims to assess the national implementation of the Basel Accords to 
answer the third sub-research question: Were the incentives inherent in the 
Basel Accords for securitized banking transposed in all countries that 
implemented them, specifically Emerging Economies?
The following section focuses on Emerging Economies and the countries that 
will be examined in this chapter, proceeded by an overview of Basel 
implementation in these countries. The third and fourth section analyses the pre-
crisis and post-crisis Basel Accord implementation in the chosen countries to 
identify the presence (or absence) of adverse incentives for securitized banking. 
The last section presents descriptive data trends of the countries’ national 
banking sectors that support the theoretical conclusions of the analysis in this 
chapter. 
5.1. Emerging Economies under the spotlight
5.1.1. The Importance of Emerging Economies
Emerging Market Economies (EMEs) refer to developing countries with high-
growth potential, accompanied with high risks and significant market 
volatility.234 These economies are playing an increasingly important role in the 
global economy, accounting for almost two-thirds of global GDP (in purchasing 
power parity terms) and their share of world GDP, private consumption, 
investment and trade nearly doubled in less than two decades.235 These 
countries continue to maintain a dominant presence in the world economy and 
have a significant impact on global growth. 
In the wake of the crisis, it was expected that countries worldwide will decouple 
from the financial meltdown in the US as it was believed that the driving forces 
behind economic growth for advanced and emerging economies are different.236
                                                          
234 Financial times at http://lexicon.ft.com/Term?term=emerging-markets.
235 European Central Bank, ‘The Slowdown in Emerging Market Economies and Its 
Implications for the Global Economy’ [2016] ECB Economic Bulletin p. 1; M Ayhan Kose and 
Eswar S Prasad, Emerging Markets: Resilience and Growth amid Global Turmoil (Brookings 
Institution Press 2010) p. 2.
236 Barry Eichengreen, ‘Lessons of the Crisis for Emerging Markets’ (2010) 7 International 
Economics and Economic Policy 49; Michael Dooley and Michael Hutchison, ‘Transmission 
of the U.S. Subprime Crisis to Emerging Markets: Evidence on the Decoupling-Recoupling 
Hypothesis’ (2009) 28 Journal of International Money and Finance 1331; Roubini and Mihm 
(2011) ch 5.
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However, the adverse impacts of the crisis was felt by countries worldwide, 
revealing the increased interconnectedness and vulnerabilities amongst global 
financial markets and institutions. Shocks from advanced economies’ financial 
systems rapidly spread to several EMEs during the crisis, disrupting their 
markets and curtailing their short-term growth prospects.237
While globalization, innovation and deregulation led to significant growth and 
positive economic benefits around the world,238 these factors created greater 
linkages across financial institutions and increased their exposure to common 
sources of risk, magnifying shocks and their impact on the real economy.239
“Both increased interconnections and common exposure to risk make the 
banking sector more vulnerable to economic, liquidity and information 
shocks.”240 Moreover, innovation that created new financial instruments 
increased the complexity of banks’ balance sheets, converging banks’ risk 
profiles and thus, creating new channels of interdependency between financial 
institutions.241
Several scholars concur on the increased globalisation and interconnectedness 
of financial markets.242 A recent empirical research investigates whether the 
global banking system has become more interdependent and susceptible to 
shocks by analysing the increase in co-dependence in default risk of commercial 
banks around the world.243 The research shows a significant increase in default 
risk co-dependence in the years prior to the crisis, highlighting the increased 
interdependence and fragility across financial markets and financial institutions. 
The study also finds that this increase in co-dependence has been greater for 
integrated countries with liberalized financial systems but the negative impact 
from financial openness can be mitigated by the presence of a strong 
institutional environment. 
                                                          
237 Kose and Prasad (2010).
238 Raghuram G Rajan, ‘Has Finance Made the World Riskier?’ (2006) 12 European Financial 
Management 499.
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241 ibid.
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The global financial crisis raised doubts about the ability of EMEs to shield 
themselves from shocks in advanced economies. Although EMEs withstood the 
global recession from the crisis, there is variation in the degree of resilience 
displayed within groups of EMEs, with Asian emerging markets, especially 
China and India, being more resilient than European emerging markets.244 This 
variation is primarily due to differences in policy choices and structural factors, 
where EMEs with disciplined macroeconomic policies, less dependence on 
foreign finance, higher levels of foreign exchange reserves and underdeveloped 
financial markets were less affected by the crisis.245
Owing to the strong potential of sustained long-term growth of EMEs, the shift 
in focus towards these economies as major drivers for global growth is expected 
to continue.246 EMEs will remain an important component of the global 
economy, thus it is essential for these economies to maintain open and 
liberalized financial markets to participate in global financial markets. 
However, “…liberalization and financial openness that are not accompanied 
by appropriate prudential regulation and supporting institutions to ensure 
effective monitoring, are likely to result in excessive risk-taking and higher 
incidence of crises.”247 Efficient financial systems, supported by financial 
regulation suitable for the institutional and capacity constraints present in EMEs 
is not only essential for them to achieve their growth and development potential
but also to counteract the build-up of risk-taking and spillover due to financial 
linkages.248 An appropriate incentive framework, developed and shaped by 
prudential regulation is crucial for ensuring systemic stability, specifically for 
large international banks and cross-border financial markets.
The Basel Committee was set up to promote convergence of international 
banking standards in order to harmonize regulation within its member states (G-
10 countries), by proposing guidelines and recommendations of best practice 
for national authorities.249 These standards are soft law and therefore, not legally 
binding unless implemented by national authorities in their legislation. The 
Basel Accords were solely formulated and intended for G-10 countries, 
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following several meetings between banking supervisory authorities of its 
member states, aimed at large international banks operating within member 
countries. The Basel Accords were not intended for non-member states, which 
included EMEs and other developing countries, hence these countries were not 
actively involved in the standard-setting process and were excluded from the 
formulation of the Basel Accords.
However, the Basel Accords became the benchmark for financial regulation 
worldwide, signaling regulatory strength and financial stability. Non-member 
states were encouraged and expected to implement the standards for banks with 
significant international activities. Consequently, the adoption of Basel Accords 
became a necessity for inclusion in global financial markets. Soon enough, the 
Basel Accords were transposed into national laws of Basel Committee member 
and non-member states, hence applied to banks worldwide. The main focus of 
the Basel Accords is prescribing minimum capital requirements based on risk-
weighted assets (RWA). While national authorities have the option to stipulate 
higher capital levels for their banking system, they have little discretion on the 
calculation of RWA. Thus, national implementation of the Basel Accords can be 
considered as an exogenous legal change for non-member states, which have 
limited options to deviate from the structure and methodology of these 
standards.
Although the Basel Accords state their unsuitability as the optimal emerging 
market banking reform, the standards have been criticized for exerting undue 
pressure on EMEs in order to participate in global financial markets.250 Thus, 
Basel implementation within EMEs could create a false sense of security within 
their financial sector while creating new, less obvious risks for its banks.251 An 
empirical study examined the impact of Basel implementation by comparing the 
behaviour of banks in emerging and developed countries (G-10) i.e. non-BCBS 
member states and BCBS member states.252 The results show that EMEs
commercial banks prefer excessive risk-taking and under-capitalized banks take 
risky decisions to boost capital whereas banks within BCBS member states 
appear to act more consistently with regulators’ expectations.253 Even Basel II, 
which was supposed to be more risk-sensitive, was not tailored for EMEs and
faced criticism for the flexibility and discretion provided to banks for complex 
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capital requirement calculations which could overwhelm EMEs regulatory 
systems.254 In the instance that EMEs lack sufficient skills and resources, central 
bankers may become laidback and allow private banks to manage their risks 
without proper oversight, incentivizing banks to take upon risks that might 
increase the possibility of collapse.255
The evolution and interconnectedness of financial markets emerged during the 
crisis, revealing the importance of EMEs as major contributors to the global 
economy. To complement these developments in global financial markets, the 
Basel Committee extended its membership after the crisis and it now comprises 
of 28 members. The membership expanded to include many EMEs such as 
South Africa, Brazil and India. These economies are now actively involved in 
the standard setting process, most recently for the current regulatory framework, 
Basel III. However, the earlier Basel Accords (Basel I and II) still represent an 
exogenous legal change for EMEs, thus the focus remains on these countries.  
5.1.2. Countries under review
There is currently no consensus on the exact parameters or a precise set of 
countries that are classified as EMEs. However, institutions such as the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank along with big market 
index makers use detailed methodologies to classify these economies, which are 
widely accepted as being representative of EMEs. Therefore, the countries 
under review are those that are classified as EMEs by major institutions and 
market indices.256 The countries classified as EMEs are the BRICS i.e. Brazil,
Russia, India, China, South Africa and Chile, Colombia, Hungary, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines, Poland, Thailand, Turkey. Some countries could 
not be examined due to informational limitations (unavailability of historical 
data and regulations) and language barriers (inability to access required data). 
These countries are Brazil, Russia, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Turkey.
Securitisation markets are still at an early stage of development in majority of 
EMEs, although some markets exhibit a significant level of development in 
                                                          
254 Barth, Caprio and Levine (2008).
255 ibid.
256 These include IMF, World Bank, FTSE, MSCI, S&P, EM Bond index, Dow Jones and 
Russell.
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terms of size and complexity of securitized instruments.257 Majority of EMEs, 
even those with relatively large markets, use plain vanilla securitized 
instruments and the largest securitisation markets operate in Brazil, Chile, India, 
Malaysia and South Africa.258
Two criteria have influenced the choice of countries for this chapter. The first 
criterion concerns the availability of securitized collateral in the national 
banking system. Since securitized instruments are the fundamental ingredient 
for securitized banking, an active securitisation market should be the premise 
for country selection. While Hungary has no securitisation market at all, 
emerging economies like Poland, China and Philippines have developed 
banking sectors but the securitisation market is either insignificant or was 
insufficiently developed before the crisis.259 For instance, securitisation activity 
in most of these countries started in 2005 and hence, was at an early 
development stage when the crisis hit. As the aim is to assess bank behavior 
before and after the crisis, a relatively young securitisation market preceding 
the crisis would be insufficient to support bank involvement in securitized 
banking.
A first step is to look at the securitisation market in advanced economies before 
and after the crisis. Observing the trends for new issuance of securitized 
instruments in US and EU, it is visible that while the magnitude of securitisation 
differs between the economies, similar data trends prevail. In the years before 
the crisis, securitisation issuance grew steeply to reach peak levels, followed by 
a decline in post-crisis issuance. It must be noted that the graphs show the entire 
securitisation market and includes issuance of all types of asset-backed
securities (ABS). The recent financial crisis was primarily centered on 
mortgage-backed securities, thus the steep declines during 2007-2008 indicate 
the negative impact on the securitisation market from these securities. However, 
issuance of other types of securitized instruments continues.
                                                          
257 Emerging Markets Committee of the IOSCO (2010).
258 ibid.
259 See ibid supra note 20, p. 15. for Hungary, OECD Publishing, OECD Economic Surveys -
Poland (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2008) p. 124 for Poland, 
Takeshi Jingu, ‘Significance of Restart of Asset Securitization in China’ (2013) 176 Nomura 
Research Institute Ltd. p. 1–2 for China,
https://asianbondsonline.adb.org/philippines/structure/rules/specialist.phpandhttp://www.bsp.g
ov.ph/financial/financial/fixed.asp for Philippines.
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Figure 17: United States – Total Asset-backed Securities Issuance (USD 
Billion)
Source: Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA)
Figure 18: European Union – Total Asset-backed Securities Issuance (USD 
Billion)
Source: Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA) in combination with the 
Association for Financial Markets in Europe (AFME). European data has already been converted 
to dollars by the source.
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The second criterion concerns the eligibility of securitized instruments as 
collateral for repo transactions. Restrictions on the use of securitized 
instruments as collateral is effectively a restriction on securitized banking. 
Hence, EMEs like India, Indonesia and Thailand which primarily allow 
government securities and do not permit the use of privately issued securities as 
collateral in transactions are excluded.260
Following these criteria, EMEs that are suitable candidates are South Africa and 
Malaysia. Both countries have an active securitisation market since the early 
2000s and also allow the use of private securities as collateral in repo 
transactions. While the banking system and securitisation market for these 
countries differ in scale, Malaysia being smaller, they both provide banks with 
the necessary elements for securitized banking. 
The active securitisation market in South Africa is demonstrated by Figure 19, 
which presents total ABS issuance, which started in 2002 and followed a steep 
development in the years before the crisis.261 Post-crisis, the level of 
securitisation issuance has declined but the securitisation market still remains 
active, with total new issuance of 35 million (Rand) in 2016. Thus, even after 
the crisis, the securitisation market in South Africa continues to provide banks 
with securitized instruments that are available for use in securitized banking.
                                                          
260 See Reserve Bank of India, Guidelines for Uniform Accounting for Repo/Reverse Repo 
Transactions (IDMC3810/110810/2002-03 2003) pt. 4 for India, 
https://www.set.or.th/tsd/en/service/repo.html for Thailand and
https://asianbondsonline.adb.org/indonesia/structure/instruments.php for Indonesia.
261 The reason behind the decline in issuance in 2004 could not be identified from the available 
information. 
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Figure 19: South Africa – Total Asset-backed Securities Issuance (Rand 
Million)
Source: The Banking Association of South Africa 
The securitisation market in Malaysia (Figure 20) follows a similar trend. The 
market has been active since early 2000s with a steady increase in the years 
preceding the crisis but with a sharp fall during 2006, which the market 
immediately recovered from in the following year. Total securitisation issuance 
was severely affected by the financial crisis, with the market unable to recover
from the decline in activity and new securitisation issuance remains halted since 
2011.262
                  
262 The reasons behind the sharp decline in 2006 and the current standstill in securitisation 
issuance could not be identified from the available information.
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Figure 20: Malaysia – Total Asset-backed Securities Issuance (Ringgit 
Million)
Source: Bond Info Hub Malaysia
Although there has been no improvement in the issuance of ABS since 2011, 
the securitisation market is still active when considering sale/purchase 
transactions of outstanding securitized instruments. While these transactions of 
outstanding securitized instruments have followed a trend similar to ABS
issuance, the demand for these instruments still exists, even if to a lesser extent 
than before.
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Figure 21: Malaysia – Asset-backed Securities Sale/Purchase (Ringgit 
Million)
Source: Bond Info Hub Malaysia
The trends above concerning the availability and eligibility of securitized 
instruments for use in repo transactions make South Africa and Malaysia 
appropriate candidates for additional research. The next section outlines the 
implementation of the Basel Accords in these EMEs from the initial Basel I 
Accord to the current regulatory framework, Basel III.
5.2. Implementation of the Basel Accords 
5.2.1. Implementation in South Africa
The banking sector in South Africa is regulated and supervised by the South 
African Reserve Bank, the Central Bank, in terms of ‘The Banks Act’ and 
applicable regulations are issued under the ‘Regulations Relating to Banks’.263
The Reserve Bank periodically reviews the legal framework for the regulation 
and supervision of banks to identify possible amendments, in order to remain in 
line with global banking standards. All institutions conducting the business of a 
bank, whether foreign or local, are subject to similar regulations.
                  
263 “The Banks Act, 1990” (No. 94 of 1990) including the “Banks Amendment Act, 2003” (No. 
19 of 2003) and “Regulations Relating to Banks”, Government Notice No. R. 628 (1996).
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In the years preceding the crisis, South Africa had fully implemented both Basel 
I and the Market Risk Amendment for its banking sector. Although all financial 
institutions were subject to similar regulations, the applicable capital 
requirements differed if a bank had the business of trading in financial 
instruments.264 This differential treatment of capital requirements started with 
national implementation of the Market Risk Amendment through the 
‘Regulations relating to Capital-Adequacy Requirements (CAR) for banks’
trading activities in financial instruments’, effective from October 1998 for all 
banks involved in trading activities.265 For banks not involved in significant 
trading activities, the Basel I Accord was applicable through the ‘Regulations 
relating to banks’, effective since 1996.266
To stimulate securitisation activity, the South African Reserve Bank introduced 
the ‘Securitisation Schemes’ framework in December 2001, which adhered to 
the securitisation standards suggested by the Basel Committee Securitisation 
Group. Prior to this, banks were restricted from being involved in securitisation 
activities, mostly due to the complexity regarding their role as originators in 
these transactions. However, this framework provided banks with guidelines 
that allowed them to not only participate in the securitisation market but also to 
fulfil multiple roles within these transactions.
During the global financial crisis in 2008, South Africa implemented the Basel 
II Accord, making it one of the first countries in the world to fully implement 
the Accord while most advanced economies were still in the implementation 
phase. The Basel II Accord was implemented through the issuance of a new set 
of ‘Regulations Relating to Banks’.267 These regulations were further amended 
in 2011 to incorporate the Basel 2.5 Accord in the regulatory framework, 
effective January 2012.268 The timely implementation of the Basel Accords not 
only highlights the importance of global financial inclusion for South Africa but 
also reflects the presence of a strong institutional framework underlying its 
banking system. Implementation of the new Basel Accord, Basel III, has been 
                                                          
264 The Banks Act (2003), section 70(2)(2A)(2B).
265South African Reserve Bank, Regulations relating to capital-adequacy requirements (CAR) 
for banks trading activities in financial instruments, Government Notice No. R. 1058 (1998).
266South African Reserve Bank, Regulations relating to banks, Government Notice No. R. 628
(1996).
267South African Reserve Bank, Regulation Relating to Banks, Government Notice No. R. 3
(2008).
268South African Reserve Bank, Regulation Relating to Banks, Government Notice No. R. 1033
(2011).
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underway since January 2013 and follows the globally agreed implementation 
timeline of a gradual phase-in approach from 2013 till 2019.
A timeline of the Basel Accords implementation in South Africa is presented in 
Appendix III.
5.2.2. Implementation in Malaysia 
The banking sector in Malaysia is regulated and supervised by Bank Negara 
Malaysia, the Central Bank, in terms of ‘The Central Bank of Malaysia Act’.269
The prudential regulation concerning the banking system is implemented 
through ‘The Risk-Weighted Capital Adequacy Framework’, initially issued for 
the implementation of the Basel I framework and subsequently amended to 
implement the Basel II Accords and the current Basel III regime. Besides the 
regulatory framework, Bank Negara Malaysia issues guidelines and circulars, 
as appropriate, to keep the banking system in line with global banking standards. 
All banking institutions are subject to similar regulations.
Malaysia remains excluded from the membership of the Basel Committee, even 
after the Committee’s expansion in 2009 and 2014. This reinforces the 
exogenous influence of the Basel Accords on EMEs, which are not actively 
involved in the standard setting procedure but face expectations similar to 
member states regarding national implementation.
Malaysia implemented the pre-crisis Basel Accords through ‘The Risk-
Weighted Capital Adequacy Framework’, which included the Basel I standards 
and incorporated the Market Risk Amendment, the latter effective from April 
2005.270 The Market Risk Amendment framework, applicable to trading book 
exposures, gave banks a choice between the standardised and internal model 
approach for capital calculations.271 However, the internal model approach was 
not available to banks in Malaysia, regardless of the sophistication of their 
internal models and financial activities.
                                                          
269“The Central Bank of Malaysia Act, 1958”, later repealed and replaced by “The Central Bank 
of Malaysia Act, 2009”.
270Bank Negara Malaysia, Prudential Financial Policy Department, Risk-Weighted Capital 
Adequacy Framework (Basel I – Risk-Weighted Assets Computation), BNM/RH/GL 001 – 21.
271The internal model approach allowed banks to use their own risk models to assess their capital 
requirements, requiring explicit approval by their national supervisory authorities.
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During the crisis, Malaysia was still under the process of implementing the 
Basel II framework, with the standardised approach for capital calculations 
effective since 2008 and the internal model approach allowed only from 2010. 
With regards to the post-crisis regulatory response i.e. the Basel 2.5 Accord, 
Malaysia did not implement these standards, citing in a 2012 report that:
‘The Basel 2.5 enhancement package, which relates mainly to 
strengthened capital requirements for trading book and 
complex securitisation exposures, has yet to be implemented 
in Malaysia, and is not expected to be a priority for Malaysia 
in the immediate term. While these markets and activities have 
developed more noticeably in Malaysia over recent years, 
such activities remain less complex with risks remaining at 
manageable levels (e.g. there are no re-securitisation 
structures in Malaysia)’.272
Hence, following the crisis, amendments were made to the existing Basel II 
framework through ‘The Capital Adequacy Framework (Basel II – Risk-
weighted Assets)’, effective from 2008.273 The Basel 2.5 Accord remains 
unincorporated and is not considered to be a priority for the Malaysian banking 
system. However, implementation of the new Basel III Accord has been 
underway since 2013, in accordance with the globally agreed timeline.
A timeline of the implementation of the Basel Accords in Malaysia is presented 
in Appendix IV.
5.2.3. Discretion for asset allocation between the banking 
book and trading book
Both countries implemented the Basel standards for asset allocation between 
the two dimensions of the balance sheet, following the guidelines for trading 
book definition, intent-based criteria for asset allocation and monitoring 
requirements. 
                                                          
272Financial Stability Institute, ‘FSI Survey: Basel II, 2.5 and III Implementation’ (2012) p. 21.
273Bank Negara Malaysia, Prudential Financial Policy Department, Capital Adequacy 
Framework (Basel II – Risk-Weighted Assets), BNM/RH/PD 032 – 5.
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Pre-crisis Basel implementation in South Africa defined the trading book to 
include banks’ proprietary positions that are “…held for resale or that are taken 
on by the bank with the intention of benefitting, in the short term, from actual 
or expected differences between their buying and selling prices, or from other 
price or interest-rate variations,…”.274 These also included repo transactions in 
the trading book and all exposures were required to be marked to market. With 
regards to monitoring standards, the regulations required that banks have a 
board approved written policy, which “…specifies the criteria for determining 
which on balance sheet items and off balance sheet items are classified as part 
of the bank's trading activities and which of the said items are classified as part 
of the bank's banking activities”.275 In contrast, Malaysia did not specify any 
guidelines or requirements for the trading book, neither the criteria for trading 
book asset allocation nor for monitoring these exposures. 
Absent any asset allocation guidelines in Malaysia, those provided in South 
Africa followed the pre-crisis Basel Accords by relying on the intent-based
criteria for asset allocation and monitoring requirements based on banks’ 
internal policies. Aside from the requirement of a board approved asset 
allocation policy, no specific monitoring guidelines were provided.
Post-crisis implementation in both South Africa and Malaysia was similar to the 
post-crisis Basel Accords. The regulations focused primarily on the guidelines 
for policies and procedures that should be in place for management of the 
trading book. 
Guidelines in South Africa required that banks have written board approved 
policy and procedures, specifying the criteria for determining asset allocation, 
the bank's appetite for trading and should incorporate the bank’s risk 
management capabilities which ensure that “…any transfer of instruments, 
items or assets between the bank's trading book and banking book is duly 
documented and subject to audit verification” and “shall be reviewed by the 
bank on a regular basis but not less frequently than once a year”.276
On the other hand, given the absence of any pre-crisis guidance, post-crisis 
Basel implementation in Malaysia followed the Basel standards in its entirety. 
The regulations specified the trading book definition with asset allocation 
following the intent-based criteria.277 A trading book policy statement was 
                                                          
274 CAR for banks trading activities in financial instruments (21 August 1998) p. 6-7.
275 Regulations Relating to Banks (8 November 2000), Regulation 26(7).
276 Regulations Relating to banks (15 December 2011), Regulation 28(6)(j).
277 Capital adequacy framework (Basel II – Risk-weighted Assets), D.1.2, 5.24 – 5.27.
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required, with clearly defined policies and procedures for determining asset 
allocation in the trading book, including the extent to which these exposures can 
be accurately valued and marked-to-market daily, any legal restrictions that can 
hamper immediate liquidation, any limitations on active risk management and 
the criteria for transferring risk or exposures between the banking and the 
trading book.278 These guidelines did not aim to provide an objective criteria, 
stating that these “…should not be treated as an exhaustive and rigid set of tests 
that a product or group of related products must pass for eligibility in the 
trading book. Rather, the list should serve as minimum or most fundamental 
areas for considerations for overall management of a banking institution’s 
trading book.”279 Moreover, as in the Basel Accords, the focus remained on 
self-surveillance with the responsibility for monitoring asset allocation and the 
presence of clear audit trails assigned to banks’ compliance officers, risk 
manager and/or internal auditors.280
Although the post-crisis asset allocation requirements in both countries, similar 
to post-crisis Basel Accords, were more detailed than those prior to the crisis, 
they remained unchanged with regard to monitoring banks’ asset allocation. It 
continued to focus on self-surveillance and relied on banks’ internal asset 
allocation and monitoring procedures. Moreover, the post-crisis standards
lacked an objective criterion to determine the eligibility of assets for trading 
book allocation. Consequently, absent a clear and objective criterion for asset 
allocation and consistent monitoring, the implementation of Basel Accords in 
both, South Africa and Malaysia, gave banks significant discretion for asset 
allocation between the two dimensions of the balance sheet. 
5.3. Assessment Methodology
The primary focus in the forthcoming sections is to identify the similarities and 
differences between the Basel Accords and their national implementation in 
South Africa and Malaysia. The aim is to identify whether key components in 
the Basel Accords that incentivize securitized banking were also similarly 
implemented, suggesting that incentives inherent in the Basel Accords were also 
transposed into national banking sectors.
                                                          
278 ibid D.1.2, 5.21 – 5.22.
279 ibid D.1.2, 5.23.
280 ibid D.1.2, 5.33 – 5.34.
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This chapter follows the structure and methodology of the previous chapters 
(Chapter 3 and 4) since the purpose of the analysis remains the same. The aim 
is to assess any differences between the capital charges for securitized banking 
through the two balance sheet dimensions, banking book and trading book, to 
identify the presence (or absence) of any capital relief. The focus remains on 
banks’ rationale for minimizing capital requirements for a given transaction by 
minimizing the risk-weighted assets (RWA).
The methodology is to compare the capital requirements for securitized banking 
under different balance sheet allocations, under the pre-crisis (before 2007) and 
post-crisis Basel Accords (2007-2011) in both countries. Similar to the analysis 
in the previous chapters, one specific scenario under the pre-crisis and post-
crisis regulatory phases will be examined. The risk weights applicable to an 
incremental securitisation position under the two balance sheet dimensions will 
be assessed, assuming a high-grade ABS (AAA to AA- or A-1/P-1) and focusing 
on the first leg of the repo transaction. 
The forthcoming analysis of the Basel Accords does not cover the standards in 
their entirety but focuses on the simpler standardised methodology for capital 
calculations and the key components that were previously concluded to 
incentivize bank involvement in securitized banking. The analysis is based on 
legal documents pertaining to Basel Accord implementation in both South 
Africa and Malaysia to examine the set of standards adopted from the Basel 
Accords and those that are unique to the countries’ national legislation. 
However, the legal analysis follows the same procedure as in the preceding 
chapters. Thus, explanations pertaining to standards similar to the Basel 
Accords will be kept concise to avoid repetition but references to the 
corresponding sections in the previous chapters will be provided for 
clarification.
5.4. Pre-crisis Implementation
The pre-crisis Basel Accords include the Basel I Accord for credit risk and the 
Market Risk Amendment for market risk. South Africa and Malaysia both 
implemented these standards in their national legislation. These regulations 
created a separation between the banks’ banking and trading book,281 the former 
                                                          
281 Banking book exposures are long-term investments typically held to maturity and hence, 
more susceptible to borrower default. On the other hand, trading book consists of banks’ short-
term trading strategies, where the main risk stems from liquidating positions in the market.
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following the Basel I framework while the latter calculated through the Market 
Risk Amendment.
The simple stylized balance sheets below, with the risk weights that would be 
assigned to an incremental securitisation exposure in South Africa and Malaysia 
highlight the incentives present for asset allocation and securitized banking 
between the two balance sheet dimensions.
Figure 22: South Africa (Pre-crisis)
 
Figure 23: Malaysia (Pre-crisis)
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5.4.1. Banking book
In both countries, standards applicable to the banking book followed those 
prescribed under the Basel I Accord in their entirety.
In both South Africa and Malaysia, similar risk weights were applicable to a 
long position in a high-grade ABS in the banking book – 20%.282
Moreover, both countries recognized the risk mitigating effect of collateral and 
applicable risk weight corresponded to the underlying asset (not the 
counterparty). Hence, a securitized banking transaction, where the underlying 
asset was the ABS, received the risk weight of the securitized instrument –
20%.283
5.4.2. Trading book
The standards applicable to the trading book were in accordance with the 
Market Risk Amendment, with small deviations in both countries.
In South Africa, the trading book capital requirements provided banks with the 
discretion to operate under either the simplified or building-block approach. The 
simplified approach followed the Basel I methodology and assigned fixed risk 
weights to marketable securities, dependent on residual maturity. The applicable 
risk weights under this approach ranged from 10 to 30%. Thus, a typical 
securitized instrument (long-term maturity) received a risk weight of 30%.284
On the other hand, as explained below, the building-block approach allowed 
banks to significantly reduce the applicable risk weights for the same asset, 
encouraging them to adopt this approach. Therefore, banks had little incentive 
to operate under the simplified approach. This preference can be confirmed by 
examining the proportion of banks that were operating under the simplified 
approach, where only 17 percent (2 out of 12) of trading banks were operating 
under this method in 2006.285 Therefore, the following analysis focuses on the 
building-block approach for banks in South Africa.
                                                          
282 See Appendix V and VI, part I, (a).1.
283 Appendix V and VI, part I, (a).2.
284 Appendix V, part I, (b).1.
285 South African Reserve Bank, ‘Annual Report’ [2006] Bank Supervision Department p. 28.
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The building-block approach in South Africa and the trading book standards in 
Malaysia prescribed risk weights for securitized instruments under the interest 
rate risk requirements, as these securities are sensitive to interest rate 
movements. The underlying methodology for interest rate risk calculation was 
similar in both countries. Total capital charge for interest rate risk consisted of 
specific risk (individual security movements) and general risk (market interest 
rate movements). These capital charges were sensitive to the residual maturity 
and coupon payments of debt securities, therefore the possible scenarios can be 
presented by a range of risk weights.286
Both countries applied risk weights similar to those prescribed in the Basel 
Accords for specific risk calculations, which ranged from 0.25 to 1.60%. 
However, while South Africa followed the Basel Accords entirely in the 
application of general risk, ranging from 0 to 12.50%, the range of risk weights 
for general risk in Malaysia were lower, ranging from 0 to 8.00%. Therefore, a 
high-grade ABS (with varying coupon payments and maturity) received a 
minimum risk weight of 0.25% in both countries, with a maximum of 9.60% in 
Malaysia and 14.10% in South Africa.287
With regards to repo transactions in the trading book, South Africa assigned 
different standards for repo transactions, which incorporated the risk mitigating 
effect of collateral.288 Total RWA were calculated by multiplying the exposure 
with the counterparty risk weight, where only the uncollateralized portion of the 
repo transaction was subject to a risk weight. Therefore, the applicable risk 
weight after risk mitigation would be lower than the counterparty risk weight of 
20% (repo transactions between banks) and the total risk weight applicable to a 
securitized banking transaction would be less than 20%.289
On the other hand, Malaysia followed the Basel Accords and treated these 
transactions similar to other security positions. Thus, the applicable risk weight 
corresponded to that for the underlying ABS – 0.25 to 9.60%.290
                                                          
286 For a detailed explanation of the calculation of interest rate risk under the pre-crisis Basel 
Accords, see chapter 3, section 3.4.2.
287 Appendix V and VI, part I, (b).1.
288 This is a simpler version of the credit risk mitigation framework that was later introduced 
under the Basel II Accord.
289 Appendix V, part I, (b).2.
290 Appendix VI, part I, (b).2.
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5.4.3. Discussion
In both South Africa and Malaysia, the incentive for asset allocation for 
securitized instruments is readily visible and favors the trading book. A long 
position in a high-grade ABS in the banking book received the same risk weight 
in both countries – 20%. However, banks were able to reduce the capital charge 
by allocating the securitized instrument to the trading book. Trading book 
allocation received a maximum risk weight of 14.10% in South Africa and 
9.60% in Malaysia, which corresponds to a reduction in risk weight of 5.9 
percentage points (pp) and 10.4pp, respectively. Thus, banks could achieve a 
minimum capital saving of approximately 30 percent in South Africa (from 20 
to 14.10%) and 48 percent in Malaysia (from 20 to 9.60%).
On the other hand, higher capital savings could be achieved in both countries if 
security specific characteristics allowed reduction in risk weight to the minimum
of 0.25% in the trading book. In this instance, banks could achieve a reduction 
in risk weight of 19.75 pp with a corresponding capital saving of approx. 99%. 
Incorporating the entire range of possible risk weights, initial allocation to the 
trading book allowed banks to achieve a minimum capital saving of 30% in 
South Africa and 48% in Malaysia and a maximum capital saving of approx. 
99% in both countries. 
Similar incentives were also present for securitized banking in both countries. 
The standards equalized the risk weights for long positions in securitized 
instrument and funding it through repo, as both received similar risk weights. 
However, the main arbitrage opportunity was whether banks would undertake 
securitized banking using ABS in the banking book or the trading book. In 
Malaysia, repo using a securitized instrument in the banking book was subject 
to the risk weight of 20% whereas the applicable risk weights for similar 
transaction through the trading book was lower, with a range of 0.25 – 9.60%. 
Therefore, banks could achieve capital savings similar to that for long positions 
in the security i.e. a minimum reduction in the risk weight of 10.4pp with a 
capital saving of 48 percent and a maximum risk weight reduction of 19.75pp 
with a capital relief of approx. 99%. On the other hand, the applicable risk 
weight for securitized banking in South Africa was dependent only on the 
uncollateralized portion of the transaction, hence the risk weight would not only 
be lower than 20% but banks would likely be able to achieve greater capital 
savings. 
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The range of possible risk weights and corresponding capital savings sheds light 
on the adverse incentives inherent in the pre-crisis regulations in both countries, 
akin to those inherent in the pre-crisis Basel Accords. The misalignment of 
capital requirements for similar assets between the banking and trading book 
created significant incentives for asset allocation towards the latter. Thus, 
majority of banks’ holdings of securitized exposures would be in the trading 
book and their subsequent use in securitized banking would be undertaken 
primarily through the same dimension. This conforms to the theoretical 
conclusions of the analysis of the pre-crisis Basel Accords in Chapter 3. 
5.5. Post-crisis Implementation
Post-crisis regulatory response included the amendment of the Basel II Accord 
and introduction of Basel 2.5, which essentially made changes to the Market 
Risk Amendment. The aim was to eliminate the adverse incentives for asset 
allocation and differentiate the trading book treatment of securitized exposures 
from other financial instruments. While both South Africa and Malaysia 
implemented Basel II, only South Africa implemented the Basel 2.5 Accord 
whereas Malaysia made amendments to the existing Basel II framework.
The stylized balance sheets with the Basel II standards for credit risk in the 
banking book and the revised trading book regime for market risk, Basel 2.5 
(South Africa) and amended Basel II (Malaysia), illustrate the continuing 
incentives for asset allocation. While the post-crisis regulatory response aimed 
to equalize the treatment of similar exposures between the two dimensions of 
the balance sheet, the adverse incentives for asset allocation persisted, although 
to a lesser extent than before. 
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Figure 24: South Africa (Post-crisis)
Figure 25: Malaysia (Post-crisis)
5.5.1. Banking Book
Both countries followed the banking book standards prescribed under the Basel 
II Accords entirely. 
Similar risk weights were applicable to a long position in an ABS in the banking 
book, which were dependent on external credit ratings and where high-grade
instruments received lower risk weights. In both South Africa and Malaysia, the 
corresponding risk weight for a high-grade ABS was 20%.291
                                                          
291 See Appendix V and VI, part II, (a).1.
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Both countries also followed the same standards for repo transactions. These 
transactions fell under the credit risk mitigation framework to calculate a 
counterparty credit risk charge, which recognized the risk mitigating effect of 
collateral (including privately issued debt securities). The risk mitigation 
framework provided two approaches. The simple approach followed the Basel 
I strategy, substituting the risk weight of the counterparty with that of the 
underlying collateral. Under this method, securitized banking transactions in the 
banking book would receive a risk weight of 20%.292
On the other hand, the comprehensive approach allowed a fuller offset of 
exposure against the collateral, after accounting for collateral quality by using 
haircuts.293 Under the risk mitigation framework, after the exposure was 
adjusted to account for collateral quality, RWA were calculated as:
ܴܹܣ௥௜௦௞ ௠௜௧௜௚௔௧௜௢௡ =  ܧכ௔ௗ௝௨௦௧௘ௗ ௘௫௣௢௦௨௥௘  ×  ܴ ௖ܹ௢௨௡௧௘௥௣௔௥௧௬
Where, RWA = risk-weighted assets, E* = adjusted exposure and RW = risk weight. These 
abbreviations will be used henceforth. 
The applicable risk weight for the counterparty in an interbank repo transaction 
was 20% (repo between banks). With the exposure reduced to take into account 
collateral quality, the total counterparty credit risk charge would be less than 
20%.294 Due to the range of possible scenarios, it suffices to say that under the 
risk mitigation framework, the adjusted exposure would be lower than the 
original, implying that the total credit risk charge for securitized banking would 
be less than 20%.
5.5.2. Trading book
Both countries amended the trading book treatment of securitized exposures and 
differentiated the treatment of these securities from all other financial 
instruments. However, the applicable standards differed in each country. 
South Africa followed the Basel 2.5 standards whereby securitized instruments 
in the trading book were subject to both a credit risk and a market risk capital 
charge. Banking book capital charges under the standardised approach were 
now applicable along with a specific risk charge for net positions in securitized 
                                                          
292 Appendix V and VI, part II, (a).2.1.
293 For detailed calculations, see Appendix V and VI, part II, (a).2.
294 For a detailed explanation of the process of risk mitigation under the post-crisis Basel 
Accords, see chapter 4, section 4.2.1.
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instruments. Thus, the incremental risk weight for a high-grade ABS was the 
credit risk charge of 20% and an additional specific risk charge to the net 
position in the security, implying that total risk weight would be greater than 
20%.295
On the other hand, Malaysia amended the Basel II framework to strengthen the 
risk weights assigned to securitized exposures. The total interest rate risk charge 
for securitized instruments was increased, with higher risk weights for both 
specific risk and general risk. The specific risk charge ranged from 0.25 to 
3.00% while the general risk charge ranged from 0 to 16.40%. Thus, a high-
grade ABS (with varying coupon payments and maturity) received a minimum
risk weight of 0.25% and a maximum of 19.40%.296
Both South Africa and Malaysia followed the same trading book treatment for 
repo transactions. Capital requirements for trading book repo were similar to 
those applicable to repo in the banking book and were hence subject to the same 
counterparty credit risk charge. However, only the comprehensive approach to 
credit risk mitigation was allowed for trading book exposures. Thus, in both 
countries, the applicable risk weight for securitized banking in the trading book 
was that applicable to banking book repo under the comprehensive approach –
less than 20%.297
5.5.3. Discussion
In both South Africa and Malaysia, the continuing incentives for asset allocation 
of securitized instruments is visible, as risk weights differed between the two 
dimensions of the balance sheet. In South Africa, similar treatment was now 
applicable to individual securitisation exposures in the banking and trading 
book. However, the new trading book regime required an additional specific 
risk charge, implying that the total capital charge would be greater than 20%. In 
this instance, banks could achieve maximum capital saving by allocating 
securitized instruments to the banking book for a minimum risk weight of 20%. 
Therefore, in South Africa, the incentive for asset allocation for securitized 
instruments persisted, although to a lesser extent, now favoring the banking 
book.
                                                          
295 Appendix V, part II, (b).1.
296 Appendix VI, part II, (b).1.
297 Appendix V and VI, part II, (b).2.
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On the other hand, banks in Malaysia were still able to reduce the capital charge 
by allocating securitized instruments to the trading book. A long position in a 
securitized instrument in the trading book received a minimum risk weight of 
0.25% and a maximum of 19.40%, corresponding to a reduction in risk weight 
of 19.75pp and 0.60pp, respectively. Incorporating the entire range of possible 
risk weights, initial allocation to the trading book allowed banks to achieve a 
minimum capital saving of 3% (20 to 19.40%) and a maximum of 99% (20 to 
0.25%).
With regard to the incentive for securitized banking, both countries 
implemented the Basel II standards entirely for repo transactions. These 
transactions were required to be treated similarly, irrespective of the balance 
sheet dimension and were subject to the credit risk mitigation framework. This 
framework recognized the risk mitigating effect of collateral by reducing the 
total credit exposure and hence, capital requirements. Although the framework 
provided two options in the banking book, banks would likely opt for the 
comprehensive approach since it provided a fuller offset against collateral and 
did not require any supervisory approval. Therefore, the standards equalized the 
risk weights for securitized banking as repo using ABS in the banking book or 
the trading book received the same risk weights.
However, in both countries, banks were provided with a new arbitrage 
opportunity between holding a long position in the securitized instrument and 
securitized banking. In South Africa, under both dimensions of the balance 
sheet, a long position received higher risk weights (20% in banking book and 
>20% in trading book) while funding through repo received lower risk weights 
(less than 20% in both banking and trading book). While the banking book 
regime in Malaysia provided the same incentives, those in the trading book are 
more difficult to estimate. On the whole, banks were now more likely to rely on 
repo funding rather than holding long positions in securitized instruments due 
to lower applicable risk weights and hence, higher capital savings. 
The analysis sheds light on the adverse incentives inherent in the post-crisis 
regulations in both countries, similar to those inherent in the post-crisis Basel 
Accords. While the incentives for repo transactions were aligned between the 
two dimensions of the balance sheet, the adverse incentives for asset allocation 
still existed, although to a lesser extent than before, dominating banks’ decisions 
for securitized banking. Despite the fact that both countries strengthened the 
risk weights and differentiated the treatment of securitized instruments from all 
other financial instruments, South Africa applied a more stringent trading book 
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regime whereas Malaysia continued with a more lenient trading book regime. 
Therefore, banks in South Africa would undertake securitized banking primarily 
through the banking book whereas those in Malaysia would continue with 
securitized banking primarily through the trading book.
Most importantly, while the post-crisis standards in both countries equalized the 
treatment of repo transactions under both dimensions of the balance sheet, they 
failed in strengthening the capital requirements for securitized banking. The 
stricter pre-crisis banking book regime assigned a risk weight of 20% for 
securitized banking298 whereas the post-crisis Accords allowed banks to 
significantly reduce the capital charge below 20%299. Owing to these lower 
capital requirements, securitized banking remained an inexpensive source of 
funding for banks in both countries. These results conform to the theoretical 
conclusions of the analysis of the post-crisis Basel Accords in Chapter 4.
5.6. Supporting data trends
This section presents trends in the national banking sector of South Africa and 
Malaysia, in order to assess whether the hypothesis of the preceding section is 
correct. The aim is to illustrate that national implementation of the Basel 
Accords also transpose the incentives inherent in these Accords. Consequently, 
global implementation of the Basel Accords would support similar bank 
behavior and hence, similar incentives for securitized banking. Therefore, data 
trends in this section highlight bank involvement in securitized banking, 
supported by the incentives inherent in the Basel Accords.
It is pertinent to mention here that the trends in this section do not reflect actual
bank involvement in securitized banking due to certain limitations in the 
available data for repo transactions. Firstly, transaction level data which would 
provide details of the underlying collateral are not readily available. Secondly, 
counterparty information is unavailable as the identity of parties involved is 
protected under national laws. Lastly, and most importantly, historical data is 
either not readily available or is inconsistent, thus data before the crisis is not 
comparable with that after the crisis. Therefore, the focus will be on data that 
illustrates the possibility and potential for bank involvement in securitized 
banking. 
                                                          
298 Appendix V and VI, part I, (a).2.
299 Appendix V and VI, part II, (a).2. 
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The timeline used in this section corresponds to the implementation of the Basel 
Accords, starting from the Market Risk Amendment, which is the focal point, 
as it created asset allocation incentives by dividing the balance sheet into the 
banking and trading book. For South Africa, this corresponds to August 1998 
but the absence of a securitisation market makes this unsuitable. The 
implementation of the Securitisation Framework in December 2001 is more 
appropriate as it was the beginning of securitisation activity in the country. 
Therefore, the timeline for South Africa starts in 2002. For Malaysia, the 
timeline starts in 2005 since the Market Risk Amendment was implemented in 
2004. The timeline ends in 2012 for both countries as it corresponds to the 
implementation of the Basel III Accord in January 2013. 
5.6.1. South Africa
The preceding analysis and overview of the Basel implementation suggests that 
bank involvement in securitized banking should be consistent with the 
following two hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: Pre-crisis – Securitized banking occurs significantly through 
the trading book
Hypothesis 2: Post-crisis – Securitized banking occurs significantly through 
the banking book
The data used looks at aggregate repo transactions in the South African banking 
sector and the proportion of these transactions undertaken with securities in the 
trading book. Data is provided by the South African Reserve Bank where repo 
transactions are represented by the ‘loans received under repurchase 
agreements’ category under the two dimensions of the balance sheet. Trading 
book repo is the proportion of repo transactions undertaken through the trading 
book as a percentage of total repo transactions. This data highlights the likely 
avenue for securitized banking i.e. if majority of repo is undertaken through the 
trading book, then it is likely that securitized banking is undertaken through the 
same dimension.
Looking at the aggregate data for the South African banking sector, the trends 
suggest that the hypotheses above may be correct. Figure 26 shows the 
aggregate repo transactions undertaken in the trading book in the years before
and after the crisis.
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Figure 26: Aggregate Repo transactions in the trading book
Source: South African Reserve Bank – Aggregate Banking sector data for repo transactions – Loans 
received under repurchase agreements (December month end balance). The graph shows repo 
transactions in the trading book as a percentage of total repo transactions.
With the implementation of the Market Risk Amendment and the securitisation 
framework in 2001, the percentage of trading book repo transactions increased 
by 23 percentage points (pp), an increase of approximately 43%. Looking at the 
post-crisis Basel Accords, what is evident is that following the implementation 
of the Basel 2.5 framework in 2011, trading book repo transactions fell by 20pp, 
a decline of 25%.
Comparing the proportion of trading book repo and the magnitude of total repo 
transactions in Figure 27 below also reinforces the hypotheses.
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Figure 27: Trading book repo and Total repo transactions
Source: South African Reserve Bank – Aggregate Banking sector data – Loans received under 
repurchase agreements (December month end balance). The graph shows total repo transactions 
(Rand Million) and percentage of repo transactions undertaken through the trading book.
Before the crisis, similar increases can be seen in the level of repo transactions 
and the proportion of repo transactions undertaken in the trading book. As the 
aggregate level of repo transactions increases, the percentage of trading book 
repo transactions also increases. In the years after the crisis (2009-2010), the 
level of repo transactions does not seem to be significantly affected, with the 
proportion of trading book repo transactions falling by 7 pp, a decline of 
approximately 8%. However, the most interesting pattern is in the years 2011-
2012, with total repo transactions increasing but the level of trading book repo 
falling by 25%. This implies a larger increase in banking book repo, which 
corresponds to the implementation of the Basel 2.5 Accord in 2011, concluded 
to be the main source for banks to allocate repo transactions towards the banking 
book.
To highlight the changes in allocation of repo transactions between the two 
dimensions of the balance sheet, Figure 28 provides a comparison of the pre-
crisis and post-crisis proportion of repo transactions undertaken through the 
trading book.
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Figure 28: Comparison of Pre-crisis and Post-crisis repo transactions in the 
trading book
Source: South African Reserve Bank – Aggregate Banking sector data – Loans received under 
repurchase agreements (December month end balance). The figure shows percentage of repo 
transactions undertaken through the trading book.
The figure above shows that the hypotheses regarding the change in allocation 
of repo transactions between the banking and trading book might be true. Repo 
transactions preceding the crisis were increasingly undertaken through the 
trading book (Hypothesis 1) while post-crisis, there was a shift in repo 
transactions towards the banking book (Hypothesis 2). While there might be 
other driving factors for these trends, it is consistent with the preceding analysis.
Although the trends do not highlight the presence or absence of securitized 
banking, they do reflect the likely avenue for these transactions. Against the 
backdrop of an active securitisation market and regulations supporting banks’
use of securitized instruments as collateral in repo transactions, the data trends 
show that banks in South Africa face similar incentives for securitized banking 
as those inherent in the Basel Accords.
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5.6.2. Malaysia
The preceding analysis and overview of Basel implementation in Malaysia 
imply that bank involvement in securitized banking should be consistent with 
the following two hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: Pre-crisis – Securitized banking occurs significantly through 
the trading book
Hypothesis 2: Post-crisis – Securitized banking continues to occur 
significantly through the trading book 
Owing to the limited availability of aggregate data for the Malaysian banking 
sector, data in this section differs from that used for South Africa in two ways. 
First, data pertains only to local banks as they are required to provide more 
detailed balance sheet disclosures than foreign banks. This comprises all 8 local 
banks300 of the Malaysian banking system, which has a total of 27 banks. Data 
from the remaining 19 foreign banks is not included due to limited data 
disclosure. However, this foreign bank exclusion does not significantly impact 
the trends or conclusions of this section as local banks represent majority of the 
Malaysian banking sector. Local bank assets comprised 76% and 75% of the 
total commercial banking sector in 2009 and 2011, respectively.301 Moreover, 
foreign banks represent only around 20% of the assets and deposits of the 
banking system, where the foreign bank share has only marginally increased 
over the last decade.302 Although in terms of number, local banks comprise 
merely one-third of the Malaysian banking system, they represent 75% of the 
banking sector in terms of market share. Therefore, while the data trends do not 
represent aggregate bank behavior, they do reflect majority of bank behavior 
and hence, exclusion of foreign banks does not significantly affect the 
conclusions of this section. 
                                                          
300The local banks include Affin Bank Berhad, Alliance Bank Malaysia Berhad, AmBank 
Malaysia Berhad, CIMB Bank Berhad, Hong Leong Bank Berhad, Malayan Banking Berhad, 
Public Bank Berhad and RHB Bank Berhad.
301 International Monetary Fund, ‘Financial Sector Assessment Program: Malaysia - Financial 
Sector Performance, Vulnerabilities and Derivatives’, vol 14/98 (2014) p. 47. Total commercial 
banking assets (Ringgit Billion) were 1,139 at year-end 2009 and 1,387 at year-end 2011, with 
corresponding local bank assets at 866 and 1,034 respectively. This results in local bank market 
share of 76% in 2009 and 75% in 2011.
302 ibid.
  
128
Second, data used examines the proportion of private debt securities (excluding 
government securities) held in the trading book as a percentage of total trading 
book exposures. These private debt securities include securitized instruments 
and total trading book consists of all debt and equity securities held for trading 
purposes (excluding derivative positions). Data has been aggregated from 
individual banks’ annual financial statements. It highlights the potential for 
banks to undertake securitized banking through the trading book i.e. an increase 
in the proportion of private debt securities in the trading book increases the 
probability of banks to engage in securitized banking through the same 
dimension. 
Observing the aggregate data for local banks in Malaysia, the trends suggest 
that the hypotheses above may be correct. Figure 29 shows aggregate private 
debt securities held in the trading book in the years before and after the crisis.
Figure 29: Private Debt Securities held in the trading book
Source: Financial statements of local banks (December month end balance). The graph shows 
private debt securities (excluding government securities) as a percentage of total trading book 
securities. Total trading book exposures consist of debt and equity securities held for trading 
purposes and excludes derivative positions.
Following the implementation of the Market Risk Amendment in 2004, the 
percentage of private debt securities held in the trading book increased by 7pp, 
an increase of approximately 22%. Post-crisis, Malaysia continued to operate 
under the Basel II framework, which was implemented in 2008. Although the 
crisis seems to have a significant impact on the banks’ balance sheet, the 
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percentage of debt securities in the trading book have increased by 8pp, 
approximately 73%.
Comparing the proportion of private debt securities held in the trading book and 
total repo transactions in Figure 30 below also reinforces the hypotheses. Data 
for total repo transactions is provided by Bank Negara Malaysia and shows total 
repo transactions undertaken by all commercial banks with other financial 
institutions.303 Therefore, the figure below shows majority of bank behavior 
(through local banks) along with total repo transactions in the market. 
Figure 30: Private Debt Securities held in the trading book and Total repo 
transactions
Source: Bank Negara Malaysia and financial statement of local banks (December month end 
balance). The graph shows total repo transactions undertaken by commercial banks with other 
financial institutions (Ringgit Million) and percentage of private debt securities in the trading book.
What is most evident is the significant impact of the crisis on both the level of 
repo transactions and the amount of private debt securities held in the trading 
book. Before the crisis, the increase in repo transactions corresponded with an 
                                                          
303 Separating repo transactions between foreign and local banks is not possible since transaction 
level data is not available and counterparty information is protected under national laws. Repo 
data is only segregated based on the type of transacting institution i.e. government, business 
enterprises, individuals or financial institutions.  
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increase in the proportion of private debt securities. Even after the sharp decline 
in repo transactions during 2007, the proportion of private debt securities in the 
trading book started to increase. During the crisis, along with the fall in repo 
transactions, the percentage of debt securities in the trading book fell by 28pp, 
a decline of approximately 72%. However, in the aftermath of the crisis, both 
the amount of repo transactions and trading book debt securities has steadily 
increased, the latter by approximately 73% since the crisis. This concurs with 
the incentives inherent in the Basel II Accord, which was concluded to 
encourage banks to undertake repo transactions through the trading book.
To highlight the trends between the two dimensions of the balance sheet, Figure 
31 provides a comparison of the pre-crisis and post-crisis proportion of private 
debt securities held in the trading book.
Figure 31: Comparison of Pre-crisis and Post-crisis trading book securities
Source: Financial statements of local banks (December month end balance). The graph shows 
private debt securities in the trading book debt (excluding government securities) as a percentage 
of total trading book securities. 
The figure above suggests that the hypotheses regarding the trend favoring repo 
transactions through the trading book might be true. Repo transactions 
preceding the crisis were increasingly undertaken through the trading book 
(Hypothesis 1) while post-crisis, the trend favoring the trading book continues 
(Hypothesis 2). While there might be other driving factors for these trends, it is 
consistent with the preceding analysis.
Although the data trends do not highlight the presence or absence of securitized 
banking, they do reflect the potential for these transactions and illustrate that 
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banks in Malaysia face similar incentives for securitized banking as those 
inherent in the Basel Accords.
Conclusion
This chapter focused on the national implementation of the Basel Accords in 
EMEs to determine whether countries implementing the standards also 
transpose the incentives inherent in these Accords, thereby encouraging similar 
bank behavior. The chapter followed the structure and methodology of the 
previous chapters to identify regulatory arbitrage by comparing the capital 
requirements for securitized banking under different balance sheet allocations, 
under both the pre-crisis and post-crisis Basel Accords. 
Focusing on EMEs with developed financial markets for securitized banking 
i.e. South Africa and Malaysia, the chapter finds that Basel implementation in 
both countries transposed the incentives inherent in these Accords. Pre-crisis 
regulation in both countries created adverse incentives for asset allocation of 
securitized instruments and securitized banking, akin to those inherent in the 
pre-crisis Basel Accords. Similar results are also present for the post-crisis Basel 
implementation in both countries, with continuing incentives for asset allocation 
of securitized instruments. While the post-crisis standards in these countries 
equalized the treatment of repo transactions under both dimensions of the 
balance sheet, they failed in strengthening the capital requirements for 
securitized banking, similar to the post-crisis Basel Accords. Owing to these 
lower capital requirements, securitized banking remained an inexpensive source 
of funding for banks in both countries. The pre-crisis and post-crisis data trends 
of the national banking sectors of South Africa and Malaysia also suggest that 
these hypotheses may be correct. Although the data trends do not highlight the 
presence (or absence) of securitized banking, they do reflect the potential for 
these transactions and illustrate that banks in both countries face similar 
incentives for securitized banking as those inherent in the Basel Accords. 
The findings of this chapter illustrate that EMEs, both Basel Committee member 
and non-member states, were similarly affected by Basel implementation and 
transposed the adverse incentives inherent in the Basel Accords. Consequently, 
global implementation of the Basel Accords supported similar bank behavior 
and hence, similar incentives for securitized banking. While the coordinated 
implementation of Basel Accords leads to harmonization of global financial 
standards, it also increases the likelihood of a buildup of common risks and 
negative spillovers in case of a financial shock. EMEs will continue to remain 
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an important component of the global economy, thus it is essential for them to
have open and liberalized financial markets. However, an appropriate incentive 
framework supported by prudential regulation is crucial for ensuring systemic 
stability of EMEs, specifically for large international banks and cross-border 
financial markets.
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Chapter 6
Current Basel Regime and Policy Implications
The dissertation so far focused on the previous Basel Accords, evaluating their 
role in incentivising banks to undertake securitized banking transactions and has 
concluded that the previous Basel standards provided banks with significant 
adverse incentives to engage in securitized banking. The previous chapter went 
a step further and focused on Basel implementation in Emerging Economies
(EMEs) to determine whether national implementation and trends in bank 
behaviour conform to the theoretical conclusions of the preceding chapters. The 
chapter illustrated that EMEs, both Basel Committee member and non-member 
states, were similarly affected by Basel implementation and transposed the 
adverse incentives inherent in the previous Basel Accords. 
This chapter will shed light on the current Basel regime, Basel III, to evaluate 
its effectiveness in eliminating the previous adverse incentives for bank 
involvement in securitized banking. Additionally, the chapter will assess 
whether the current Basel regime continues to incentivise banks to engage in 
securitized banking and provide policy implications to address whether current 
policy should be redesigned or reformed more effectively.
This chapter examines the Basel III Accord to answer the final sub-research 
question: Has the current regulation resolved the deficiencies inherent in 
the preceding Basel Accords for securitized banking and does it continue 
to provide incentives for banks to engage in securitized banking?
The previous chapter concluded that global implementation of the Basel 
Accords supported similar bank behaviour and hence, similar incentives for 
securitized banking. As almost all countries in the world have confirmed to 
adhere to the Basel III Accord, this chapter contributes to the current policy 
debate by evaluating the global regulatory regime to examine the incentives for 
securitized banking that are likely to be transposed in national banking sectors. 
The conclusions of this chapter will be informative for policy-level decision 
makers in all countries, even those with underdeveloped securitisation markets, 
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as it will allow them to weigh the benefits and drawbacks of Basel III
implementation for securitized banking and its impact on their banking sectors.
This chapter is broadly divided into two sections. The first section provides an 
overview of the current Basel Accords, not in their entirety but limited to the 
key standards relevant for securitized banking. The second section evaluates 
whether the current Basel regime has resolved the weaknesses of the previous 
Basel Accords and if the incentives for bank involvement in securitized banking 
still prevail. This section also provides policy recommendations for the current 
Basel regime to suggest whether the standards can be reformed to regulate 
securitized banking transactions more effectively. 
6.1. Basel III
The financial crisis of 2007-09 signalled the need for a fundamental reform of 
the global financial regulatory regime to improve financial market resilience 
and minimize vulnerability in financial markets. The Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (BCBS) recognized the lack of appropriate incentive 
structures, poor governance and risk management, which led to the mispricing 
of credit and liquidity risk and resulted in excessive credit growth.304 In 
response to the crisis, the Basel Committee and BCBS member states 
formulated the post-crisis regulatory reform – the Basel III Accord in December 
2010, implemented from 2013 following a gradual phase-in approach whereby 
all parts are expected to be fully implemented by 2019.305
Similar to other Basel Accords, the Basel III standards are minimum 
requirements applicable to internationally active banks and BCBS member 
states are committed to implementing these standards within the time frame 
established by the Basel Committee. For instance, the European Union (EU)
adopted a new legislative package to implement Basel III in 2013, which 
replaced the previous legislations (2006/48 and 2006/49) with a Directive and a 
Regulation called the CRD IV/CRR package.306 The legislative package was 
                                                          
304 Basel III: Responding to the 2007-09 financial crisis at 
https://www.bis.org/bcbs/history.htm.
305 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), ‘Basel III: A Global Regulatory 
Framework for More Resilient Banks and Banking Systems’ (2010) Annex 4.
306 European Banking Authority (EBA) at http://www.eba.europa.eu/regulation-and-
policy/implementing-basel-iii-europe.
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implemented from January 2014, with all specific provisions to be phased-in 
until 2019, in accordance with the BCBS phase-in timeline.307
The BCBS made revisions to the Basel III standards in December 2017, which 
were endorsed by the Group of Central Bank Governors and Heads of 
Supervision (GHOS), the Basel Committee's oversight body.308 This finalised 
Basel III framework is frequently referred to as Basel IV by all market 
participants, since the standards have undergone extensive revisions to update 
capital requirement calculations and improve comparability across banks 
globally. For these final Basel III standards, the BCBS proposes a nine-year 
implementation timetable, with a five-year phase-in period commencing in 
January 2022 and full implementation foreseen from January 2027.309 However, 
since the updated standards have not been officially declared as Basel IV, this 
dissertation will follow the BCBS and refer to the recent revisions as the 
finalised Basel III Accord. 
The Basel III standards aim to address the shortcomings of the pre-crisis 
regulatory framework and strengthen the regulation and risk management of 
banks worldwide to enhance financial stability and develop a resilient banking 
system that will support the real economy.310 The new standards are essentially 
revisions made to the Basel II Accord, which are intended to strengthen banks 
by requiring more and better quality of capital, decreasing bank leverage and 
improving bank liquidity. The Basel III Accord consists of three pillars.311 Pillar 
I centres on the quality and quantity of capital and assigns capital requirements 
for various risks, securitisations, trading book exposures and containing 
leverage. The new standards also impose additional capital requirements on 
global systemically important banks (G-SIBs)312 as they pose higher risks to the 
financial system. Pillar II focuses on risk management and supervision whereas 
                                                          
307 ibid. 
308 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), ‘Basel III: Finalising Post-Crisis 
Reforms’ (2017).
309 ibid p. 2 section 9.
310 ibid p. 1.
311 The Basel III Accord is a complication of documents that jointly represent these global 
standards and can be accessed at https://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3.htm?m=3%7C14%7C572.
312 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), ‘Global Systemically Important 
Banks: Updated Assessment Methodology and the Higher Loss Absorbency Requirement’ 
(2013). Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs) are banks whose business models rely 
heavily on trading and capital markets-related activities. These institutions pose significant 
cross-border negative externalities in case of failure, making them systemically important not 
only locally but also globally. Negative externalities from G-SIBs arise from these institutions 
being too-big-to-fail, being highly interconnected with other financial institutions, operating 
with high levels of complexity and functioning on a global scale.
  
136
pillar III covers market discipline and outlines standards for disclosure 
requirements. Moreover, Basel III introduces a liquidity framework which aims 
to ensure sufficient liquidity in case of severe banking crises and also prescribes 
measures for sound liquidity risk management and supervision. 
The following sections provide an overview of the Basel III Accord, not 
exhaustive in content but providing a summary of enhanced capital 
requirements and key components that are relevant for bank involvement in 
securitized banking. This section focuses firstly on pillar I standards for 
enhanced capital requirements, risk coverage for securitized instruments and 
trading book exposures and secondly, on the new liquidity framework. Pillar II 
and pillar III will be excluded as these standards focus primarily on supervision 
and disclosure requirements and are hence not crucial for bank involvement in 
securitized banking. As mentioned, since there is no official recognition of a 
Basel IV Accord, no distinction will be made between the first Basel III 
framework and the 2017 revisions. Thus, the upcoming overview will focus on 
all final revisions and standards under the Basel III Accord to date. 
6.1.1. Pillar I
Standards falling under the Pillar I category focus on strengthening capital 
requirements through higher quality and quantity of capital, leverage ratios and 
additional requirements for G-SIBs. These standards also outline requirements 
for enhanced risk coverage of credit risk, market risk, securitisations and asset 
allocation between the banking and trading book.
6.1.1.1. Capital and Leverage Requirements
The Basel III Accord strengthened capital requirements by improving the 
quality and quantity of capital held by banks along with several new additions 
such as the capital conservation buffer and countercyclical capital buffer.313
Additionally, the introduction of a leverage ratio and specific guidelines for G-
SIBs are aimed at reducing leverage and improving resilience of the banking 
sector.314 These standards were part of the first round of the Basel III Accord 
and thus, majority of these have been implemented as of date. 
                                                          
313 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), ‘Basel III: A Global Regulatory 
Framework for More Resilient Banks and Banking Systems’ A.
314 ibid.
  
137
Total capital requirements determine the amount of capital that should be 
maintained to guard against unexpected losses. Similar to previous Basel 
Accords, these capital requirements are based on risk-weighted assets (RWA), 
which are calculated by multiplying the asset value by the applicable risk 
weight. 
ܥܽ݌݅ݐ݈ܽ ݎ݁ݍݑ݅ݎ݁݉݁݊ݐ =
ܴ݁݃ݑ݈ܽݐ݋ݎݕ ܥܽ݌݅ݐ݈ܽ
ܴ݅ݏ݇ െ ݓ݄݁݅݃ݐ݁݀ ܽݏݏ݁ݐݏ
ܴ݅ݏ݇ െ ݓ݄݁݅݃ݐ݁݀ ܽݏݏ݁ݐݏ (ܴܹܣ) = ܣݏݏ݁ݐ ݒ݈ܽݑ݁ × ܴ݅ݏ݇ ݓ݄݁݅݃ݐ(ܴܹ)
The risk weights are dependent on the level of riskiness of the asset, where 
assets of high risk receive higher risk weights which increases the total amount 
of RWA and hence, imposes higher capital requirement. Thus, banks need less 
capital to cover exposures to safer assets and more capital to cover riskier 
exposures. ͒
To strengthen the quality and quantity of capital, the new standards place a 
greater focus on banks to hold common equity. The minimum requirement for 
Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) increased from 2% to 4.5% of RWA.315
Moreover, financial institutions are now required to hold a capital conservation 
buffer of 2.5% of RWA using only common equity, phased-in from 2016 and 
effective January 2019.316 This buffer is incorporated to absorb losses during 
periods of financial and economic stress and banks that do not maintain this 
buffer face restrictions on discretionary distributions such as dividend payouts 
and bonuses.317 Basel III also introduces a countercyclical capital buffer to be 
implemented within a range of 0% - 2.5% of common equity, dependent on 
national circumstances and applicable when authorities ascertain an 
unacceptable build-up of systematic risk from credit growth.318
The capital conservation buffer is required in addition to the 4.5% minimum 
common equity requirement.319 Although the overall minimum total capital 
ratio remains the same as before – the Basel ratio of 8% of RWA, the capital 
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conservation buffer increases the total capital requirement to 10.5% of RWA,
of which 7% must be common equity capital. Thus, the new common equity 
requirement is increased from 2% to 7% of RWA. These enhanced capital 
requirements for strengthened definition of capital have been phased-in from 
2013 to 2017.320
Within the Basel III standards, G-SIBs are subject to additional common equity 
requirements to increase their loss absorbency capacity as they pose higher risks 
to the financial system.321 These institutions are identified on the basis of both 
quantitative indicators and qualitative elements. The aim is to dis-incentivize G-
SIBs from increasing their global systemic importance in the future and reduce 
the moral hazard posed by these financial institutions.322 The new Basel 
standards prescribe an additional risk-based capital buffer ranging from 1% to 
2.5% of common equity tier 1 (CET1) for G-SIBs, depending on a bank’s 
systemic importance.323
To restrict individual bank leverage and also contain system wide build-up of 
leverage, Basel III incorporates a minimum leverage ratio – a non-risk-based 
measure to supplement the risk-based capital requirements, phased-in over 2013 
to 2017.324 The leverage ratio is calculated by dividing common equity capital 
(CET1) by the bank's average total assets (including off-balance sheet 
exposures), with a prescribed leverage ratio in excess of 3%.325 The 2017 
revisions impose an additional leverage surcharge for G-SIBs, effective January 
2022, where each such financial institution will incur a surcharge set at 50% of 
its risk-based capital buffer.326 For example, a bank with a 2% risk-based capital 
buffer will have a 1% leverage ratio buffer and thus, will be required to maintain 
a leverage ratio of at least 4% (minimum leverage ratio of 3% + 1% G-SIBs 
surcharge).
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6.1.1.2. Risk Coverage
Basel III aims to restore credibility in the calculation of RWA and improve the 
comparability of banks’ capital ratios, specifically targeting the variation in 
RWA that cannot entirely be explained by differences in the riskiness of banks’ 
portfolios.327 In accordance with the preceding Basel Accords, capital 
requirements are dependent on total RWA, which estimate the riskiness of a 
banks’ activities and determine the minimum level of regulatory capital to 
manage unexpected losses. These RWA incorporate all risk factors impacting 
banks’ activities and include credit risk, market risk and operational risk.
ܶ݋ݐ݈ܽ ܴܹܣ = ܥݎ݁݀݅ݐ ܴܹܣ +ܯܽݎ݇݁ݐ ܴܹܣ + ܱ݌݁ݎܽݐ݅݋݈݊ܽ ܴܹܣ
Following the previous Basel standards, the Basel III Accord also provides 
banks with two alternatives for calculating RWA across all three risk factors, 
namely a standardised approach and an internal model approach.328 While the
internal model approach allows for more accurate risk management, the recent 
financial crisis highlighted the adverse incentives underlying this alternative, 
which gave banks significant discretion over capital calculations and hence
provided an opportunity for regulatory arbitrage to evade capital 
requirements.329 The new Basel standards aim to limit the flexibility for banks 
using the internal model approach by introducing constraints on the estimates 
for capital calculations and, in some cases, removes the use of internal models 
entirely.330 Additionally, an output floor is imposed which limits the regulatory 
capital benefits that a bank using internal models can derive relative to the 
standardised approaches when determining minimum capital requirements.331
The output floor requires that banks’ calculations of RWA through internal 
models cannot fall below 72.5% of the RWA computed by the standardised 
approaches, limiting the capital benefit from using internal models to 27.5%.332
The revisions and restrictions to the internal model approach is effective Jan 
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2022 whereas the output floor follows a phased-in implementation from Jan 
2022 until Jan 2027.333
As concluded in the previous chapters, even with the simpler standardised 
approach banks had significant adverse incentives to engage in regulatory 
arbitrage of capital requirements when undertaking securitized banking 
transactions. Therefore, this section focuses primarily on the standardised 
approach for capital calculations to evaluate the revisions made to improve risk 
sensitivity and resolve the shortcomings of the preceding Basel Accords. The 
Basel III framework has made significant amendments to the standardised 
approaches across the entire risk spectrum for calculating credit risk, market 
risk and operational risk. However, due to the specific focus of this dissertation 
on bank involvement in securitized banking, emphasis will remain on revisions 
made to credit risk and market risk as these are the core risks that impact 
securitized banking transactions. Additionally, the upcoming description of 
revisions made to the credit risk and market risk framework do not cover these 
new standards in their entirety but focus on key components relevant for 
securitized banking transactions. 
6.1.1.2.1. Credit risk
Credit risk is the risk of͒ loss due to a borrower’s failure to repay a loan or fulfil 
contractual obligations and usually accounts for majority of banks’ risk-taking 
activities and regulatory capital requirements. Credit risk related capital charges 
are applicable to exposures and activities undertaken through the banking book. 
The Basel III Accord makes changes to the standardised approach for credit 
risk, which requires banks to apply supervisor prescribed risk weights to 
determine RWA. The main objective is to enhance risk sensitivity by providing 
a detailed risk-weighting approach instead of a flat risk weight and to reduce 
reliance on external credit ratings by requiring banks to conduct sufficient due 
diligence when using external ratings.334 Furthermore, the new standards 
require banks to have a detailed non-ratings-based approach for jurisdictions 
that cannot or do not wish to rely on external credit ratings.335 Majority of the 
revisions to the credit risk framework follow a phase-in implementation from 
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2013 and will be fully implemented until 2019.336 However, the final revisions 
pertaining to external credit ratings were introduced in 2017, to be implemented 
by January 2022.337
With respect to securitisation exposures, a revised securitisation framework was 
introduced in December 2014, which was updated in July 2016 and came into 
effect in January 2018.338 The new framework focused on the shortcomings of 
the Basel II securitisation framework and strengthened the capital standards for 
securitisation exposures held in the banking book. It aimed to address concerns 
over insufficient capital and risk sensitivity for securitized instruments by 
increasing the risk weights for highly-rated securitisation exposures and 
strengthening the capital treatment for complex re-securitisation exposures.339
While the capital requirements have been significantly increased to reflect the 
complexity and risk of securitized instruments, senior securitisation exposures 
backed by high quality assets can still receive risk weights as low as 15%.340
Moreover, the new standards seek to reduce reliance on external ratings by 
reducing the complexity and hierarchy of permissible calculation 
methodologies. As opposed to the several approaches and treatments allowed in 
the Basel II framework, the new standards only allow three approaches while 
also requiring banks to conduct more rigorous credit analyses of externally rated 
securitisation exposures.341
The revised securitisation framework also introduced an alternative capital 
treatment for Simple, Transparent and Comparable (STC) securitisations. This 
criterion is intended to help parties evaluate more thoroughly the risks and 
returns of securitisation and to enable comparison across securitisation products 
within an asset class.342 The aim is to help in the risk assessment of 
securitisation exposures by promoting simplicity in the underlying assets and 
structures, improving transparency to provide investors with comprehensive 
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and reliable information and enhancing comparability of securitisation 
transactions to lower investors’ hurdle for assessing securitisation risks.343
While the Basel III Accord made significant changes to the securitisation 
framework, capital requirements applicable to securitized banking transactions 
still follow the Basel II Accord, which treats collateralised repo transactions 
under the credit risk mitigation framework. In accordance with the Basel II 
Accord, the new standards also allow banks to take advantage from the risk 
mitigation potential of eligible collateral, which is reflected as a reduction in the 
capital charge for credit risk and therefore, lower total capital requirements. 
Eligible financial collateral under the credit risk mitigation framework in the 
Basel III Accord follows the Basel II standards. Privately issued debt securities 
rated investment grade by a recognised external credit rating agency are still 
considered eligible financial collateral.344 Unrated securitized instruments and 
other debt securities are eligible collateral as long as they are issued by a bank, 
listed on a recognised exchange, fulfil the criteria for issuer credit rating (not 
below investment grade) and the supervisor is confident about the market 
liquidity of the security.345 Eligible collateral in jurisdictions that do not allow 
the use of external ratings also include privately issued debt securities as long 
as they are issued by high-grade banks and investment grade entities.346 Re-
securitisation exposures and non-investment grade securities are not considered 
eligible financial collateral.347
Similar to the Basel II Accord, the Basel III credit risk mitigation framework 
gives banks a choice between the simple approach and the comprehensive 
approach in the banking book, with both approaches remaining fundamentally 
unchanged.348 The simple approach replaces the risk weight of the counterparty 
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with the risk weight of the collateral for the collateralised portion of the 
exposure, subject to a 20% floor, to calculate RWA as:349
ܴܹܣ௦௜௠௣௟௘ ௔௣௣௥௢௔௖௛ = ܧݔ݌݋ݏݑݎ݁ ܸ݈ܽݑ݁ ×  ܴ ௜ܹ௦௦௨௘௥ ௢௙ ௖௢௟௟௔௧௘௥௔௟
Where, RWA = risk-weighted assets and RW = risk weight. These abbreviations will be used 
henceforth. 
Whereas, the comprehensive approach allows for a fuller offset against 
collateral, applicable to the exposure rather than the risk weight, as below: 
ܴܹܣ௔௙௧௘௥ ௥௜௦௞ ௠௜௧௜௚௔௧௜௢௡ = ܧכ௔ௗ௝௨௦௧௘ௗ ௘௫௣௢௦௨௥௘  ×  ܴ ௖ܹ௢௨௡௧௘௥௣௔௥௧௬
The adjusted exposure (E*) under the comprehensive approach incorporates the 
risk mitigating effect of collateral by reducing the exposure with a discounted 
value of collateral using volatility-adjusted haircuts.350 The Basel standards 
provide banks with applicable supervisory haircuts which are used to adjust 
both the amount of the exposure and the value of collateral to incorporate 
possible fluctuations in the value of either.351 The amount of haircut is linked to 
the credit rating of collateral – high credit ratings represent low risk and hence, 
receive lower haircuts. Standard supervisory haircuts range from zero (cash) to 
30% (non-main index equities) and those for debt securities are dependent on 
issue rating, residual maturity and issuer type (sovereigns, banks or 
corporates).352 Haircuts are also applicable to unrated exposures where these are 
considered eligible collateral for risk mitigation.353
What has essentially changed in the Basel III standards is that the credit risk 
mitigation framework enhances the risk sensitivity to collateralised transactions 
where the underlying is a securitized instrument. Supervisory haircuts for 
comprehensive approach now differentiates between securitisation exposures 
and other financial instruments.354 The objective is to increase the risk 
sensitivity to complex financial instruments by increasing the applicable 
haircuts for securitized instruments to incorporate their higher risk. For the same 
credit rating, haircuts for securitisation exposures range from 2 to 24% while 
                                                          
349 ibid D.3.ii.146-147.
350 ibid D.2.i.133.ii.
351 ibid D.3.iii.a.155.
352 ibid D.3.iii.c.163 Table 14.
353 ibid.
354 ibid.
  
144
those applicable to debt securities from other issuers range from 1 to 20%.355
These higher haircuts and exclusion of non-investment grade securitized 
instruments from the risk mitigation framework aims to increase the capital 
requirements for securitized banking. 
To determine total RWA, the risk weight applicable to the counterparty falls 
under the Basel III standard for exposures to banks as repo is an interbank 
transaction. The current standards aim to reduce the reliance on external credit 
ratings and differentiate between jurisdictions that allow the use of external 
credit ratings for regulatory purposes and those that do not.356 Exposure to banks 
in jurisdictions that allow the use of external credit ratings is risk-weighted
according to the External Credit Risk Assessment Approach (ECRA), which 
similar to the preceding Basel II Accord assigns fixed risk weights dependent 
on the bank’s credit rating. The risk weights range from 20% for highly rated 
banks (AAA to AA-) to 150% for banks rated below B- while those for short-
term exposures range from 20% for investment grade banks (AAA- to BBB-)
to 150% for banks rated below B-.357 On the other hand, exposure to banks in 
jurisdictions that do not allow the use external ratings is risk-weighted
according to the Standardised Credit Risk Assessment Approach (SCRA).358
This approach classifies exposures to banks into three buckets – Grades A, B 
and C and assigns risk weights of 40%, 75% and 150% to all exposures and 
20%, 50% and 150% to short-term exposures, respectively.359 Under both 
approaches, exposures to banks with an original maturity of three months or less 
are assigned the risk weight for short-term exposures.360
6.1.1.2.2. Market risk
Market risk refers to the risk of loss arising from fluctuations in market prices 
from banks’ trading activities and the capital charges for market risk are 
applicable to exposures held within the trading book. In January 2016, the Basel 
III framework introduced revisions to the trading book regime (Basel 2.5), 
which significantly altered the risk calculations for both the standardised 
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approach and the internal model approach.361 These changes to the market risk 
framework replaced the existing capital requirements for market risk, including 
all amendments made after Basel II. The revised market risk framework is to be 
implemented by January 2019 as final rules under national legislation whereas 
regulatory reporting by banks under the new standards is expected by end 
2019.362 The current standards make significant changes to the entire market 
risk framework including a revised standardised approach, a revised internal 
model approach and incorporation of illiquidity risk within both approaches to 
mitigate the risk of a sudden impairment of market liquidity.363
The revised standardised approach fundamentally overhauls the previous 
methodology to improve risk-sensitivity for all exposures in the trading book, 
both non-securitisation and securitisation exposures. The standardised approach 
capital charge for market risk is now a summation of three key components: 
ܯܽݎ݇݁ݐ ܴ݅ݏ݇ ܥ݄ܽݎ݃݁ =
ܵ݁݊ݏ݅ݐ݅ݒ݅ݐ݅݁ݏ ܤܽݏ݁݀ ܥ݄ܽݎ݃݁ + ܦ݂݁ܽݑ݈ݐ ܴ݅ݏ݇ ܥ݄ܽݎ݃݁ +
ܴ݁ݏ݅݀ݑ݈ܽ ܴ݅ݏ݇ ܣ݀݀ െ ݋݊363F364
The sensitivities based method uses sensitivities in some risk treatments and 
assigns capital charges for these unique risks (delta, vega and curvature risk) 
across all asset classes and financial instruments.365 The default risk charge 
captures the default risk of both non-securitisation and securitisation exposures 
in the portfolio and is calibrated to the credit risk treatment in the banking 
book.366 This aims to reduce the discrepancy in capital requirements for similar 
risk exposures across the two balance sheet dimensions. Lastly, the residual risk
add-on accounts for any risks not captured within the other two capital charges 
to ensure sufficient coverage of market risks for more sophisticated trading book 
instruments.367
                                                          
361 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), ‘Minimum Capital Requirements 
for Market Risk’ (2016).
362 ibid p. 4.
363 ibid p. 1.
364 ibid B.2.i.47.
365 ibid B.2.i.47.a. Delta is a risk measure based on sensitivities of a bank’s trading book to 
regulatory delta risk factors whereas vega is a similar risk measure based on sensitivities to 
regulatory vega risk factors. Curvature is a risk measure which captures the incremental risk 
not captured by delta risk when valuing an option. The entire range of asset classes and risks 
include General Interest Rate Risk (GIRR), Credit Spread Risk (CSR) for securitisation and 
non-securitisation exposures, Foreign Exchange (FX) risk, equity risk and commodity risk.
366 ibid B.2.i.47.d.
367 ibid B.2.i.47.e.
  
146
Thus, with respect to holding securitized instruments in the banks’ trading book, 
the new standards completely overhaul the previous risk weight requirements 
under the Basel II Accord. Market risk requirements for holding securitized 
instruments in the trading book have significantly strengthened and incorporate 
risk-sensitivities that were not accounted for in the previous standards. 
Moreover, securitisation exposures in the trading book are now excluded from 
the internal model approach and are required to be capitalised under the revised 
standardised approach.368
However, the focal point of this dissertation is the capital requirements 
applicable for securitized banking transactions, which uses securitized 
instruments as collateral in repo transactions. The Basel III standards require 
that banks calculate a counterparty credit risk charge for repo transactions in the 
trading book, separate from the capital charge for general market risk.369 Banks 
are required to calculate this counterparty charge for trading book repo 
transactions using the comprehensive approach under the Basel II credit risk 
mitigation framework.370 Thus, the new standards follow the preceding Basel II 
standards for securitized banking transactions in the trading book, whereby 
capital charges for these transactions fall under the comprehensive approach of 
the banking book risk mitigation framework. All instruments held in the trading 
book may be used as eligible collateral for risk mitigation, thus all instruments 
that fall under the banking book definition of eligible collateral can also be used 
for risk mitigation in the trading book.371
Therefore, securitized banking transactions under the Basel III Accord follow
the same guidelines as those prescribed under the Basel II standards, requiring 
banks to use the comprehensive approach under the risk mitigation framework 
(described in the previous section). While the risk mitigation framework in the 
banking book provides banks with two options for capital charge calculation, 
banks would likely opt for the comprehensive approach under both dimensions 
of the balance sheet for securitized banking, as it provides a fuller offset against 
the collateral and does not require any prior supervisory approval. 
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6.1.1.3. Asset allocation between the banking book and trading 
book
The Basel III standards for market risk also aim to strengthen the boundary 
between the banking and trading book by establishing an objective criterion for 
asset allocation and reduce arbitrage incentives by placing stricter limits and 
capital disincentives to the transfer of instruments between the two dimensions 
of the balance sheet.372 Any deviations from these standards would lead to 
supervisory review which may initiate reallocation of assets in either regulatory 
book if an instrument is deemed to be improperly designated.373 The asset 
allocation standards were introduced as part of the revised market risk 
framework in January 2016, expected to be fully implemented by January 2019.
The revised boundary treatment outlines an objective criterion for instruments 
that must be included in the banking book or trading book. The Basel III 
framework follows the Basel II Accord to define the components of the trading 
book. Trading book exposures include all financial instruments, foreign 
exchange and commodities given that there is no legal impediment against 
selling or fully hedging the instruments and they are valued daily.374 The revised 
boundary abandons the arbitrary requirement of ‘trading intent’ that was used 
under the previous Basel Accords and requires that, ‘Any instrument a bank 
holds for one or more of the following purposes must be designated as a trading 
book instrument: (a) short-term resale; (b) profiting from short-term price 
movements; (c) locking in arbitrage profits; (d) hedging risks that arise from 
instruments meeting criteria (a), (b) or (c) above.’375 It specifically requires that 
‘…any instrument which is not held for any of the purposes listed above must 
be assigned to the banking book.’376
Moreover, the boundary criterion also assigns certain instruments and activities 
to the trading book which the banks generally hold for trading purposes. 
Trading-related repo transactions, instruments from market-making and those 
held as trading assets or liabilities for accounting purposes are required to be 
held in the trading book, as there is a general presumption that such instruments 
are being held for at least one of the purposes required for the trading book 
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instrument classification above.377 If the bank needs to deviate from this 
presumptive list, an explicit supervisory approval is required based on evidence 
that the instrument is held for different purposes and these deviations must be 
documented on an on-going basis.378
Besides these requirements, the new standards also provide more supervisory 
tools to help ensure consistent implementation of the boundary across banks. 
The supervisor may require banks to provide evidence that an instrument held 
in either regulatory book is in accordance with the Basel criteria and re-assign 
instruments to the appropriate book in case of insufficient evidence or if the 
supervisor believes that the instrument customarily would belong to a different 
balance sheet dimension.379 The Basel III standards also outline documentation 
requirements that must be subject to periodic internal audit and the results must 
be available for supervisory review. Banks are required to have clearly defined 
policies, procedures and documented practices for determining asset allocation 
to the trading book and conduct on-going evaluation of instruments both in and 
out of the trading book to assess whether its instruments are being properly 
designated initially as trading or non-trading instruments.380
The new Basel standards for asset allocation also aim to address weaknesses 
previously seen in the boundary between the banking and trading book by 
reducing the possibility of arbitrage between the two balance sheet dimensions. 
To reduce the opportunities for regulatory arbitrage and eliminate the asset 
allocation discretion provided by previous Basel regulations, the Basel III 
Accord specifies restrictions on moving instruments between the two regulatory 
books, stating that: 
“There is a strict limit on the ability of banks to move 
instruments between the trading book and the banking 
book by their own choice after initial designation … . 
Switching instruments for regulatory arbitrage is 
strictly prohibited. In practice, switching should be rare 
and will be allowed by supervisors only in 
extraordinary circumstances. Possible examples could 
be a major publicly announced event, such as a bank 
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restructuring that results in permanent closure of 
trading desks, requiring termination of the business 
activity applicable to the instrument or portfolio or a 
change in accounting standards that allows an item to 
be fair-valued through the P&L. Market events, 
changes in the liquidity of a financial instrument, or a 
change of trading intent alone are not valid reasons for 
re-designating an instrument to a different book.”381
Moreover, any re-designation between the two regulatory books requires 
explicit approval by both the supervisor and senior management, which must be 
thoroughly documented and publicly disclosed.382 Also, any re-designation 
between the balance sheet dimensions is irrevocable.383
With regard to regulatory arbitrage due to discrepancies or switching between 
the two dimensions of the balance sheet, the standards also provide specific 
guidelines: 
“Without exception, a capital benefit as a result of 
switching will not be allowed in any case or 
circumstance. This means that the bank must determine 
its total capital charge (across banking book and 
trading book) before and immediately after the switch. 
If this capital charge is reduced as a result of this 
switch, the difference as measured at the time of the 
switch will be imposed on the bank as a disclosed Pillar 
1 capital surcharge, which will be allowed to run off as 
the positions mature or expire.”384
Therefore, the Basel III asset allocation standards mitigate regulatory capital 
arbitrage by imposing strict limits on the movement of instruments between the 
two dimensions of the balance sheet. In case of a discrepancy arising from the 
capital charge on an instrument or portfolio, whereby it is reduced as a result of 
switching (in the rare instances where this is allowed), the difference in charges 
is imposed on the bank as a fixed, additional Pillar 1 capital charge. This 
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eliminates all opportunities for regulatory capital arbitrage from asset 
allocation, as any benefits that would have previously been realised by the bank 
are now imposed in the form of an additional capital charge within the Pillar I 
framework. 
The revised boundary treatment removes the previous arbitrary ‘trading intent’ 
criterion and introduces an objective criterion for both initial asset allocation 
and any re-designation, thus removing all asset allocation discretion earlier 
provided to banks. More importantly, even in the rare instance that a re-
designation or switch is allowed, the standards eliminate any opportunity for 
regulatory arbitrage or capital benefits. 
6.1.2. Introduction of Liquidity Requirements  
The global financial crisis illustrated the crucial role of liquidity in the proper 
functioning of financial markets and the banking sector. Despite being 
adequately capitalised, many banks experienced difficulties due to improper 
liquidity management. It also highlighted the likelihood of rapid reversal in 
market conditions, where liquidity can quickly evaporate and illiquidity can last 
for an extended period of time. 
The Basel Committee has strengthened its liquidity framework by developing 
two minimum standards for funding liquidity, developed to achieve two 
separate but complementary objectives. The Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) is 
developed to achieve the first objective – to promote short-term resilience of a 
bank’s liquidity risk profile by ensuring that it has sufficient High Quality 
Liquid Assets (HQLA) to survive a significant stress scenario lasting for one 
month.385 The Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) aims to meet the second 
objective – to promote resilience over a longer time horizon (one year) by 
creating additional incentives for banks to fund their activities with more stable 
sources of funding on an on-going basis and provide a sustainable maturity 
structure of assets and liabilities.386
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The new liquidity ratios ensure adequate funding in case of a severe banking 
crisis and aim to develop a more resilient banking sector. In accordance with 
the Basel standards, these liquidity ratios establish a minimum level of liquidity 
for internationally active banks and national authorities may impose higher 
liquidity requirements.387
6.1.2.1. Liquidity Coverage Ratio 
The Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) aims to improve the banking sector’s 
ability to absorb shocks arising from financial and economic stress, thus 
reducing the risk of spill over from the financial sector to the real economy. The 
objective of the LCR is to promote short-term resilience of the liquidity risk 
profile of banks by ensuring that sufficient levels of High Quality Liquid Assets 
(HQLA) are available for one-month survival in a severe stress scenario. The 
stress scenarios incorporate many of the shocks experienced during the recent 
financial crisis into one significant stress event for which a bank would need 
sufficient liquidity to survive for up to 30 calendar days.388 To ensure that banks 
can implement the liquidity requirement without disruption to their financing 
activities, the minimum LCR requirement began at 60% in January 2015, rising 
in equal annual steps of 10 percentage points to reach 100% in January 2019.389
The LCR is represented as: 
ܵݐ݋ܿ݇ ݋݂ ܪܳܮܣ
ܶ݋ݐ݈ܽ ݊݁ݐ ܿܽݏ݄ ݋ݑݐ݂݈݋ݓݏ ݋ݒ݁ݎ ݐ݄݁ ݊݁ݔݐ 30 ݈ܿܽ݁݊݀ܽݎ ݀ܽݕݏ
 ൒ 100%390
Under the standard, banks must have an adequate stock of unencumbered 
HQLA to cover the total net cash outflows (total expected cash outflows minus 
total expected cash inflows)391 over a 30-day period under an acute short-term 
liquidity stress scenario.392 During periods of stress, banks are allowed to use 
their stock of HQLA and hence, the ratio can fall below the minimum.393
                                                          
387 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), ‘Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage 
Ratio and Liquidity Risk Monitoring Tools’ 6.
388 ibid pt 1, II.20.
389 ibid 10.
390 ibid pt 1, II.22.
391 ibid pt 1, II.B.69.
392 ibid pt 1, II.A.23.
393 ibid 11. Banks are required to notify supervisors immediately if their LCR has fallen, or is 
expected to fall, below 100% with an assessment of its liquidity position and factors that 
contributed to the fall in LCR. The supervisor(s) then determine whether the fall in LCR was 
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The Basel standards specify the characteristics of assets that can fall under the 
HQLA category. Firstly, these assets should be liquid in markets during a time 
of stress which requires that they can be easily and immediately converted in 
private markets into cash at little or no loss of value.394 The test of whether 
liquid assets are of high quality is their liquidity-generating capacity through 
sale or repo and is presumed to remain unaffected even in periods of severe 
idiosyncratic and market stress.395 However, certain assets are more likely to 
generate funds without incurring large discounts in sale or repo markets from 
fire-sales during stress events.396 The LCR standard requires a bank to hold 
assets that can be immediately used as a source of  contingent funds to fill 
funding gaps between cash inflows and outflows at any time during a one month 
stress event, through outright sale or repo and without any restrictions on the 
use of the liquidity generated.397
Secondly, HQLA should also be eligible at central banks for intraday liquidity 
needs and overnight liquidity facilities.398 This aims to provide additional 
confidence that banks are holding assets that could be used in stress events 
without damaging the broader financial system, thereby raising confidence in 
the safety and soundness of the banking system.399 The Basel liquidity standards 
also take account of the ex-ante uncertainty of determining which specific assets 
might be subject to shocks ex-post and thus, requires that the stock of HQLA be 
well diversified within asset classes.400
HQLA are comprised of Level 1 and Level 2 assets. Level 1 assets include cash, 
central bank reserves and certain marketable securities backed by sovereigns 
and central banks.401 Level 2 assets are comprised of Level 2A and Level 2B 
assets, where each category of assets is subject to a haircut applicable to the 
current market value to account for their lower level of liquidity. Level 2A 
assets are subject to a 15% haircut and include government securities, covered 
                                                          
due to a period of stress, taking into account both current and forward-looking assessments of 
macroeconomic and financial conditions.
394 ibid pt 1, II.A.1.24.
395 ibid pt 1, II.A.1.25.
396 ibid pt 1, II.A.1.24.
397 ibid pt 1, II.A.2.29.
398 ibid pt 1, II.A.1.26.
399 ibid.
400 ibid pt 1, II.A.3.44.
401 ibid pt 1, II.A.4.i.49-50.
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bonds and corporate debt securities.402 Level 2B assets incur varying haircuts 
and, subject to fulfilment of certain conditions, include residential mortgage-
backed securities (25% haircut), lower rated corporate bonds (50% haircut) and 
equities (50% haircut).403 Level 1 assets are of the highest quality and the most 
liquid, thus there is no limit on the extent to which a bank can hold these assets 
to meet the LCR while Level 2 assets may not in aggregate account for more 
than 40% of HQLA stock and within this, Level 2B assets may not account for 
more than 15% of the total HQLA stock.404
6.1.2.2. The Net Stable Funding Ratio 
The Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) promotes long-term resilience by 
creating incentives for financial institutions to fund their activities with stable 
sources of funding. The NSFR aims to limit overreliance on short-term 
wholesale funding, encourages better assessment of funding risk across all on-
and off-balance sheet items and promotes funding stability.405 This liquidity 
ratio has been implemented as a minimum standard from January 2018, with 
banks required to meet these requirements on an on-going basis and report 
quarterly.406
The global financial crisis highlighted that private incentives of banks can 
diverge from socially desirable levels and result in excessive reliance on 
unstable sources of funding. The Basel Committee recognises the adverse 
incentives for banks to expand their balance sheets through cheap and abundant 
short-term wholesale funding, which can lead to rapid balance sheet growth and 
weaken the ability of individual banks to respond to liquidity (and solvency) 
shocks.407 The NSFR aims to provide a stable funding structure to promote 
sustainable liquidity even in case of disruptions to a bank’s regular sources of 
funding, thus reducing the bank’s risk of failure and the potential negative spill 
over to the broader financial system.408
                                                          
402 ibid pt 1, II.A.4.ii.51-52.
403 ibid pt 1, II.A.4.iii.53-54.
404 ibid pt 1, II.A.4.46-47. The 40% cap on Level 2 assets and the 15% cap on Level 2B assets 
should be determined after the application of required haircuts.
405 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), ‘Basel III: The Net Stable Funding 
Ratio’ I.1.
406 ibid I.8 & III.A.49.
407 ibid I.2.
408 ibid I.1.
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The NSFR will require banks to maintain a stable funding profile in accordance 
with the composition of banks’ on-balance sheet assets and off-balance sheet 
activities.409 The NSFR is defined as: 
ܣݒ݈ܾ݈ܽ݅ܽ݁ ܽ݉݋ݑ݊ݐ ݋݂ ݏݐܾ݈ܽ݁ ݂ݑ݊݀݅݊݃
ܴ݁ݍݑ݅ݎ݁݀ ܽ݉݋ݑ݊ݐ ݋݂ ݏݐܾ݈ܽ݁ ݂ݑ݊݀݅݊݃
 ൒ 100%410
The standard prescribes that the amount of available stable funding relative to 
the amount of required stable funding should be equal to at least 100% on an 
on-going basis. Available stable funding is defined as the portion of capital and 
liabilities expected to be reliable over the long-term time horizon, defined as 
one year under the standard.411 The required amount of stable funding will be 
in accordance with the liquidity characteristics and residual maturities of the 
various assets held by a bank.412
The amount of available and required stable funding are calibrated to 
incorporate both the degree of stability of liabilities and the liquidity of assets.413
The appropriate amount of required stable funding for liabilities is dependent 
first, on the funding tenor, where long-term liabilities are assumed to be more 
stable than short-term liabilities.414 The second determinant is funding type and 
counterparty, which presumes short-term deposits provided by retail customers 
and funding provided by small business customers to be more stable than 
wholesale funding of the same maturity from other counterparties.415
For determining the required amount of stable funding for assets, the standard 
incorporates asset tenor which presumes that some short-term assets require a 
smaller proportion of stable funding because banks would hold some assets to 
maturity rather than rolling them over.416 Moreover, asset quality and liquidity 
value are also incorporated, which presume that unencumbered high-quality 
assets that can be securitized, traded or used as collateral to secure additional 
funding or sold in the market, do not need to be wholly financed with stable 
                                                          
409 ibid.
410 ibid II.9.
411 ibid.
412 ibid.
413 ibid II.12.
414 ibid II.13. The Basel standards refer to short-term funding as those with a short-time horizon 
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415 ibid.
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funding.417 The standard also takes into account the importance of resilient 
credit creation and requires stable funding for a proportion of lending to the real 
economy for continuity of financial intermediation.418
The amount of available stable funding (ASF) is dependent on the stability of a 
bank’s funding sources, which includes the residual maturity of its liabilities 
and the propensity of different types of funding providers to withdraw their 
funding.419 The total amount of ASF is calculated as: 
ܶ݋ݐ݈ܽ ܣܵܨ ܽ݉݋ݑ݊ݐ =  ܥܽݎݎݕ݅݊݃ ݒ݈ܽݑ݁ ×  ܣܵܨ ݂ܽܿݐ݋ݎ420
ASF is determined by allocating the carrying value of a bank’s capital and 
liabilities to one of five categories and the total ASF is calculated as the sum of 
the weighted amounts within these categories.421 Each category is assigned an 
ASF factor according to assumed funding stability and ranges from 0% to 
100%.422 For example, assets with an ASF factor of 100% are the most stable 
sources and include regulatory capital and long-term liabilities whereas an ASF 
factor of 90% represents less stable non-maturity deposits and term deposits 
provided by retail and small business customers.423 Short-term funding 
provided by non-financial corporate customers, sovereigns and multilateral 
development banks along with other short-term funding provided by central 
banks and financial institutions is considered moderately stable with an ASF 
factor of 50%.424
To summarise, this first section provided an overview of the current Basel 
regime and highlighted the key revisions that aim to overcome the weaknesses 
of the preceding Basel Accords, specifically with regards to securitized banking 
transactions. The next section discusses the current Basel standards and 
evaluates their effectiveness in eliminating the previous adverse incentives for 
bank involvement in securitized banking. Furthermore, it evaluates whether the 
current Basel regime continues to incentivise banks to engage in securitized 
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banking and provides policy implications to recommend if current policy should 
be redesigned or reformed more effectively. 
6.2. Discussion and Policy Implications
The global financial crisis highlighted significant deficiencies of the preceding 
Basel framework, following which the current Basel regime has made 
significant improvements to overcome these weaknesses. 
First, the Basel III Accord has improved the loss absorbency capacity and 
resilience of the banking system through strengthened capital and leverage 
requirements. The required quality and quantity of capital is strengthened from 
higher common equity requirements while capital buffers will improve loss 
absorbency and restrain build-up of systematic risk. The additional capital 
buffers have increased the minimum capital requirement to 10.5% of RWA, of 
which 7% must be common equity capital. Additionally, the minimum leverage 
ratio will restrict individual and aggregate build-up of leverage within the 
banking sector. Specific guidelines for G-SIBs impose additional common 
equity requirements and a leverage surcharge to constrain the size of these 
financial institutions and restrict their global systemic importance.
Second, the new standards significantly improve the risk management of 
securitized instruments, now including more complex re-securitisation 
instruments as well. The revised standards focus on the shortcomings of the 
Basel II securitisation framework and strengthen the capital requirements for 
securitisation exposures held in both the banking book and the trading book. 
Capital requirements and risk sensitivity for securitized instruments have 
improved through increased risk weights applicable to highly-rated 
securitisation exposures and strengthening the capital treatment for re-
securitisation exposures. Trading book securitisation requirements are 
completely overhauled, now incorporating risk-sensitivities that were 
previously not accounted for and increasing capital requirements for holding 
securitized instruments in portfolios. Moreover, the new standards seek to 
reduce reliance on external credit ratings and constrain the options for 
calculation methodologies in both regulatory books, allowing only one capital 
calculation approach for securitisation exposures in the trading book. 
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Third, the current Basel regime successfully eliminates the adverse incentives 
for asset allocation and regulatory arbitrage between the banking and trading 
book present in the previous Basel Accords. The boundary between the two 
dimensions of the balance sheet is strengthened by establishing an objective 
criterion for asset allocation, for both initial asset allocation and any re-
designation. This removes the arbitrary ‘trading intent’ criterion and all asset 
allocation discretion previously provided to banks. To reduce the opportunities 
for regulatory arbitrage, the Basel III Accord places stricter limits and capital 
disincentives to the transfer of instruments between the two regulatory books. 
Even in the rare instance that a re-designation or switch is allowed, the standards 
eliminate any opportunity for regulatory arbitrage by imposing an additional 
capital charge equivalent to the capital reduction from any asset switching.
Lastly, the LCR and NSFR under the new liquidity framework are appropriate 
for managing short-term liquidity and promoting long-term stability, 
respectively. The LCR recognizes the varying liquidity of financial instruments 
by incorporating asset liquidity and asset quality. HQLA are categorized 
according to their characteristics, those with high liquidity and quality fall under 
Level 1 while others are assigned to Level 2 and subject to haircuts to account 
for their lower level of liquidity. However, the LCR continues to recognise 
securitized instruments (specifically mortgage-backed securities) as liquid 
assets, assigned under Level 2 and subject to a haircut. This is contrary to the 
developments in the crisis, where even highly rated and liquid securitized 
instruments were deemed illiquid due to the uncertainty of their valuation.425
Moreover, although the NSFR provides appropriate incentives for banks to hold 
a sufficient amount of stable funding for the long-term, it falls short on repo 
financing requirements, stating that “… unencumbered, high-quality assets that 
can be securitized or traded can be readily used as collateral to secure 
additional funding or sold in the market and therefore, do not need to be wholly 
financed with stable funding.426 This is also at odds with the experience of 
financial markets during the crisis, as assets perceived to be high-quality for 
securitisation or trade suffered the most from liquidity constraints and funding 
withdrawals.427
                                                          
425 See chapter 2, section 2.2.1 on the underlying risks and resulting financial fragility from 
securitized instruments.
426 ibid II.14.d.
427 See chapter 2, section 2.2.2 on the vulnerabilities of short-term repo funding.
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However, it is pertinent to assess whether the current Basel regime continues to 
incentivise bank involvement in securitized banking. The Basel III Accord has 
shown little improvement in this regard. The new Basel standards treat 
securitized banking transactions similar to those under the Basel II Accord. 
Securitized banking under both the banking book and the trading book remain
under the comprehensive approach of the credit risk mitigation framework. 
Banks can continue to take advantage from lower capital charges for securitized 
banking as privately issued investment grade debt securities are still considered 
eligible financial collateral for risk mitigation. Although the Basel III risk 
mitigation framework aims to increase the capital requirements for securitized 
banking by imposing higher haircuts to these transactions, securitized banking 
still remains a cheap source of funding as compared to other sources for banks 
who want to gain exposure to securitized instruments. Therefore, while the 
capital requirements for securitized instruments are higher than before, the 
current Basel regime still provides incentives for banks to engage in securitized 
banking due to the significantly lower capital charges as compared to deposit 
funding.
Nevertheless, the principal focus should be on the financial instruments 
considered as eligible collateral for risk mitigation. Not only investment grade 
securitized instruments, but also all other privately issued investment grade debt 
securities continue to be recognised as eligible collateral. While securitized 
instruments have become infamous in the aftermath of the crisis, prior to that, 
these instruments evolved as innovative private securities developed for 
efficient risk management, fulfil demand for private collateral by market 
participants and provide a new source of liquidity for financial institutions.428
Repo transactions were, and will continue, to remain a vital source of short-term 
funding for banks. While private liquidity creation is desirable, such private 
money can result in socially excessive leverage, imposing negative externalities 
on other banks and the society.429 The crisis highlighted the fact that while 
financial innovation can be beneficial to increase the liquidity in financial 
markets, such liquidity might not be socially desirable. More specifically, 
private security issuance might suffer from neglected risks, both by the issuers 
and investors, creating false substitutes for traditional securities, which can lead 
                                                          
428 See chapter 1, section 1.2 on securitisation.
429 Gennaioli, Shleifer and Vishny, ‘Neglected Risks, Financial Innovation, and Financial 
Fragility’; Gorton and Metrick, ‘Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo’; Stein (2012).
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to financial instability.430 Therefore, not all innovative collateral in repo 
transactions can be considered ‘safe’ and a source of ‘good liquidity’ for 
financial institutions. 
While proclaiming any financial instrument as ‘safe’ is idealistic, as zero risk is 
an unachievable target, the focus should be on securities that carry the least 
risk.431 The definition of HQLA in the LCR of the Basel III liquidity framework 
provides a realistic description of ‘safe’ instruments that can provide ‘good 
liquidity’. Firstly, these assets should be liquid in markets during stress events 
and thus, can be easily and immediately converted in to cash at little or no loss 
of value through sale or repo in private markets. Secondly, HQLA should also 
be eligible at central banks for intraday and overnight liquidity needs to provide 
additional confidence that these assets can be used in a crisis without harming 
the broader financial system. Most government securities fall under this 
criterion but the LCR specifies ‘safe’ assets as cash, central bank reserves and 
marketable securities backed by sovereigns and central banks. However, the 
LCR aims to promote short-term resilience over a one-month stress event and 
the NSFR requires banks to hold a stable source of funding for a one-year 
period. While both these liquidity instruments positively contribute to the 
provision of ‘good liquidity’ provided by ‘safe’ collateral, the crucial aspect is 
to examine the use of assets as collateral in on-going bank operations and 
activities. Although regulating assets, such as securitized instruments, found to 
be high-risk after a crisis will constrain related financial activities, such as 
production of securitized instruments and their use in securitized banking, this 
asset-specific regulation will also support the development of new and 
innovative financial instruments that will continue to provide banks with similar 
benefits but are not currently regulated.
Financial innovation will continue to evolve and financial institutions and 
markets will continue to find creative ways to expand their balance sheet. In 
reforming financial regulation, scholars have stressed the importance of not 
only controlling leverage but also restricting the scale of financial innovation 
while preserving the creation of liquidity by the banking system.432 Regulation 
should be more attuned to the risks inherent in innovative or complex financial 
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instruments and stipulate higher capital requirements to account for their higher 
risks. With regard to bank involvement in repo transactions, both the risks 
pertaining to the underlying collateral and counterparty are equally relevant. 
The following sections provide recommendations to constrain bank 
involvement in securitized banking, and repo transactions with new forms of 
collateral, while promoting the beneficial role of these transactions in providing 
‘good liquidity’ with ‘safe’ collateral, such as government securities.
6.2.1. Collateral – Risk mitigation from complex financial 
collateral
As a first step in this direction, securitized instruments and innovative financial 
securities, especially those with complex risks, should not be considered eligible 
for risk mitigation. 
The current regulatory regime, Basel III, does little in this regard. Securitized 
instruments are still considered eligible collateral for risk mitigation under both 
the banking book and trading book. Moreover, the standards applicable to 
securitized banking transactions under the new Basel Accord are similar to those 
under the Basel II Accord. Securitized banking transactions under both 
dimensions of the balance sheet fall under the comprehensive approach of the 
risk mitigation framework which allows a significant portion of the exposure to 
be offset against eligible collateral, as below: 
ܴܹܣ௔௙௧௘௥ ௥௜௦௞ ௠௜௧௜௚௔௧௜௢௡ = ܧכ௔ௗ௝௨௦௧௘ௗ ௘௫௣௢௦௨௥௘  ×  ܴ ௖ܹ௢௨௡௧௘௥௣௔௥௧௬
Similar to the Basel II Accord, this approach calculates the adjusted exposure 
as:
ܧכ௔ௗ௝௨௦௧௘ௗ ௘௫௣௢௦௨௥௘ = max{0, [ܧ(1 + ܪ௘) െ ܥ൫1െ ܪ஼ െ ܪ௙௫൯]} 433      
Where, E = exposure value, He = exposure haircut, C = collateral value, Hc = collateral haircut, 
Hfx = currency mismatch haircut
                                                          
433 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), ‘Basel III: Finalising Post-Crisis 
Reforms’ Standardised approach for credit risk D.3.iii.b.160; The Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (BCBS), ‘International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital 
Standards (Basel II)’ pt 2, section II, D.3.ii.147-148.
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The exposure is adjusted for specific collateral characteristics, which are 
incorporated in the applicable haircut. For example, supervisory haircut 
assigned to a high-grade (AAA rated) private debt security with a residual 
maturity greater than 10 years issued by a bank is 12%.434 Thus, the collateral 
value is discounted by 12% and the exposure can be offset against 88% of the 
collateral value. This reduction in original exposure reduces the corresponding 
RWA and hence, lowers capital requirements. However, now the risk mitigation 
framework differentiates the haircuts applicable to securitized collateral from 
all other financial instruments. It aims to increase the risk sensitivity to complex 
financial instruments by increasing the applicable haircuts for securitized 
exposures to incorporate their higher risk. So, supervisory haircut assigned to a 
securitized instrument with similar characteristics (high-grade, residual 
maturity greater than 10 years) is 16%.435 The collateral value is discounted by 
16% and the exposure can now be offset against only 84% of the collateral 
value.
The differences in the capital requirements for a securitized banking transaction 
under the new Basel standards can be assessed by examining the total RWA
calculation of a hypothetical transaction under both the previous Basel II Accord 
and the Basel III Accord. The hypothetical transaction will assume an exposure 
of 9.8 million and collateral of 10 million, without any currency mismatch. The 
collateral is assumed to be a high-grade (AAA rated) asset-backed security with 
a residual maturity greater than 10 years. 
Basel II
Under the Basel II Accord, haircut applicable to the exposure and collateral was 
2% (He) and 8% (Hc), respectively.436 Thus, the original exposure was allowed 
to be offset against 92% of the collateral value, as below: 
ܧכ௔ௗ௝௨௦௧௘ௗ ௘௫௣௢௦௨௥௘ = {9.8(1 + 0.02) െ 10(1െ 0.08)}
However, to determine the total RWA for the securitized banking transaction, 
this adjusted exposure needs to be multiplied by the counterparty risk weight. 
The counterparty to an interbank repo transaction is primarily other banks or 
                                                          
434 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), ‘Basel III: Finalising Post-Crisis 
Reforms’ Standardised approach for credit risk D.3.iii.c.163 Table 14.
435 ibid.
436 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), ‘International Convergence of 
Capital Measurement and Capital Standards (Basel II)’ section II.D.3.ii.151.͒
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securities firms. Thus, the applicable counterparty risk weight was 20%, 
corresponding to claims on banks and securities firms with highest credit 
rating.437
The RWA for a securitized banking transaction with risk mitigation are 
determined as:  
ܴܹܣݏ௥௜௦௞ ௠௜௧௜௚௔௧௜௢௡ = ܧכ௔ௗ௝௨௦௧௘ௗ ௘௫௣௢௦௨௥௘ כ ܴ ௖ܹ௢௨௡௧௘௥௣௔௥௧௬
= {9.8(1 + 0.02) െ 10(1െ 0.08)} כ 20% ൎ
 0.16݈݈݉݅݅݋݊ (݉݊)
The total counterparty credit risk charge applicable to a securitized banking 
transaction under the Basel II Accord was approximately 1.6% (RWA ÷ original 
exposure). 
Basel III
Under the Basel III Accord, haircut applicable to the exposure remains 2% (He)
but the haircut applicable to the collateral is increased to 16% (Hc).438 Thus, the 
original exposure can now be offset against only 84% of the collateral value, as 
below: 
ܧכ௔ௗ௝௨௦௧௘ௗ ௘௫௣௢௦௨௥௘ = {9.8(1 + 0.02) െ 10(1െ 0.16)}
The total RWA for the securitized banking transaction are determined by 
multiplying this adjusted exposure with the counterparty risk weight. The 
applicable counterparty risk weight remains 20%, corresponding to short-term 
claims on banks with investment grade rating.439 The RWA for a securitized 
banking transaction under the new risk mitigation framework are: 
ܴܹܣ௥௜௦௞ ௠௜௧௜௚௔௧௜௢௡ = ܧכ௔ௗ௝௨௦௧௘ௗ ௘௫௣௢௦௨௥௘ כ ܴ ௖ܹ௢௨௡௧௘௥௣௔௥௧௬
= {9.8(1 + 0.02) െ 10(1െ 0.16)} כ 20% ൎ  0.32݉݊
                                                          
437 ibid section II.A.4 & 5.
438 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), ‘Basel III: Finalising Post-Crisis 
Reforms’ Standardised approach for credit risk D.3.iii.c.163 Table 14.
439 ibid A.4.a.18 Table 6.
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The total counterparty credit risk charge applicable to a securitized banking 
transaction under the current Basel III Accord is approximately 3.3% (RWA ÷ 
original exposure). 
Therefore, the Basel III Accord imposes higher capital requirements for similar 
securitized banking transactions, essentially doubling the total counterparty risk 
charge compared to that under the Basel II Accord. Thus, in first instance, the 
new Basel regime does strengthen the capital requirements and hence, makes 
securitized banking more expensive for banks. This is a positive development 
in the Basel standards as it is now more risk-sensitive to the complexities of 
securitized instruments and hence, requires banks to hold higher amounts of 
capital to take into account the higher risks associated with securitized banking.
Looking beyond the strengthened capital requirements, the new Basel regime 
continues to provide significant incentives for bank involvement in securitized 
banking. First, the exclusion of non-investment grade securitisation exposures 
from eligible collateral encourages banks to use investment grade securitized 
instruments, the quality of which might not be as stable as that perceived by 
market participants. Secondly, unrated securitized instruments and other debt 
securities are eligible collateral as long as they fulfil certain criteria, allowing 
banks to undertake repo transactions with unrated exposures, which might have 
similar or even higher risks than non-investment grade exposures. Thirdly, new 
financial instruments will fall under the non-securitisation category, subject to 
lower haircuts and hence, lower capital requirements. This further incentivises 
banks to develop innovative and complex financial instruments to use as 
collateral in repo markets, providing benefits similar to that from securitized 
banking but subject to lower capital requirements as these new instruments will 
be considered less risky than securitized exposures.
Therefore, the new Basel regime does not only continue to provide incentives 
for on-going bank involvement in securitized banking but also provides banks 
with new incentives, whereby using new financial instruments as collateral for 
repo transactions would provide an even cheaper source of short-term funding 
than securitized banking. Thus, regulation should not only eliminate the risk 
mitigation potential for securitized instruments but also new financial securities, 
especially those with complex risk profiles, should not be considered eligible 
for risk mitigation. In this instance, securitized banking or a repo transaction 
with any new financial instrument will be eliminated from the risk mitigation 
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framework. Without any risk mitigation benefits, the total RWA applicable to 
these transactions would be:
ܴܹܣ௡௢ ௥௜௦௞ ௠௜௧௜௚௔௧௜௢௡ = ܧݔ݌݋ݏݑݎ݁ כ  ܴ ௖ܹ௢௨௡௧௘௥௣௔௥௧௬ = 9.8 ݉݊ כ  20%
=  1.96 ݉݊
Hence, the total counterparty credit risk charge for a securitized banking 
transaction, or a repo transaction with a new financial instrument, will be 20% 
(RWA ÷ original exposure). This is significantly higher than the 1.6% and 3.3% 
charges under the Basel II and Basel III Accord, respectively. 
The proposal for excluding securitized exposures, and other innovative financial 
instruments, from the risk mitigation framework should not be seen as a 
prohibition. The goal is to merely restrict securitized banking and repo 
transactions with new forms of collateral for necessary liquidity needs. This can 
be achieved by imposing higher capital requirements for such transactions and 
giving preferential treatment to those with ‘safe’ forms of collateral, such as 
high-grade government securities. This will promote on-going ‘good liquidity’ 
and restrict the growth of financial instruments with complex risks, which can 
lead to instability in financial markets. The recommendation does not suggest 
an ‘all-or-nothing’ approach to repo transactions but maintains that the 
increased risk inherent in the underlying collateral, securitized or other complex 
instruments, must be segregated from ‘safe’ collateral. However, this should not 
be at the expense of ‘good liquidity’ provided by repo transactions since it 
remains an effective and secure source of funding for financial institutions.
6.2.2. Counterparty – Capital for exposures between 
financial institutions
A second step should be to minimise the negative externalities due to increased 
linkages from bank involvement in repo transactions by strengthening the 
capital treatment for exposures between financial institutions. A suggestion is 
to increase risk weights for transactions between banks, specifically for 
securitized banking and repo transactions with innovative collateral.  
The current regulatory regime, Basel III, lacks in this respect. The applicable 
risk weight for exposures to banks keeps the counterparty risk weight for repo 
transactions unchanged, with a floor of 20% for highly-rated and high-grade 
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banks.440 While the Basel II Accord assigned risk weights based only on the 
credit rating of banks, the Basel III Accord takes a step forward to reduce the 
reliance on external credit ratings by differentiating between jurisdictions that 
allow the use of external ratings for regulatory purposes and those that do not. 
However, under both approaches, counterparty risk weight for repo transactions 
will correspond to those applicable to short-term exposures since repo is an 
exposure to banks with a maturity of three months or less. Thus, in any 
jurisdiction, repo transactions with high-credit rating or a high-grade bank will 
receive a counterparty risk weight of 20%.441
Thus, while the new Basel regime differentiates between a jurisdiction’s use of 
credit ratings, it does little to improve the capital requirements for exposures 
between financial institutions as the applicable risk weight for counterparty 
remains unchanged from the preceding Basel II Accord. Moreover, while the 
current standards are risk-sensitive to the varying credit ratings of banks, 
prescribing higher risk weights to low-credit rating and low-grade banks, there 
is little differentiation in the risk weights for short-term exposures, which are 
significantly lower than those applicable to exposures longer than three months. 
Additionally, the risk-sensitivity to varying credit rating has little impact for 
repo transactions since post-financial crisis, interbank transactions are likely to 
be primarily undertaken between high-credit rating and high-grade banks to 
minimise default risk. 
The recommendation for promoting on-going ‘good liquidity’ from ‘safe’ 
collateral through higher capital requirements for securitized banking and repo 
transactions with innovative financial collateral is also supported by increasing 
the counterparty risk weight and hence, capital requirements for such 
transactions. Thus, preferential treatment will be given to repo transactions with 
‘safe’ forms of collateral, such as high-grade government securities. This will 
address the increased risks from interconnectedness between financial 
institutions, specifically with existing and new forms of complex financial 
instruments while encouraging ‘good liquidity’ in the banking sector.
In this instance, other regulatory tools, most prominently the EU Financial 
Transactions Tax is a step forward. It imposes a harmonized tax (0.1% of the 
market price) on all securities trading transactions to be paid by all involved 
                                                          
440 ibid A.4.a.18 & A.4.b.21.
441 ibid.
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financial institutions.442 The goal is to increase the disincentives for certain 
transactions and reduce the size of the securities trading market. However, it is 
important to stress that imposing a tax on all inter-financial transactions can 
constrain the ‘good liquidity’ provided by repo collateralized with ‘safe’ 
securities. This observation has been made by the European Repo Council, 
claiming that the tax would cause the short-term repo market in Europe to 
contract by approximately 66%.443 The study argues for secured financing 
transactions, such as repo and securities lending, to be exempted from the tax, 
to maintain an efficient debt capital market and continued collateralisation in 
the financial markets. 
While imposing a tax on all transactions between financial institutions is one 
extreme that will restrict all liquidity provided through repo markets, not 
accounting for the higher risk inherent in securitized or other complex 
instruments is another extreme that can lead to excessive liquidity in financial 
markets. Therefore, liquidity provided through securitized banking and repo 
with innovative financial collateral must be segregated from the ‘good liquidity’ 
provided from repo using ‘safe’ collateral.
Conclusion
This chapter focused on the current Basel regime, Basel III, to evaluate whether 
the current regulation has resolved the weaknesses of the preceding Basel 
Accords and if the incentives for bank involvement in securitized banking still
prevail. The chapter also provided policy implications to address whether 
current policy should be reformed to regulate securitized banking transactions 
more effectively.
The chapter finds that the current Basel regime has made significant 
improvements to overcome the weaknesses of the previous Basel Accords by 
strengthening capital and leverage requirements, enhancing the risk 
management of securitized instruments, implementing a strict and objective 
boundary between the banking book and trading book and introducing a new 
liquidity framework which appropriately manages short-term liquidity and 
                                                          
442 European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Council Directive Implementing Enhanced 
Cooperation in the Area of Financial Transaction Tax’, vol 45 (2013).
443 European Repo Council and Richard Comotto, ‘Collateral Damageௗ: The Impact of the 
Financial Transaction Tax on the European Repo Market and Its Consequences for the Financial 
Markets and the Real Economy’ [2013] International Capital Market Association (ICMA) p. 3.
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promotes long-term stability. However, with regard to on-going bank activities, 
the current Basel regime continues to incentivise bank involvement in 
securitized banking. The new Basel standards treat securitized banking 
transactions similar to those under the Basel II Accord, allowing banks to 
continue to take advantage from lower capital charges for securitized banking 
through risk mitigation. Although the capital requirements for securitized 
instruments are higher than before, the continuing opportunity of risk mitigation 
incentivizes banks to engage in securitized banking as it still remains a cheap 
source of funding as compared to other sources.
In this regard, proposed policy recommendations focus on the fact that while 
financial innovation can be beneficial to increase the liquidity in financial 
markets, such liquidity might not be socially desirable. Therefore, not all 
innovative collateral in repo transactions can be considered ‘safe’ and a source 
of ‘good liquidity’ for financial institutions. Thus, regulation should be more 
attuned to the risks inherent in innovative or complex financial instruments and 
stipulate higher capital requirements to account for their higher risks.
The chapter recommends that higher capital requirements should be imposed 
for securitized banking and repo transactions with innovative collateral by 
giving preferential treatment to repo with ‘safe’ forms of collateral, such as 
high-grade government securities. The proposal requires that firstly, securitized 
instruments and other innovative financial securities should not be considered 
eligible for risk mitigation and secondly, higher counterparty risk weights 
should be applicable to such transactions between financial institutions. This 
will constrain bank involvement in securitized banking and repo transactions 
with new forms of collateral while promoting the beneficial role of repo in 
providing ‘good liquidity’ with ‘safe’ collateral, thereby restricting the growth 
of instruments with complex risks which can lead to instability in financial 
markets. 
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Conclusion
Securitized banking – the use of securitized instruments as collateral in repo 
markets, became a new avenue for banks’ private liquidity creation and has 
grabbed considerable attention for its contribution in the global financial crisis 
of 2007-09. The dissertation started by providing a theoretical overview of bank 
involvement in securitized banking and summarized the current literature in this 
regard. 
Chapter 1 illustrated the mechanism of repo transactions and how they 
developed into a new kind of money-like instrument through securitized 
banking. Repo transactions are an important instrument for short-term 
financing, allowing financial institutions to borrow from each other for very 
short periods of time. Central to repo borrowing is the underlying collateral, 
reliability of which is crucial for the functioning of repo markets. In the years 
before the crisis, securitisation supported the development of high-grade 
securitized instruments which were perceived to carry the lowest risk and were 
considered as safe as government securities. This was the critical step in the 
innovation of securitized banking, as all market participants considered these 
high-grade securities reliable and safe to be used as collateral in repo 
transactions. While commercial banks were traditionally involved in repo 
transactions as lenders, securitized banking allowed them to expand their roles 
as borrowers and provided them with a new source of short-term borrowing. 
Consequently, securitized banking became an additional source of short-term 
funding (besides deposits) for banks using privately issued securities which 
created a private liquidity cycle for banks and therefore, increased liquidity in 
financial markets. 
Chapter 2 highlighted the key literature regarding securitized banking and its 
role in the crisis.  Securitized banking became a new source of banks’ short-
term funding, but the underlying vulnerabilities were similar to other forms of 
short-term debt. Literature has recognized the harmful social welfare effects 
from private liquidity creation and there is agreement on the instability caused 
by private security issuance which increases private liquidity but exposes the 
financial system to the risks of financial meltdown due to socially excessive 
leverage and liquidity. The key source of instability arises from the significant 
negative externalities from private liquidity creation through securitized 
banking, whereby the failure of individual banks can spread to other financial 
institutions and financial markets. As financial institutions had relied heavily on 
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short-term repo funding from each other using similar collateral, a shock in 
collateral value affected all market participants alike, transmitting weakness in 
one bank to other financial institutions. In the presence of such negative 
externalities, regulation plays an important role to make firms internalize the 
harmful social effects from their activities. However, in the aftermath of the 
crisis, bank regulation was found to be inadequate in fully incorporating the true 
risk of banks’ activities and overlooked regulatory capital arbitrage, thereby 
imposing negative externalities on other financial institutions, and on society. 
The dissertation focused on these shortcomings of the global financial 
regulatory framework and analysed the role of international capital regulation –
the Basel Accords, to answer the overarching question of the role of capital 
regulation in encouraging bank involvement in securitized banking. 
Incentives for Bank Involvement in Securitized Banking
In order to answer this central question, the dissertation started by examining 
the incentives inherent in the preceding Basel Accords to identify the presence 
of regulatory capital arbitrage for securitized banking. It evaluated the presence 
of regulatory arbitrage in the pre-crisis Basel Accords (Chapter 3) and the 
effectiveness of the immediate post-crisis regulatory response (Chapter 4) in 
eliminating these arbitrage opportunities. The objective was to examine 
differences between the capital charges for securitized banking through both 
dimensions of the balance sheet – the banking book and trading book, to identify 
the presence (or absence) of any capital arbitrage. The analysis focused on 
banks’ rationale for minimising their capital requirements, thus asset allocation 
of securitized instruments would favour the balance sheet dimension with lower 
capital requirements and hence, securitized banking would primarily occur 
through the same dimension. 
The dissertation finds that preceding the crisis, the presence of significant 
adverse incentives under both dimensions of the balance sheet encouraged bank 
involvement in securitized banking. Similar incentives existed for asset 
allocation of securitized instruments and securitized banking, both favouring 
the trading book. The pre-crisis Basel Accords allowed similar assets and 
transactions in the trading book to receive lower capital requirements than in 
the banking book. This created an arbitrage opportunity to reduce capital 
requirements and created significant adverse incentives for banks to allocate 
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securitized instruments and engage in securitized banking primarily through the 
trading book. This regulatory capital arbitrage opportunity provided banks with 
significant capital savings for securitized banking, making it cheaper in the 
trading book and hence, an inexpensive source of funding for banks. 
With regards to the post-crisis regulatory response, the previous adverse 
incentives for asset allocation of securitized instruments persisted but favoured 
the banking book. While the post-crisis standards equalized capital 
requirements for securitized banking under both dimensions of the balance 
sheet, eliminating the previous opportunity for regulatory arbitrage, securitized 
instruments in the trading book were now subject to higher capital requirements. 
This created an arbitrage opportunity to reduce capital requirements and created 
significant adverse incentives for banks to allocate securitized instruments to 
the banking book. Thus, the adverse incentives for asset allocation prevailed 
and encouraged securitized banking to be undertaken primarily through the 
banking book. Moreover, the post-crisis Basel standards failed to strengthen the 
capital requirement for securitized banking, which remained subject to 
significantly low capital requirements as compared to deposit funding, creating 
incentives for banks to engage in repo funding and reduce their overall capital 
requirements. While the post-crisis regulatory response met its objective of 
strengthening the trading book capital requirements, the revisions did not 
eliminate the adverse incentives for asset allocation and securitized banking 
remained an inexpensive avenue for banks’ short-term funding. 
To support these theoretical findings, the dissertation relied on descriptive 
empirics to illustrate data trends for bank involvement in securitized banking in 
some of the largest European banks before and after the crisis. Both pre-crisis 
and post-crisis data trends support the theoretical findings of the analysis of the 
preceding Basel Accords. Pre-crisis data trends highlight the increased asset 
allocation towards the trading book and an increase in bank reliance on repo 
transactions in the years before the crisis. Post-crisis data trends show increased 
asset allocation towards the banking book and the continued bank reliance on 
repo funding in the years after the crisis in majority of the banks.
To summarize, the dissertation finds that the preceding Basel Accords, both pre-
crisis and post-crisis, provided banks with significant adverse incentives to 
engage in securitized banking. The incentives were primarily borne out of 
opportunities for regulatory capital arbitrage, which allowed banks to lower 
their capital requirements through preferential balance sheet allocation and 
capital treatment of securitized banking transactions. These lower capital 
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requirements made securitized banking an inexpensive source of short-term 
funding and encouraged bank involvement in securitized banking.
Basel Implementation in Emerging Economies
As the Basel Accords are the global benchmark for bank capital regulation, in 
Chapter 5 the dissertation evaluated the impact of Basel implementation and 
investigated the international dimension of securitized banking and bank 
behaviour. The aim was to examine whether national implementation of the 
Basel Accords also transpose the underlying incentives for securitized banking, 
thereby encouraging similar bank behaviour. 
The focus was limited to Emerging Economies (EMEs) as they play an 
important role in the global economy and are major drivers for global growth. 
The inability of EMEs to shield themselves from shocks in advanced economies 
was evident in the global financial crisis as the adverse impacts were transmitted 
to countries worldwide. The Basel Accords were not intended for the financial 
systems of EMEs but these standards became the benchmark for regulatory 
strength and financial stability, implemented by countries worldwide. 
Therefore, global implementation of the Basel Accords would also transpose 
the incentives inherent in these Accords and thus, banks in EMEs would face 
similar incentives for securitized banking as those in advanced economies under 
the preceding Basel Accords.  
EMEs were chosen based on the presence of the fundamental components of 
securitized banking, namely the availability of securitized collateral in the 
national banking system and the eligibility of securitized instruments to be used 
as collateral in repo markets. Following these criteria and due to certain data 
limitations, two EMEs with developed financial markets for securitized banking 
were chosen, namely South Africa and Malaysia. To examine the incentives 
transposed with Basel implementation, under both pre-crisis and post-crisis 
Basel Accords, the structure and methodology of the previous chapters were 
followed to identify the presence of regulatory capital arbitrage by comparing 
the capital requirements for securitized banking under different balance sheet 
dimensions.
The dissertation finds that Basel implementation in both South Africa and 
Malaysia transposed the incentives inherent in these Accords. Pre-crisis 
regulation in both countries created adverse incentives for asset allocation of 
  
173
securitized instruments and securitized banking, akin to those inherent in the 
pre-crisis Basel Accords. Similar results are also present for the post-crisis Basel 
implementation in both countries, with continuing incentives for asset allocation 
of securitized instruments and hence, securitized banking. Following the 
preceding Basel Accords, opportunities for regulatory capital arbitrage 
incentivised banks to lower their capital requirements and hence, securitized 
banking became an inexpensive source of funding for banks within these 
countries. To support these theoretical findings, the dissertation used descriptive 
statistics to illustrate data trends within the national banking sectors of both 
South Africa and Malaysia, revealing bank involvement in securitized banking 
before and after the crisis. Both pre-crisis and post-crisis data trends of these 
countries’ banking sectors support the theoretical findings and illustrate that 
banks in both countries face incentives for securitized banking similar to those 
inherent in the Basel Accords.
The dissertation illustrates that EMEs, both Basel Committee member and non-
member states, were similarly affected by Basel implementation and transposed 
the adverse incentives inherent in the Basel Accords. Consequently, global 
implementation of the Basel Accords supports similar bank behaviour and 
hence, similar incentives for securitized banking. 
 
Current Regulatory Regime
To examine the current Basel regime – Basel III, chapter 6 evaluates whether 
the current regulation has resolved the weaknesses of the preceding Basel 
Accords for securitized banking and if the incentives for bank involvement in 
securitized banking still prevail. 
The dissertation finds that the current Basel regime has made several 
improvements to the global regulatory framework. Capital and leverage 
requirements have been strengthened by imposing higher common equity 
requirements to improve the loss absorbency capacity and restrain build-up of 
systematic risk and leverage within the banking sector. The standards also 
recognise the significance of global systemically important banks (G-SIBs), 
which are now subject to additional equity and leverage requirements to restrict 
their global systemic importance. The crucial role of liquidity within the 
financial system is also incorporated in the new liquidity framework, which 
appropriately manages short-term liquidity and promotes long-term stability. 
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The Basel III Accord has also made significant changes to overcome the 
weaknesses of the previous Basel Accords. The current Basel regime 
successfully eliminates the adverse incentives present in the preceding Basel 
Accords for asset allocation and regulatory arbitrage between the two 
dimensions of the balance sheet. The boundary between the banking book and 
trading book is strengthened by establishing an objective criterion for asset 
allocation while stricter limits and capital disincentives are imposed to the 
transfer of instruments between the two regulatory books to eliminate 
opportunities for regulatory arbitrage. The revised standards have notably 
improved the risk management of securitized instruments by strengthening the 
capital requirements for securitized exposures in both the banking and trading 
book. Moreover, the current Basel standards now incorporate the risks from 
more complex re-securitisation instruments and other risk-sensitivities that were 
previously not accounted for. 
To assess whether the current Basel regime continues to incentivise bank 
involvement in securitized banking, the dissertation focuses on on-going bank 
activities and finds that the Basel III Accord has shown little improvement in 
this regard. The new Basel standards treat securitized banking transactions 
similar to those under the post-crisis Basel Accord, allowing banks to continue 
to take advantage from lower capital charges for securitized banking
transactions. Although the capital requirements for securitized instruments are 
higher than before, using these assets as collateral in a repo transaction – a
securitized banking transaction, is subject to lower capital requirements, akin to 
those under the post-crisis Basel Accords. These lower capital requirements 
make securitized banking a cheaper source of funding than others and 
incentivise banks to engage in securitized banking as an inexpensive source of 
short-term funding. Therefore, the current Basel regime – Basel III, continues 
to incentivise bank involvement in securitized banking. 
Assessment of the incentives inherent in the current Basel regime was the last 
element to consider in order to answer the central question of the dissertation 
i.e. “What is the role of the Basel Accords in encouraging bank involvement in 
securitized banking?”. The dissertation provides significant evidence that the 
preceding Basel Accords played a vital role in encouraging bank involvement 
in securitized banking. While regulation should provide banks with appropriate 
incentives to internalize the social costs from their activities and behaviour, the 
regulatory arbitrage opportunities present in the preceding Basel Accords 
provided banks with significant adverse incentives to engage in securitized 
banking. Moreover, the lax capital requirements for securitized banking 
  
175
transactions under the current Basel regime continues to incentivise bank 
involvement in securitized banking, irrespective of the risks underlying these 
transactions. Consequently, securitized banking continues to remain an 
inexpensive source of short-term funding for banks.
Policy Implications 
After answering the overarching research question, the dissertation takes a step 
further to address whether and how the current regulation should be reformed 
to regulate securitized banking transactions more effectively. 
The focus was on the failure of the current Basel regime to incorporate the risks 
from securitized banking by examining the use of assets as collateral in on-
going repo transactions. The main aspect of the Basel III Accord that continues
to incentivise bank involvement in securitized banking is the risk mitigation 
standard, which allows transactions secured by eligible collateral to be subject 
to lower capital requirements than unsecured transactions. Assets eligible for 
this reduction in capital continue to include securitized instruments, allowing 
banks to lower capital requirements for securitized banking than if they were to 
be treated as unsecured funding. Moreover, assets considered eligible for risk 
mitigation also include all other privately issued debt securities. Since the 
current Basel regime strengthens the capital requirements for securitized 
instruments, other debt securities are now subject to lower capital requirements. 
Hence, the current standards are stricter for repo transactions with securitized 
collateral than with other debt securities. Therefore, the new Basel regime does 
not only continue to provide incentives for securitized banking but also provides 
banks with incentives to use new financial instruments as collateral for repo 
transactions, which would provide them with an even cheaper source of short-
term funding than securitized banking. 
While strengthening oversight of securitized instruments will constrain their 
production and use in securitized banking, this asset-specific regulation will 
also support the development of new and innovative financial instruments that 
can be used as collateral in repo transactions. The global financial crisis was 
evidence that although financial innovation can be beneficial to increase the 
liquidity in financial markets, such liquidity might not be socially desirable and 
hence, not all innovative collateral used in repo transactions should be 
considered ‘safe’ and a source of ‘good liquidity’. Thus, regulation should be 
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more attuned to the risks inherent in innovative or complex financial 
instruments and stipulate higher capital requirements to account for their higher 
risks while preserving the creation of liquidity by the banking system. 
In this regard, the dissertation provides policy implications for better regulation 
to incorporate the risks of not only securitized banking but also repo transactions 
with new innovative collateral in the future, which might have risks similar to 
securitized banking but will not be regulated in the same way. The dissertation 
recommends that higher capital requirements should be imposed for securitized 
banking and repo transactions with innovative collateral by giving preferential 
treatment to repo with ‘safe’ forms of collateral, such as government securities. 
This can be achieved firstly, by making securitized instruments and other 
innovative financial securities ineligible for risk mitigation, excluding them 
from receiving lower capital charges when used as collateral in repo 
transactions. Secondly, higher capital requirements should be applicable to 
securitized banking and repo with innovative collateral between financial 
institutions, to minimise the negative externalities due to increased financial 
linkages from such transactions. 
These recommendations will constrain bank involvement in securitized banking 
and repo transactions with new forms of collateral while promoting the 
beneficial role of repo in providing ‘good liquidity’ with ‘safe’ collateral. The 
dissertation does not recommend an ‘all-or-nothing’ approach to repo 
transactions but maintains that the increased risk inherent in the underlying 
collateral, securitized or other complex instruments, must be segregated from 
traditional ‘safe’ collateral. Repo transactions were, and will continue, to remain 
a vital source of short-term funding for banks and the ‘good liquidity’ provided 
by repo transactions with ‘safe’ collateral should be preserved as the key source 
of liquidity for financial institutions. 
Limitations and Recommendations for Future Research
The primary limitation of this dissertation pertains to the empirical strategy. An 
extensive empirical analysis could not be undertaken to assess the causal impact 
of Basel Accords on bank involvement in securitized banking due to the 
unavailability of transaction level repo data. Historical data on repos was either 
not collected or the information required could not be accessed under 
information protection laws. Therefore, a descriptive empirical strategy was 
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chosen, which used proxy data variables to reflect the potential for these 
transactions and demonstrate bank involvement in securitized banking. Thus, 
the data trends do not show genuine presence (or absence) of securitized 
banking and there might be other driving factors influencing the trends. Similar
limitations were also present in the analysis of Basel implementation in EMEs. 
Due to informational limitations (unavailability of historical data and 
regulations) and language barriers (inability to access required data), some 
countries could not be examined and hence, a complete overview of the impact 
of Basel implementation in EMEs could not be provided.
There are also several aspects of Basel Accords and securitized banking that 
could not be incorporated in this dissertation and can form the basis for future 
research. Some recommendations are below:
i. Differentiating between different types of securitized instruments for 
use as collateral in repo. This will shed light on whether only certain 
types of securitized instruments were considered safe by market 
participants. 
ii. Extent of securitized banking within the shadow banking system. This 
will highlight the use of securitized banking by other financial 
institutions besides banks as repo transactions are the main source of 
short-term funding for shadow banks. Moreover, it will illustrate the 
complex financial linkages created between different financial 
institutions in different financial markets.
iii. Securitized banking within the universal banking model. Evaluating 
whether segregation of securitized banking between commercial 
banking and investment banking is economically efficient. For instance, 
segregation can restrict the commercial banking arm to use only safe 
collateral while the investment banking arm can undertake the risky 
transactions with securitized and innovative instruments.
iv. Inclusion of EMEs as Basel Committee member states. EMEs are now 
actively involved in the standard setting process and future research can 
illustrate whether the Basel standards now accommodate and 
incorporate the different financial systems of EMEs. 
v. Basel implementation and enforcement. This can shed light on the 
differences in bank behaviour when agreement is reached on the 
timeline of Basel implementation and after they are enforced within 
national laws.
  
178
  
179
Appendices
Appendix I: The Basel Accords
Appendix II: Applicable risk weights under the Basel Accords
Appendix III: SOUTH AFRICA – Basel Timeline
Appendix IV: MALAYSIA – Basel Timeline
Appendix V: SOUTH AFRICA – Applicable risk weights
Appendix VI: MALAYSIA – Applicable risk weights
  
180
 181
N
ot
e:
 T
he
 a
rr
ow
s c
or
re
sp
on
d 
to
 th
e 
in
te
nd
ed
 d
at
e 
of
 im
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
B
as
el
 A
cc
or
ds
 b
y 
m
em
be
r s
ta
te
s i
n 
th
ei
r n
at
io
na
l l
eg
is
la
tio
n.
 F
or
 e
xa
m
pl
e,
 
th
e 
B
as
el
 I 
A
cc
or
d 
fo
rm
ul
at
ed
 in
 1
98
8 
w
as
 d
ue
 to
 b
e 
im
pl
em
en
te
d 
by
 1
99
2.
 T
he
se
 st
an
da
rd
s w
er
e 
in
 fo
rc
e 
un
til
 th
ey
 w
er
e 
su
pe
rs
ed
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
im
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n
of
 su
bs
eq
ue
nt
 B
as
el
 A
cc
or
ds
.A
pp
en
di
x 
I:
 T
he
 B
as
el
 A
cc
or
ds
  
182
183
Appendix II: Applicable risk weights under the Basel Accords
I. Pre-Crisis Basel Accords
(a) Banking Book (Basel I)
1. Asset-backed Security: Risk weight 20%1
1.1. Claims on banks incorporated in the OECD and claims guaranteed by OECD 
incorporated banks.
1.2. Claims on securities firms incorporated in the OECD subject to comparable 
supervisory and regulatory arrangements, including in particular risk-based 
capital requirements, and claims guaranteed by these securities firms.
2. Repo: Risk weight 20%2
2.1. Sale and repurchase agreements and asset sales with recourse, where the credit 
risk remains with the bank are assigned a credit conversion factor (CCF) of 
100%.
2.2. These items are to be weighted according to the type of asset and not 
according to the type of counterparty with whom the transaction has been 
entered into. The applicable risk weight corresponds to that for an asset-
backed security.
(b) Trading Book (Market Risk Amendment)
1. Asset-backed Security: Risk weight 0.25 - 14.10%
1.1. Specific Risk (0.25 – 1.60%)3: Qualifying category including securities that 
are rated investment grade by authorized credit rating agencies. Risk weights 
vary according to residual term to maturity.
1.2. General Risk (0 – 12.50%)4: This calculation applies to the securities positions 
in the entire trading book. Under the maturity method, risk weights for debt 
securities correspond to their coupon payments and residual term to maturity. 
1.3. Specific risk capital charges for an investment grade and a non-investment 
grade securitization exposure under the standardised approach:
                                                          
1 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), ‘International Convergence of Capital 
Measurement and Capital Standards (Basel I)’ (1998) annex 2.
2 ibid annex 3, 4. ft 1.
3 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), ‘Amendment to the Capital Accord 
to Incorporate Market Risks’ (1996) pt A, sec A.1.I, 4-6.
4 ibid pt A, sec A.1.II, 8-12.
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Qualifying Category: Investment Grade (AAA to BBB)
Residual term to maturity
less than 6
months
between 6 and 
24 months
greater than 
24 months
Specific Risk weight 0.25% 1.00% 1.60%
General Risk weight 0% - 0.4% 0.70 – 1.25% 1.25-12.50%
Minimum Total Market Risk 0.25% 1.70% 2.85%
Maximum Total Market Risk 0.65% 2.25% 14.10%
Other Category: Non-Investment Grade (BB and below)
Residual term to maturity
less than 6 
months
between 6 and 
24 months
greater than 
24 months
Specific Risk weight 8.00% 8.00% 8.00%
General Risk weight 0% - 0.4% 0.70 – 1.25% 1.25-12.50%
Minimum Total Market Risk 8.00% 8.70% 9.25%
Maximum Total Market Risk 8.40% 9.25% 20.25%
2. Repo: Risk weight 0.25 - 14.10%
2.1. A security which is the subject of a repurchase or securities lending agreement 
will be treated as if it were still owned by the lender of the security, i.e., it will 
be treated in the same manner as other securities positions.5 (The applicable 
risk weight corresponds to that for an asset-backed security)
II. Post-Crisis Basel Accords
(a) Banking Book (Basel II)
1. Asset-backed Security (AAA to AA-/A-1/P-1): Risk weight 20% under the 
Securitization Framework
1.1. Retained or repurchased securitization exposures needed to be accounted for 
in regulatory capital.6
1.2. Risk weights are determined dependent on the credit ratings of the securitized 
tranches. Long-term ratings range from AAA – BB+ with risk weights of 20 
- 350% and short-term ratings range from A-1/P-1 – A-3/P-3 with risk weights 
of 20 - 100% respectively.7
                                                          
5 ibid pt A, sec A.1.1, ft 9.
6 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), ‘International Convergence of Capital 
Measurement and Capital Standards (Basel II)’ (2006) pt 2, sec IV.D.1.560.
7 ibid pt 2, sec IV.D.3.(ii).567.
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2. Repo: Risk weight < 20% under the Credit Risk Mitigation Framework
2.1. Where banks take eligible financial collateral, they are allowed to reduce their 
credit exposure to a counterparty when calculating their capital requirements 
to take account of the risk mitigating effect of the collateral.8
2.2. Banks may opt for either the simple approach (subject to a 20% floor) or for 
the comprehensive approach, which allows fuller offset of collateral against 
exposures, by effectively reducing the exposure amount by the value ascribed 
to the collateral.9
2.3. The comprehensive approach recognised the risk mitigating effect of
collateral by calculating the adjusted credit exposure, which was then assigned 
a corresponding counterparty risk weight, as below:10
ܴܹܣ௔௙௧௘௥ ௥௜௦௞ ௠௜௧௜௚௔௧௜௢௡ = ܧכ௔ௗ௝௨௦௧௘ௗ ௘௫௣௢௦௨௥௘ כ  ܴ ௖ܹ௢௨௡௧௘௥௣௔௥௧௬
ܧכ௔ௗ௝௨௦௧௘ௗ ௘௫௣௢௦௨௥௘ = max{0, [ܧ(1 + ܪ௘)െ ܥ൫1െܪ஼ െ ܪ௙௫൯]}
Where: E = current value of the exposure, He = haircut appropriate to exposure, C = 
the value of the collateral received, Hc = haircut appropriate to collateral, Hfx = haircut 
appropriate for currency mismatch between collateral and exposure
2.4. Standard supervisory haircuts range from zero (cash) to 25% (non-main index 
equities) where those for debt securities depend on their issue rating, residual 
maturity and type of issuer (sovereigns, banks or corporates).11
2.5. Example of the calculation of risk-weighted assets for a repo transaction under 
different collateral scenarios, with an exposure and collateral amount of 9.8 
million and 10 million respectively, without any currency mismatch, are as 
follows:
Where: E = 9.8 million, C = 10 million, He = 2%, Hfx = 0%, ܴ ௖ܹ௢௨௡௧௘௥௣௔௥௧௬ = 20%
(banks and securities firms with highest credit rating)12
(i) Collateral: AAA asset-backed security, residual maturity less than 1 year (Hc=1%)
ܴܹܣ௥௜௦௞ ௠௜௧௜௚௔௧௜௢௡ = {9.8(1 + 0.02)െ 10(1െ 0.01)} כ 20% ൎ  0.02݉݊
                                                          
8 ibid pt 2, sec II, D.2.(i).120 & D.3.(i).
9 ibid pt 2, sec II.D.2.(i).121. 
10 ibid, pt 2, sec II, D.3.(ii).147-8.
11 ibid pt 2, sec II.D.3.(ii).151.
12 ibid pt 2, sec II.A.4 & 5.
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(ii) Collateral: AAA rated asset-backed security, residual maturity greater than 5 years 
(Hc=8%) 
ܴܹܣ௥௜௦௞ ௠௜௧௜௚௔௧௜௢௡ =  {9.8(1 + 0.02)െ 10(1െ 0.08)} כ 20% ൎ  0.16݉݊
(iii) Collateral: Non-investment grade (BB) rated junk bond issued by sovereigns 
(Hc=15%)
ܴܹܣ௥௜௦௞ ௠௜௧௜௚௔௧௜௢௡ =  {9.8(1 + 0.02)െ 10(1െ 0.15)} כ 20% ൎ  0.3݉݊
(iv) Collateral: Non-investment grade (BB) rated junk bond issued by non-sovereign 
entities (not eligible collateral)
ܴܹܣ = ܧݔ݌݋ݏݑݎ݁ כ  ܴ ௖ܹ௢௨௡௧௘௥௣௔௥௧௬ = 9.8 ݉݊ כ  20% =  1.96 ݉݊
Therefore, the total counterparty credit risk charge (RWA/original exposure) in all the 
scenarios with eligible financial collateral is much lower than the 20% charge without 
risk mitigation. Due to the range of possible scenarios, it suffices to say that under the 
risk mitigation framework, the adjusted exposure will be lower than the original, 
implying that the total credit risk charge must be lower than 20%.
(b) Trading Book (Basel 2.5)
1. Asset-backed Security (AAA to AA-/A-1/P-1): Risk weight > 20% under the 
Securitization Framework
1.1. For securitised products, the capital charges of the banking book will apply 
and the standardised measurement method will in general be applied to these 
products.13
1.2. The specific risk of securitisation positions which are held in the trading book 
is to be calculated according to the method used for such positions in the 
banking book unless specified otherwise. To that effect, the risk weight has to 
be calculated and applied to the net positions in securitisation instruments in 
the trading book.14
The applicable risk weights are similar to those under the securitization framework in 
the banking book i.e. 20% for a high credit rating securitization exposure. However, 
the new trading book regime applies an additional specific risk charge to the net 
positions in the security. Therefore, the overall risk weight is likely to be greater than 
20% for the securitisation portfolio but the precise calculation is beyond the scope of 
this thesis.
                                                          
13 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), ‘Revisions to the Basel II Market 
Risk Framework’ (2009) 1. & I.9.
14 ibid IV.18.712(iii).
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2. Repo: Risk weight < 20% under the Credit Risk Mitigation Framework
2.1. Banks may operate only under the comprehensive approach in the trading 
book which will be applied to OTC derivatives and repo transactions.15
2.2. Regardless of where they are booked, all repo-style transactions are subject to 
a banking book counterparty credit risk charge.16
2.3. Banks will be required to calculate the counterparty credit risk charge for OTC 
derivatives, repo-style and other transactions booked in the trading book, 
separate from the capital charge for general market risk and specific risk. The 
risk weights to be used in this calculation must be consistent with those used 
for calculating the capital requirements in the banking book.17 (The applicable 
risk weight calculation is similar to that for a banking book repo transaction 
using the comprehensive approach)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
                                                          
15 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), ‘International Convergence of 
Capital Measurement and Capital Standards (Basel II)’ pt 2, sec II, D.1.(ii).112 & D.2.(i).121.
16 ibid pt 2, sec VI.A.1.689.(iii).
17 ibid pt 2, sec VI.A.4.702.
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Appendix V: SOUTH AFRICA – Applicable risk weights
I. Pre-Crisis Basel Accords
(a) Banking Book (Regulations Relating to Banks - Basel I)
1. Asset-backed Security: Risk weight 20%1
1.1. Transactions with and assets issued by banks and securities firms incorporated 
in the Republic of South Africa and OECD countries.
2. Repo: Risk weight 20% 
2.1. Investments in securities issued by a special purpose vehicle in terms of a 
securitisation scheme shall attract the risk weighting applicable to the 
underlying asset securitised.2
2.2. When loans, advances, leasing transactions, suspensive sale transactions, off
balance sheet lending transactions, counterparty risk exposures and large 
exposures are – (b) secured by the pledge of assets that attract a lower risk 
weighting than the transactions or exposures themselves, the risk weightings 
applicable to the assets pledged shall apply.3 (The applicable risk weight 
corresponds to that for an asset-backed security)
(b) Trading Book (CAR for banks trading activities - Market Risk 
Amendment)
1. Asset-backed Security:
1.1. A bank may enter into transactions included in the trading book of a bank with 
a special purpose institution under certain conditions. If the conditions are 
met, the provisions of CAR for banks trading activities shall apply to such 
transactions.4
                                                          
1 Regulations Relating to Banks (8 November 2000), ch II, Regulation 21, (9).
2 ibid ch II, Regulation 16, (6).
3 ibid ch II, Regulation 21, (14), 6-9 (b).
4 Securitisation Schemes (13 December 2001), 9 (a)-(b). 
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Simplified Approach (Basel I): Capital Requirement 10.00 - 30.00%5
LOAN STOCK6
Marketable securities issued by other parties
Residual term 
to maturity Less than 1 year Less than 3 years More than 3 years
Required 
Capital 10% of MV 20% of MV 30% of MV
Building - Block Approach (Standardised Approach): Risk weight 0.25 - 14.10%
1.2. Specific Risk (0.25 – 1.60%)7: Qualifying category includes all loan stock 
listed on the Bond Market Exchange, or any other financial exchange listed 
loan stock approved by the Financial Services Board. Risk weights vary 
according to residual term to maturity.
1.3. General Risk (0-12.50%)8: This calculation applies to the securities positions 
in the entire trading book. Under the maturity method, risk weights for debt 
securities correspond to their coupon payments and residual term to maturity.
1.4. Capital charges for a listed asset-backed security under the building-block 
approach:
Qualifying Category (LISTED on Bond Market Exchange)
Residual term to 
maturity
less than 6 
months
between 6 and 
24 months
greater than 24 
months
Specific Risk weight 0.25% 1.00% 1.60%
General Risk weight 0% - 0.40% 0.70-1.25% 1.25-12.50%
Minimum Total Market 
Risk 0.25% 1.70% 2.85%
Maximum Total Market 
Risk 0.65% 2.25% 14.10%
2. Repo: Risk weight < 20%9
2.1. The counterparty-risk requirement shall be calculated by multiplying the 
counterparty exposure by the counterparty risk weight i.e. Risk-weighted 
Assets (RWA) = Exposure x Counterparty risk weight.
                                                          
5 CAR for banks trading activities in financial instruments (21 August 1998) & as amended (5 
October 2001), ch 4, Regulation 14 (Method 1) Table 3.
6 Loan stock refers to financial instruments (including debt securities) which evidence the 
existence of a debt between a borrower (issuer) and one or more lenders. 
7 CAR for banks trading activities in financial instruments (21 August 1998) & as amended (5 
October 2001) ch 4, Regulation 15 (Method 2) Table 4.
8 ibid ch 4, Regulation 15 (Method 2) Table 5.
9 ibid ch 5, Regulation 21 Table 11.
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Exposure
Qualifying debt instruments
Market Value less 105% of related 
funds or collateral
Other securities notional value
Notional Value less 110% of related 
funds or collateral
Counterparty Risk Weight
Transactions settled through exchange 10%
Banks in RSA and OECD countries 20%
Other counterparty 100%
Since exposure takes into account the risk mitigating effect of collateral, only the 
uncollateralized portion of the repo transaction will be subject to risk weight 
calculation. The counterparty risk weight applicable for repo transactions between 
banks is 20%. Due to the range of possible scenarios, it suffices to say that the total 
credit risk charge (RWA/original exposure) will be lower than 20%.
II. Post-Crisis Basel Accords
(a) Banking Book (Regulations Relating to Banks - Basel II)
1. Asset-backed Security (AAA to AA-/A-1/P-1): Risk weight 20%
1.1. Risk weights are dependent on the credit ratings of the securitized tranches. 
Long-term ratings range from AAA – BB+ with risk weights of 20 - 350% 
and short-term ratings range from A-1/P-1 – A-3/P-3 with risk weights of 20 
- 100% respectively.10
2. Repo: Risk weight < 20% - Credit Risk Mitigation 
2.1. Banks may opt for either the simple approach (subject to a 20% floor) or for 
the comprehensive approach, which allows fuller offset of collateral against 
exposures, by effectively reducing the exposure amount by the value ascribed 
to the collateral.11
2.2. The comprehensive approach recognised the risk mitigating effect of 
collateral by calculating the adjusted credit exposure, which was then assigned 
a corresponding counterparty risk weight, as below:12
ܴܹܣ௔௙௧௘௥ ௥௜௦௞ ௠௜௧௜௚௔௧௜௢௡ = ܧכ௔ௗ௝௨௦௧௘ௗ ௘௫௣௢௦௨௥௘ כ  ܴ ௖ܹ௢௨௡௧௘௥௣௔௥௧௬
                                                          
10 Regulations Relating to banks (15 December 2011), ch II, Regulation 23, (h)(i) Table 3.
11 ibid ch II, Regulation 23, 7(b)(v) and 9(b)(i).
12 ibid ch II, Regulation 23, 9(b)(viii)(A).
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ܧכ௔ௗ௝௨௦௧௘ௗ ௘௫௣௢௦௨௥௘ = max{0, [ܧ(1 + ܪ௘)െ ܥ൫1െܪ஼ െ ܪ௙௫൯]}
Where: E = current value of the exposure, He = haircut appropriate to exposure, C = 
the value of the collateral received, Hc = haircut appropriate to collateral, Hfx = haircut 
appropriate for currency mismatch between collateral and exposure
2.3. Standard supervisory haircuts range from zero (cash) to 25% (non-main index 
equities) where those for debt securities depend on their issue rating, residual 
maturity and type of issuer (sovereigns, banks or corporates).13
2.4. Example of the calculation of risk-weighted assets for a repo transaction under 
different collateral scenarios, with an exposure and collateral amount of 9.8 
million and 10 million respectively, without any currency mismatch, are as 
follows:
Where: E = 9.8 million, C = 10 million, He = 2%, Hfx = 0%, ܴ ௖ܹ௢௨௡௧௘௥௣௔௥௧௬ = 20%
(banks and securities firms with highest credit rating)14
(i) Collateral: AAA rated asset-backed security, residual maturity less than 1 year 
(Hc=1%)
ܴܹܣ௥௜௦௞ ௠௜௧௜௚௔௧௜௢௡ = {9.8(1 + 0.02)െ 10(1െ 0.01)} כ 20% ൎ  0.02݉݊
(ii) Collateral: AAA rated asset-backed security, residual maturity greater than 5 years 
(Hc=8%) 
ܴܹܣ௥௜௦௞ ௠௜௧௜௚௔௧௜௢௡ =  {9.8(1 + 0.02)െ 10(1െ 0.08)} כ 20% ൎ  0.16݉݊
Therefore, the total counterparty credit risk charge (RWA/original exposure) in all the 
scenarios with eligible financial collateral is much lower than the 20% charge without 
risk mitigation. Due to the range of possible scenarios, it suffices to say that under the 
risk mitigation framework, the adjusted exposure will be lower than the original, 
implying that the total credit risk charge must be lower than 20%.
(b) Trading Book (Regulations Relating to Banks - Basel 2.5)
1. Asset-backed Security (AAA to AA-/A-1/P-1): Risk weight > 20% 
1.1. A bank that adopted the standardised approach for the measurement of the
bank's exposure to market risk shall in the case of a securitisation exposure 
calculate the bank's specific risk capital requirement in accordance with those 
applied in the banking book. Moreover, an additional specific risk weight is 
applicable to externally rated net securitization positions.15
                                                          
13 ibid ch II, Regulation 23, 9(b)(xi) Table 11.
14 ibid ch II, Regulation 23, 8(a) Table 9.
15 ibid ch II, Regulation 28, 7(b)(ii)(C).
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The applicable risk weights are similar to those in the banking book i.e. 20% for a high 
credit rating securitization exposure. However, the new trading book regime applies an 
additional specific risk charge to the net positions in the security. Therefore, the overall 
risk weight is likely to be greater than 20% for the securitisation portfolio but the 
precise calculation is beyond the scope of this thesis.
2. Repo: Risk weight < 20% - Credit Risk Mitigation
2.1. For bank exposures to credit risk secured by the pledge of eligible financial 
collateral, banks may operate only under the comprehensive approach in the 
trading book.16
2.2. Banks will be required to calculate the counterparty credit risk charge for repo 
transactions booked in the trading book by using the comprehensive approach 
to credit risk mitigation, consistent with those under the same approach in the 
banking book.17 (The applicable risk weight calculation is similar to that for 
a banking book repo transaction using the comprehensive approach)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
16 ibid ch II, Regulation 23, 9(b)(i).
17 ibid ch II, Regulation 28, 6(i).
  
198
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
199
Appendix VI: MALAYSIA – Applicable risk weights
I. Pre-Crisis Basel Accords
(a) Banking Book (Capital Adequacy Framework - Basel I)
1. Asset-backed Security: Risk weight 20% 
1.1. Claims (all maturities) on, securities issued by licensed banking institutions in 
Malaysia (including branches of foreign banking institutions operating in 
Malaysia).1
2. Repo: Risk weight 20% 
2.1. Claims (all maturities) collateralised by securities issued by licensed banking 
institutions in Malaysia (including branches of foreign banking institutions 
operating in Malaysia). This includes repo transactions with instruments with 
licensed banking institutions, which are treated as collateralised loans.2 (The 
applicable risk weight corresponds to that for an asset-backed security)
(b) Trading Book (Capital Adequacy Framework - Market Risk Amendment)
1. Asset-backed Security: Risk weight 0.25 – 9.60%
1.1. Specific Risk (0.25 – 1.60%)3: Financial institutions category includes interest 
rate related financial instruments issued and guaranteed by licensed banking
institutions.
1.2. General Risk (0-8.00%)4: This calculation applies to the securities positions 
in the entire trading book. Under the maturity method, risk weights for debt 
securities correspond to their coupon payments and residual term to maturity.
1.3. Capital charges for a highly rated asset-backed security issued by a licensed 
banking institution:   
Financial Institutions Category
Residual term to 
maturity
less than 6 
months
between 6 and 
24 months
greater than 24 
months
Specific Risk weight 0.25% 1.00% 1.60%
General Risk weight 0% - 0.50% 0.80-1.30% 1.90-8.00%
Minimum Total Market 
Risk 0.25% 1.80% 3.50%
Maximum Total Market 
Risk 0.75% 2.30% 9.60%
                                                          
1 Capital adequacy framework (Basel I – Risk-weighted Assets Computation), Part B, 4.3.
2 ibid pt B, 4.3.
3 ibid pt C, 11.2, Table 4.
4 ibid pt C, 11.3, Table 5.
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2. Repo: Risk weight 0.25 – 9.60%
2.1. Repo transactions are treated in the same manner as other securities positions
i.e. they are subject to a specific and general market risk requirement. (The 
applicable risk weight corresponds to that for an asset-backed security)5
II. Post-Crisis Basel Accords
(a) Banking Book (Capital Adequacy Framework - Basel II)
1. Asset-backed Security (AAA to AA-/A-1/P-1): Risk weight 20%
1.1. Risk weights are dependent on the credit ratings of the securitized tranches. 
Long-term ratings range from AAA – BB+ with risk weights of 20 - 350% 
and short-term ratings range from A-1/P-1 – A-3/P-3 with risk weights of 20 
- 100% respectively.6
2. Repo: Risk weight < 20% - Credit Risk Mitigation 
2.1. Banks may opt for either the simple approach (subject to a 20% floor) or for 
the comprehensive approach, which allows fuller offset of collateral against 
exposures, by effectively reducing the exposure amount by the value ascribed 
to the collateral.7
2.2. The comprehensive approach recognised the risk mitigating effect of 
collateral by calculating the adjusted credit exposure, which was then assigned 
a corresponding counterparty risk weight, as below:8
ܴܹܣ௔௙௧௘௥ ௥௜௦௞ ௠௜௧௜௚௔௧௜௢௡ = ܧכ௔ௗ௝௨௦௧௘ௗ ௘௫௣௢௦௨௥௘ כ  ܴ ௖ܹ௢௨௡௧௘௥௣௔௥௧௬
ܧכ௔ௗ௝௨௦௧௘ௗ ௘௫௣௢௦௨௥௘ = max{0, [ܧ(1 + ܪ௘)െ ܥ൫1െܪ஼ െ ܪ௙௫൯]}
Where: E = current value of the exposure, He = haircut appropriate to exposure, C = 
the value of the collateral received, Hc = haircut appropriate to collateral, Hfx = haircut 
appropriate for currency mismatch between collateral and exposure
2.3. Standard supervisory haircuts range from zero (cash) to 25% (non-main index 
equities) where those for debt securities depend on their issue rating, residual 
maturity and type of issuer (sovereigns, banks or corporates).9
2.4. Example of the calculation of risk-weighted assets for a repo transaction under 
different collateral scenarios, with an exposure and collateral amount of 9.8 
                                                          
5 ibid pt C, 11.4, Table 8.
6 Capital adequacy framework (Basel II – Risk-weighted Assets), Part F, F.3.1, Appendix III.
7 ibid pt B, B.2.5, 2.95 & 2.108.
8 ibid pt B, B.2.5, 2.118.
9 ibid pt B, B.2.5, 2.119.
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million and 10 million respectively, without any currency mismatch, are as 
follows:
Where: E = 9.8 million, C = 10 million, He = 2%, Hfx = 0%, ܴ ௖ܹ௢௨௡௧௘௥௣௔௥௧௬ = 20%
(banks and securities firms with highest credit rating)10
(i) Collateral: AAA rated asset-backed security, residual maturity less than 1 year 
(Hc=1%)
ܴܹܣ௥௜௦௞ ௠௜௧௜௚௔௧௜௢௡ = {9.8(1 + 0.02)െ 10(1െ 0.01)} כ 20% ൎ  0.02݉݊
(ii) Collateral: AAA rated asset-backed security, residual maturity greater than 5 years 
(Hc=8%) 
ܴܹܣ௥௜௦௞ ௠௜௧௜௚௔௧௜௢௡ =  {9.8(1 + 0.02)െ 10(1െ 0.08)} כ 20% ൎ  0.16݉݊
Therefore, the total counterparty credit risk charge (RWA/original exposure) in all the 
scenarios with eligible financial collateral is much lower than the 20% charge without 
risk mitigation. Due to the range of possible scenarios, it suffices to say that under the 
risk mitigation framework, the adjusted exposure will be lower than the original, 
implying that the total credit risk charge must be lower than 20%.
(b) Trading Book (Capital Adequacy Framework - Basel II)
1. Asset-backed Security: Risk weight 0.25 – 19.40%
1.1. Specific Risk (0.25 – 3.00%)11: Securitization exposures are subject to a 
specific risk capital charge, dependant on credit ratings. 
1.2. General Risk (0-16.40%)12: This calculation applies to the securities positions 
in the entire trading book. Under the maturity method, risk weights for debt 
securities correspond to their coupon payments and residual term to maturity. 
1.3. Capital charges for a highly rated asset-backed security (Non-G10 issuers):
Corporates & Securitizations Category
Residual term to 
maturity
less than 6 
months
between 6 and 24 
months
greater than 24 
months
Specific Risk weight 0.25% 1.00 - 2.00% 1.60 – 3.00%
General Risk weight 0% - 0.50% 0.80-1.30% 1.90-16.40%
Minimum Total Market 
Risk 0.25% 1.80% 3.50%
Maximum Total Market 
Risk 0.75% 3.30% 19.40%
                                                          
10 ibid pt B, B.2.2, Appendix III.
11 ibid pt D, D.2.1, 5.51, Table 2.
12 ibid pt D, D.2.1, 5.65, Table 3.
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2. Repo: Risk weight < 20% - Credit Risk Mitigation
2.1. For bank exposures to credit risk secured by the pledge of eligible financial 
collateral, banks may operate only under the comprehensive approach in the 
trading book.13 Banks will be required to calculate the counterparty credit risk 
charge for repo transactions booked in the trading book by using the 
comprehensive approach to credit risk mitigation, consistent with those under 
the same approach in the banking book.14 (The applicable risk weight 
calculation is similar to that for a banking book repo transaction using the 
comprehensive approach)
                                                          
13 ibid pt B, B.2.5, 2.97.
14 ibid pt B, B.2.5, 2.96-2.97.
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Executive Summary
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2007-09, bank involvement in 
securitized banking gained considerable attention and is claimed to be one of 
the main sources of the crisis. Securitized banking is the use of securitized 
instruments as collateral in repo transactions, which allowed financial
institutions to borrow money from each other for very short periods of time. The 
crisis highlighted the shortcomings of global financial regulation and the failure 
of banks and regulators to incorporate the risks from securitized banking in 
capital regulation.
The dissertation assesses the role of international capital regulation – the Basel 
Accords, in encouraging bank involvement in securitized banking. Emphasis is 
on the presence of regulatory capital arbitrage, which refers to strategies by 
which regulated financial institutions evade capital requirements. The 
dissertation conducts a legal analysis of the Basel Accords to evaluate the 
underlying incentives and their impact on bank involvement in securitized 
banking.
The introduction sets the stage for the dissertation and is followed by the first 
two chapters, which provide a theoretical overview of securitized banking and 
summarize the current literature in this regard. Chapter 1 focuses on the 
functioning and motivation behind bank involvement in securitized banking. 
Chapter 2 highlights the key literature, focusing on the negative externalities 
from private liquidity creation through securitized banking and elaborates on 
the shortcomings of the financial regulatory framework visible after the crisis.
These chapters are followed by an analysis of the preceding Basel Accords to 
evaluate the role of regulation in incentivising bank involvement in securitized 
banking. Chapter 3 is an analysis of the pre-crisis Basel Accords to identify the 
presence of regulatory arbitrage and Chapter 4 assesses the effectiveness of the 
post-crisis Basel Accords in eliminating any arbitrage opportunities. Both 
chapters find the presence of significant adverse incentives that encouraged 
banks to engage in securitized banking. The finding regarding capital arbitrage 
is vital, as this made securitized banking an inexpensive source of funding for 
banks.
Chapter 5 focuses on the implementation of the Basel Accords in Emerging 
Economies (EMEs) to determine whether global implementation also 
transposed the incentives inherent in these Accords, thereby encouraging 
similar bank behavior. The findings of this chapter illustrate that EMEs, both 
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Basel Committee member and non-member states, were similarly affected by 
Basel implementation and transposed the adverse incentives inherent in the 
Basel Accords.
Chapter 6 evaluates the effectiveness of the current Basel regime in eliminating 
the previous adverse incentives and also assesses whether it continues to 
incentivise banks to engage in securitized banking. The chapter finds that 
although the current Basel regime has made significant improvements to 
overcome the previous weaknesses, the adverse incentives for bank 
involvement in securitized banking still persist. This chapter also provides 
policy implications and recommends higher capital requirements for securitized 
banking and repo transactions with other innovative collateral to restrict the 
growth of instruments with complex risks which can lead to instability in 
financial markets. The dissertation concludes with a summary of the research 
findings and suggestions for future research.
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Samenvatting
In de nasleep van de wereldwijde financiële crisis van 2007-2009 kreeg de 
betrokkenheid van banken in securitisatiemarkten uitgebreide aandacht. In 
securitisatietransacties worden gesecuritiseerde vorderingen gebruikt als 
onderpand in repo-transacties, wat het voor financiële instellingen mogelijk 
maakte om voor korte periodes geld van elkaar te lenen. De crisis vestigde de 
aandacht op de tekortkomingen van financiële regulering wereldwijd en de 
nalatigheid van banken en toezichthouders om de risico’s van securitisatie te 
integreren in de kapitaalregulering.
In deze dissertatie wordt onderzocht wat de rol is van internationale 
kapitaalregulering – meer specifiek de de Bazel-akkoorden – in het bevorderen 
van de deelname van banken aan securitisatietransacties. Het accent ligt daarbij 
op de aanwezigheid van financiële reguleringsarbitrage, wat verwijst naar 
strategieën waarmee gereguleerde financiële instellingen kapitaalvereisten 
omzeilen. De Bazel-akkoorden worden vanuit een juridisch perspectief 
geanalyseerd teneinde de onderliggende prikkels en de invloed daarvan op de 
betrokkenheid van banken bij securitisatie te evalueren.
Na een inleiding waarin de toon wordt gezet voor de dissertatie, volgen de eerste 
twee hoofdstukken die een theoretisch overzicht geven van gesecuritiseerd 
bankieren en een samenvatting van de actuele literatuur over dit onderwerp. 
Hoofdstuk 1 richt zich op de wijze waarop banken betrokken zijn in 
securitisatietransacties en wat hun motivatie is. Hoofdstuk 2 belicht relevante 
literatuur, waarbij de nadruk ligt op de negatieve externe effecten van het 
creëren van liquiditeit door securitisatietransacties in de private sector. Ook 
wordt een uitwerking gegeven van de tekortkomingen van het financiële 
reguleringskader, die zichtbaar werden na de crisis.
Deze hoofdstukken worden gevolgd door een analyse van de genoemde Bazel-
akkoorden, om de rol van regulering in het bevorderen van betrokkenheid van 
banken in securitisatie te evalueren. In hoofdstuk 3 worden de Bazel-akkoorden 
van voor de crisis geanalyseerd om de aanwezigheid van mogelijkheden tot 
toezichtarbitrage op te sporen, en in hoofdstuk 4 wordt de effectiviteit van de 
Bazel-akkoorden van na de crisis in het elimineren van mogelijkheden tot 
arbitrage beoordeeld. Beide hoofdstukken signaleren de aanwezigheid van 
negatieve prikkels die banken hebben aangemoedigd om zich bezig te houden 
met securitisatie. De uitkomst met betrekking tot financiële arbitrage is cruciaal, 
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omdat deze gesecuritiseerd bankieren maakt tot een goedkope manier om 
kapitaal te verwerven.
Hoofdstuk 5 richt zich op de implementatie van de Bazel-akkoorden in 
opkomende economieën (Emerging Economies, EMEs), om vast te stellen in 
hoeverre wereldwijd dezelfde prikkels zijn overgebracht en soortgelijk gedrag 
van banken is aangemoedigd. De uitkomsten in dit hoofdstuk laten zien dat 
EMEs, leden en niet-leden van het Bazelse Comité, op dezelfde manier zijn 
beïnvloed door de implementatie van de Bazel-akkoorden en de daaraan 
inherente negatieve prikkels.
Hoofdstuk 6 evalueert de effectiviteit van het huidige Bazel-regime in het 
elimineren van de eerder aanwezige negatieve prikkels en onderzoekt of het 
banken nog steeds aanmoedigt om zich bezig te houden met 
securitisatietransacties. De bevinding in dit hoofdstuk is dat, hoewel het huidige 
Bazel-regime aanzienlijke verbeteringen laat zien met betrekking tot het 
elimineren van de eerdere zwakheden, er nog steeds negatieve prikkels 
aanwezig zijn voor banken met betrekking tot gesecuritiseerde transacties. 
Daarnaast benoemt dit hoofdstuk beleidsimplicaties, en wordt de aanbeveling 
gedaan om te komen tot hogere kapitaalvereisten voor securitisatie en repo-
transacties met andere innovatieve onderpanden, om de groei te beperken van 
instrumenten met complexe risico’s die kunnen leiden tot instabiliteit op de 
financiële markten. De dissertatie wordt afgesloten met een samenvatting van 
de onderzoeksresultaten en aanbevelingen voor toekomstig onderzoek.
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